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 ABSTRACT 
 
 The Japanese invasion of Malaya, and their later conquest of Singapore, was an event 
of significantly more political importance than was its strategic impact on the course of the 
war in the Far East.  The defeat of a sizeable British Imperial Military Force and the speed 
and humiliation with which it was inflicted, destroyed forever the icon of British invincibility 
and prestige. Some historians claim that this momentous affair was the catalyst that presaged 
the end of the British Empire.   
Following the costly First World War, Britain was stretched beyond its means, 
economically and militarily. Its diminishing ability to meet the diverse demands of a 
worldwide Empire were glaringly exposed. The failure to prepare Singapore for invasion was 
one manifestation of this bankruptcy. Moreover, when the Second World War erupted in 
Europe, the paucity of military support from London for the Far East theatre shrunk even 
more. The resultant loss of the „Island Fortress‟ to an Asian military invader destroyed 
forever the cultivated, centuries old image of British infallibility.   
The military failure of this campaign is a well-documented and closely examined 
episode. And while attention is often drawn to the role of the Colonial Governor and his staff 
during this period, the civil authorities participation has not been subjected to the same 
rigorous scrutiny. Quite evidently, they had a vital role to play in conjunction with the 
military to prepare the people and the country for a possible war. Their contribution to this 
task however, bordered on negligence.     
 In this dissertation I undertake a close examination of the role and the responsibilities 
of the colonial government both in the lead-up to the war and during it. I contend that the 
colonial government by pursuing different priorities, often demanded by Whitehall, 
needlessly created distraction and confusion. Moreover, the shamefully poor, even hostile, 
relations that developed between the local government and the British military hierarchy 
impeded a joint approach to the growing threat and affected the course of this campaign. 
Additionally, the tawdry management of civil defence matters led to unnecessary loss of 
civilian life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At 5.15 p.m. on 15 February 1942, at the Ford Motor Car Factory, sited on a 
prominent hill (Bukit Timah) in the centre of Singapore Island, the British and Japanese 
delegations met. They assembled in the relatively undamaged, bare and austere factory 
offices, to agree the terms of surrender of the British Forces.  The tall, spare and 
unprepossessing figure of the British Commander, Lieutenant General Arthur Percival, led 
the delegation of senior staff officers, all looking disconsolate. The iconic photograph 
recording this event shows the group arriving, looking incongruous in steel helmets and 
shorts, towering over their Japanese captors. The triumphant, short, pugnacious Japanese 
army commander, Lieutenant General Yamashita, was waiting for them.   The Governor, Sir 
Shenton Thomas, refused to attend this ceremony. He regarded the loss of Singapore as an 
ignominious military disaster and the military alone, therefore, should face the indignity of 
laying down their arms. He was not surrendering the Crown Colony.
1
 His resolve, to 
disassociate his government from the military failure was symptomatic of the poor civil-
military relationship, which had so dominated the campaign and inhibited a united war effort.   
His pretentious stand however, was a mere technical statement of no political significance. 
Thomas was a colonial officer of the old school and of limited ability. He was on his final 
posting before retirement and had wanted a quiet and uneventful conclusion. His bailiwick 
included Peninsula Malaya as well as Singapore and some outlying islands.  Throughout the 
campaign, he sought the least contentious solutions to serious issues of war preparations. He 
frequently ignored military advice, lacked resolve and equivocated. The demands of his 
colonial masters for ever-increasing production of the vital war commodities, rubber and tin, 
fixated him. He never seems to have thought to warn them of his quandary - that he could not 
simultaneously prepare the country for invasion and increase production. 
The fall of Singapore was the end of an era; British authority would never be the same 
again. The effect on world opinion of the loss of Singapore however, proved to be more 
serious than its effect upon the course of the war.
2
  Western power and authority was no 
longer secure and the relationship between the European and Asian peoples changed forever.  
                                                 
1
 Montgomery, Brian. Shenton of Singapore. Leo Cooper (in association with Secker & Warburg Ltd.) 
London.1984, p138.  It is interesting to contrast this standpoint with that taken by the Governor of Hong Kong, 
Sir Mark Young, who resisted military advice to surrender the Colony to the Japanese until it was clearly 
impossible to carry on and then insisted that he as Governor would surrender the Colony. 
2
 Thompson, Virginia. Postmortem on Malay. Macmillan NY, 1943. p vii. 
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In the minds of the indigenous peoples of Malaya and Singapore, for whose protection 
Britain was responsible, doubts arose. The first flaws appeared as early as ten days after the 
Japanese landings when the British hastily abandoned the island of Penang. Only the 
Europeans on the island had warning of the impending withdrawal and arrangements made 
for their departure. The Asian population were left to their own devices. The reaction from 
the local people was one of disbelief and astonishment. They were shocked at the apparent 
inability of the civilian administration to deal with the emergencies of war; of their display of 
racial selectivity and the failure to tell them honestly, what was happening.
3
 It also cast the 
European civilian population as a whole in a bewildering and damaging image, somewhat 
diminishing the existing relationship.  
Many have claimed that the population of Malaya was neither psychologically nor 
physically prepared for the ordeal that descended upon them, and importantly, despite endless 
pleadings from the military authorities for support, Britain proved powerless to avert.
4
 The 
revisionist theory is that the Colonial power should have either sent adequate forces from 
outside to avoid the disaster, or else the governing authorities should have given the 
indigenous population enough of a stake in the colony to make it worth their while to help 
defend British rule. The contemporary journalist, Virginia Thompson, has claimed, „the root 
of the evil lay in the purely economic form of imperialism which developed and which failed 
to weld the peoples of the country into a Malayan nation.‟5  
It is true that the colonial governance of Malaya focused on the exploitation of the 
country‟s natural resources rather than on preparing the nation for self-government.  On the 
other hand, there was no compelling reason to change the status quo.  The administration was 
working perfectly satisfactorily and created many benefits for the people. There was no 
predictable demand for change from a restless population and scant evidence of any strong 
nationalist desire. A little known Malay organisation Kesatuan Muda Melayu (League of 
Malay Youth) tried to arouse interest, but as will be discussed later, it had limited success.
6
   
Moreover, at no point throughout the period of British rule had there been even a hint of an 
external threat to the country‟s security, a condition, which might have forced the authorities 
to attempt to create a unified nation. Even so, in the light of subsequent events, it is doubtful 
that a united Malayan nation would have had any noticeable impact on the course of the 
                                                 
3
 Chew, E & Lee, E (eds) A History of Singapore. Singapore 1991. p117. 
4
 See for example case made by Sir George Sansom in the Foreword to Postmortem.   
5
 Ibid. See also Bayly, Christopher & Harper, Tim.. Forgotten Wars. Allen Lane, London, 2007. p10.  
6
 Bastin, John & Winks, Robin W. Malaysia, Selected Historical Reading‟s. Oxford University Press, 1966. 
P.294, Silcock & Ungku Abdul Aziz. “Malay Nationalist Movements”.  
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campaign.  Both the local inhabitants and the Colonial Office in London regarded this corner 
of South East Asia as a successful and peaceful backwater. That is not to say, however, that 
the question of self-determination did not arise. The authorities both in the country and in 
London debated the matter on a number of occasions, sometimes heatedly.  
The matter of governance was complex in that Britain‟s piecemeal expansion into 
Peninsular Malaya meant that by the 1930‟s the country consisted of autonomous and semi-
autonomous states. Before the late 19
th
 century, Britain largely practised a non-interventionist 
policy; her primary interest was its trading posts along the west coast, known as the Straits 
Settlements (Penang, Province Wellesley, Malacca and Singapore). Thereafter, several 
factors persuaded the British to play a more active role on the mainland, such as fluctuating 
supplies of raw materials, the Straits Settlements becoming increasingly dependent on the 
economy of the Malay states, and more frequent requests for assistance from state rulers to 
either resolve disputes or help them suppress internecine troubles. The outcome was a 
plethora of different agreements and relationships with individual states. Over time, it became 
clear that some form of rationalisation was needed. However, each state ruler, while 
accepting British advice, protection, progress and economic growth, showed little enthusiasm 
for centralised control. By the end of the 19
th
 century, however  Britain persuaded four 
contiguous and most lucrative states on the west coast
7
 to combine into a federation (The 
Federated Malay States, (FMS)) with Kuala Lumpur as its capital. The remaining states were 
classified as unfederated (UMS).   The important implication of this administrative medley 
was that the Governor in 1940 did not have the jurisdiction to impose nationwide commands.  
In the Straits Settlements he had absolute power, in the Federated States, limited authority 
and in the Unfederated States only an advisory role.  This meant that if matters arose which 
would clearly be beneficial countrywide, they had to undergo lengthy consultative processes 
with each state.    
  Added to this administrative miscellany was the complex racial makeup of the 
peoples of Malaya. The Malays claimed they were the Bumiputera (sons of the soil) the 
rightful indigenous natives of the country.  The Chinese, made up of mainland Chinese and 
Malayan-born Chinese, together with Indians from southern India and local born, comprised 
the multi-national and segregated community.  These different ethnic groups rarely inter-
married, lived separate existences, spoke different languages and had different religions. 
They were also inclined to confine their employment to specific niches of the economy; 
                                                 
7
 The states were Selangor, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. 
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Indians, for example, worked mostly as labourers on rubber estates and on the railways and 
those with some education gravitated towards clerical employment.
8
 The Chinese had strong 
commercial instincts and combined with their natural hard work ethic, meant they dominated 
the business world. Most of the big trading companies were Chinese owned and the tin 
industry was very dependent on Chinese labour. The Malays were easy-going, pleasant 
people, lacking political or national aspirations, content that their country should be run for 
them. „A plural society was evolving which would inevitably place heavy emphasis on 
communal rather than “national” values.‟9     
A consequence of the evolving administrative arrangements, barely noticeable in 
peacetime, was the variety of government departments that mushroomed to deal with the 
increasing cultural, social, structural and commercial issues, in a materially rich developing 
multi-cultural country.  Many of these departments were independent answering direct to 
their authorities in London. Soon after the outbreak of war in Europe, it became evident that:  
The multiplicity of official organs in the Far East was hampering the 
conduct of affairs.  The strain of emergencies revealed weakness in the 
governmental structure which not only prevented quick and concerted 
action but also had the serious disadvantage that, because the picture of 
events in the Far East was presented piecemeal by a variety of organs 
overseas to a variety of departments in London, the essential unity of the 
problem of the Far East tended to be obscured. 
10
        
 
 Later, this autonomy would cause serious confusion and obstruct coordination of 
action, but even before the onset of war, the mass of uncoordinated data from Singapore to 
London was considered so confusing that attempts were made to deal with it. Special organs 
like the Eastern Group Supply Council were established in London and the Far Eastern 
Branch of the Ministry of Information and the Far East Mission of the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare were established in Singapore.  There was also in Singapore the Far East Combined 
Bureau of Intelligence, which collected and collated naval, military and political information, 
principally for the use of the Commander-in-Chief. All these mediums provoked the major 
complaint, which became glaringly obvious, that of the lack of a single and authoritative 
voice in the Far East able to speak in convincing terms to the government in the United 
Kingdom.
11
 
                                                 
8
 Bastin, J & Winks, R. Malaysia. Selected Historical Readings. OUP 1966. p. 257. Jackson, R. „Indian 
Immigration into Malaya.‟  
9
 Ibid. P.272.   
10
 Thompson. Postmortem on Malaya. p.xv.  
11
 Report on lessons from the point of view of the Colonial administration in wartime from the experience of 
Hong Kong and Malaya. CO 967/80. 4 Dec 42. NA. 
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In the military domain, the forces were catastrophically short of vital weapons and 
armaments of war, for which they had been pleading, literally, for years.   However, this 
failure to deliver needs placing in the context of Britain‟s global obligations at that point. 
Churchill had decided that the needs of the Libyan and the Russian fronts must come first, 
and Britain was simply not in a position to provide and meet several worldwide demands for 
manpower and equipment at the same time. Anything given to Malaya would have been at the 
expense of the other theatres. In any case, as will be seen, because the strategic assumptions 
for the defence of Singapore were forever changing, there was not enough time to assemble 
the correct balance of men and equipment to defeat a determined Japanese attack.  
The fall of France left Britain without an ally to protect the vital Mediterranean Sea 
route, a task that Britain now had to take on alone. In turn, this meant that one of the tenets of 
the defence of Malaya, a deterrent naval fleet sailing quickly to Singapore, was not available.  
Furthermore, France‟s capitulation left her Far East possession, Indo-China, virtually 
defenceless and enabled the Japanese to establish themselves there and in Thailand.  Nor did 
any of the pre-war military „Studies‟ envisage Japan attacking the USA at the same time as 
assaulting British and Dutch possessions.  Indeed, Churchill believed that any thought Japan 
may have had of advancing down Asia‟s eastern seaboard would be deterred by the 
knowledge that her long exposed flank would be vulnerable to the power of America‟s 
mighty Pacific Fleet sailing from Hawaii.
12
  Fundamentally, strategic military shortcomings 
can be attributed not so much to misjudgement, but to the compelling needs of global 
warfare.  
 The strategic concept upon which the Singapore Base was founded was that it was a 
protected naval harbour from which a powerful fleet could operate. In addition, at the time of 
its planning and the beginning of construction in the 1920‟s, the perceived threat was 
properly assessed to be from the sea because the hinterland of the Malay Peninsula, still 
covered in dense tropical forest and with a primitive communications network, was regarded 
as virtually impenetrable. At this stage, nearly all internal transportation was by river craft. 
The coastal defences were thus built, to protect Singapore from a sea approach. The primary 
task of the installed heavy artillery was to fire armour piercing and explosive shells at 
warships at sea; some of the guns however were capable of pointing at the mainland and were 
later actually so used. The claim, made by some, that Singapore was lost because the guns 
faced the wrong way is quite wrong. One who promoted this belief was a civilian government 
                                                 
12
 CAB 79/6. COS 317
th
 Meeting. 19 Sep. 1940. NA. 
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official, C. A. Vlieland, who in his capacity as Secretary of Defence in the Singapore 
government (1939-41) should have known better. After the war, he claimed: 
„No one should have been fooled by the legend of the mighty fortress of 
Singapore. The place had none of the natural characteristics of an old time 
fortress like Gibraltar; nor was it „fortified‟ in any way, though it had been 
armed with guns which were useless against anything but a sea-borne 
assault.‟13   
 
During the naval base‟s twelve years of construction, weapons of war and armaments 
became more sophisticated and technologically, spectacularly advanced. Added to this many 
areas of mainland Malaya, particularly on the West coast, opened up with the building of 
roads and railways and the laying down of larger areas for rubber estates. The most important 
factor in developing the west coast was the tin industry. The first roads and railways were 
built to connect tin mines to the ports and towns.
14
  Plans for the defence of the naval base 
had to be constantly revised in the light of these developments and also as the strategic 
outlook in the Far East changed in the light of Japan‟s restless aggressive behaviour. Then, 
with the outbreak of war in Europe, it became abundantly clear that the main strength of the 
Royal Navy was needed in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and there would be precious 
few warships available to rush to the aid of Singapore.  
It was however, one thing to identify the changing threat and reassess the manpower 
and equipment needed to meet it, and quite another to be given the wherewithal for the task.  
After much debate and taking account of their meagre resources, the Services eventually 
agreed that the weight of responsibility for the defence of the Naval Base lay with the Air 
Force.  Consequently the RAF asked for a substantial increase in numbers and quality of 
aircraft. The Chiefs of Staff in London promised them a significant enhancement, albeit short 
of their ideal, but a considerable improvement.  On this premise deployment plans were 
drawn up and airfields constructed. Unfortunately, the choice of airfield locations was taken 
without consulting the Army whose task it was to protect them. The upshot was that a 
significant proportion of already under strength ground forces were dispersed to defend 
airfields in remote locations over a vast area, and because of the nature of the terrain, there 
was little chance of swiftly redeploying or reinforcing them. Some airfields were built on the 
                                                 
13
 Vlieland papers. Kings College, London. LHCMA.  
14
 Siew Nim Chee. „The Tin Mining Industry in Malaya‟ as quoted in Baskin & Robins „Malaysia, Selected 
Historical Readings.‟ OUP 1966. P. 281.  
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exposed east coast, in places next to long and excellent sea beaches, which were difficult to 
defend, a fact of which the Japanese were to take full advantage.
15
   
 The promised modern aircraft never came and the Royal Navy‟s late and 
inconsequential contribution, without air support, meant that the inevitable outcome of the 
campaign was evident within days of the Japanese landings. After 48 hours of battle, the RAF 
had only ten serviceable, obsolete, aircraft remaining in the area. They were compelled to 
withdraw from northern Malaya.  By serious miscalculation the Royal Navy‟s only two 
capital ships in the Far East were sunk. While no historian has argued that with the conditions 
existing at the time of the invasion Singapore could have been saved, there is nevertheless a 
strong case to be made that a more aggressive and determined defence could perhaps have 
created time to enable reinforcements to arrive, which might have turned the tide of events.
16
 
Further, a more proactive administration could have helped the military install better defences 
to delay the enemy for longer. Unquestionably, a country forewarned of the ordeals ahead 
and told how its citizens could help and how they could contribute to preparations would 
have been invaluable. 
The many diagnoses of the campaign have thus far not considered explicitly the place 
of the civilian administration in Singapore‟s failed defence.  It is self-evident the Governor 
and his team of civil servants had a crucial part to play in this momentous historical event, 
but their role has not, to my knowledge, been subjected to the same close analysis as have the 
military. In this thesis, I set out to explore in depth that role and the consequences of the part 
played by the administration leading up to and during the war. 
Severe criticism has been levelled at the government of Shenton Thomas for the tardy 
and casual approach it took about alerting the peoples of Malaya to the danger ahead, and its 
failure to put in place a properly organised civil defence infrastructure.  Probably more 
important, Thomas and his staff had not compiled emergency plans for the evacuation of 
civilians or designed a system for the continued administration of the Malayan states during 
hostilities.  A prime example was the lack of civil management during the loss of the island 
of Penang, which   revealed serious weaknesses in local civil administration and military 
control. After it was heavily bombed on December 11 and for three days afterwards, 
casualties were terrible, nearly all the essential services broke down and most of the local 
                                                 
15
 Richards & St. G. Saunders. „Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol II. The Fight Avails‟ HMSO 1954. P. 7. 
16
 The view of Colonel (later General) Jacob, a member of the War Cabinet Secretariat, was that with conditions 
existing at the time of the invasion Singapore was “hopeless from the start” and that the fall of Singapore and 
Malaya was a foregone conclusion from the time of the first landings at Singora and Patani. Quoted in Kinvig, 
Clifford. Scapegoat. General Percival of Singapore. Brassey‟s, London, 1996. p 223.     
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population fled to Penang Hill. The town was in flames, hundreds of corpses lay unburied in 
the streets, the native police had deserted, looters were rampant and there was no labour, 
apart from a few volunteers, to cope with firefighting, sanitation and burial of the dead.  
However, it was the hasty evacuation of the European population, on the misguided orders of 
a confused civil-military command, which caused the greatest offence. This evacuation 
became a cause célèbre and a huge embarrassment to the Government in Singapore because 
of its effect on Asian opinion.
17
 Had a number of British civil servants remained in place they 
might have been able to arrange for an orderly evacuation of the Asian population who, 
aware of the gratuitous cruelty of the Japanese forces, stood in particular danger from the 
invaders. 
Governor Thomas had a strong belief, not wholly shared by the military, that the 
Japanese would not invade Malaya or if they did, would be driven back into the sea. The 
Colonial authorities who were urging general caution in any estimation of Japanese intentions 
may have heavily influenced his conviction.
18
 Nevertheless, he was privy to all the immediate 
regional military and political intelligence information, which increasingly and accurately 
predicted Japanese activities. He maintained that his major concern was to meet the directive 
from the Colonial Office, to increase the production of the vital war commodities. 
Determined that nothing should interfere with the task he objected to the military preparing 
overt defensive sites and would not release labour to help the army with this work.  Thomas 
passionately believed that the construction of trenches and the laying of minefields were bad 
for the morale of the population. They would convey a defeatist image, which in turn would 
infect the motivation to work.
19
 It should be noted, that the GOC, Percival, was of a similar 
opinion about the effect on morale, (though specifically soldiers‟ morale), of rearward 
defences. It seems that the Governor‟s mind-set of also pervaded his control of information 
given to the country before and during the war.  He imposed such severe restrictions on the 
release of truthful details of the progress of the invasion that many of the population were 
quite unaware of the advancing Imperial Japanese Army until it was upon them.  Even when 
the Japanese were in Johore Bahru looking across the 1 kilometre causeway at Singapore 
                                                 
17
Callahan, Raymond. The Worst Disaster: The Fall of Singapore. Associated University Presses, London. 
1977. p 242.        
18
 See ODC Paper No: 19. 20 Mar 1940. NA.  When Thomas attended a Joint Planning Sub-Committee in 
London during his 1940 leave, a committee member (Air Cdr Slessor) also informed him „that at the present it 
was not intended that we should go to war with Japan even if they advanced into Indo-China or Thailand.‟ 
CO967/75.  Also in the opinion of Churchill, as late as 28 Apr 41, Japan was unlikely to enter the war if they 
feared the United States would join the allied cause. PREM 3/156/6; reprinted in Sir James Butler, Grand 
Strategy, London HMSO, 1957. Vol. 2, p 577-578.   
19
 Thompson, Peter. The Battle for Singapore. Portrait Books, London, 2005. p 42. 
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Island and preparing to attack, the scale of the imminent catastrophe was barely raised. A 
chaotic evacuation arrangement, for women and children, was under way but so ambiguous 
was the war news that others were still partying and dining in the hotels and clubs of 
Singapore city. The press were not allowed to use the word siege.
20
  
 By late 1940, the British Government was sufficiently concerned by evident 
aggressive Japanese behaviour and the less than satisfactory politico-military arrangements in 
Singapore to meet the worrying development, that it introduced command changes.  A new 
Commander-in-Chief and later, in 1941, a senior Government Minister were sent to 
Singapore to co-ordinate the military strategy and improve the relations between the military 
and the Administration.   Neither appointment was entirely successful. The new elderly C-in-
C, a retired air force officer, recalled to service, but with restricted powers, only added 
another layer to an already cumbersome structure. The minister, a failed cabinet officer  
recommended swingeing changes, after too brief a review: these included the sacking of 
senior civil servants and even a proposal to replace the Governor.  Instead of being helpful, 
the new incumbents were not only resentful of the others authority but also disagreed with 
each other.     
The warning indicators of Japan‟s desire for the lands of South East Asia were, in the 
light of Britain‟s later pitiful response, distressingly obvious.  By the middle of 1941, Japan 
had greatly expanded its territorial possessions: it aggressively occupied Hainan, Formosa 
and took possession of Indo-China (Vietnam) and openly declared her intention of forming a 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, by force if necessary.
21
  All this took place while 
Japan was engaged in a charade of participation in talks in Washington aimed at having the 
economic embargo removed and of resuming normal relations with the western powers. At 
the same time allied intelligence sources were reporting an increase in Japanese agents in 
southern Thailand and a build-up of military forces, resources and aircraft in southern Indo-
China. Moreover, the British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, was cabling his 
strong belief that the behaviour of the Japanese authorities and other information he acquired, 
indicated a pre-emptive southern assault. 
It would be unsafe to assume too confidently that Japan does not want a 
campaign in the south….Should Washington conversations break down, 
                                                 
20
 Barber, Noel. Sinister Twilight. Collins, London.1969. p. 133. 
21
 Intelligence information from many sources was compiled by JIC London and sent to Singapore keeping them 
informed of Japanese movement. In addition, the FECB had regional agents providing information. Acting 
Consuls General were also important informers.     
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immediate move southwards cannot be excluded, despite weather 
conditions. 
22
  
 
By this time, the numbers of Japanese armed forces had increased significantly.  The 
great majority of them were well equipped and battle hardened from war with China. By 
1941, in addition to its army in China, and with bases in the southern reaches of East Asia, 
Japan was poised to fulfil its brazenly declared expansionist designs. Malaya and in particular 
Singapore was a crucial objective in the Japanese strategic plan for the conquest of South 
East Asia.
23
 
Structure of the study 
This study may be summarised as follows.  In Chapter 1, I explain the background to 
the events, which led Japan, without warning, to attack the major Western Powers then 
resident in the Pacific region.  In Chapter 2, I examine the historical development of Britain‟s 
interest and responsibility in Singapore and the extent of its involvement in the states of the 
Malay Peninsula and the form of Colonial Government designed for the governance of the 
country.  In the subsequent chapter, I look at the imprecise development of the plans to 
defend the Singapore naval base. How this limited objective grew to embrace the defence of 
the whole of Malaya.  I also examine the crucial role the civil administration was called upon 
to play in the gathering crises. Chapter 4 investigates the civil defence arrangements put in 
place by the administration and the glaring failings to anticipate obvious problems and 
subsequent confused arrangements. Chapters 5 and 6 follow the Government‟s response to 
the invasion. How it managed the affairs of state in the midst of war, and how it faced the 
final assault on Singapore Island.  Chapter 7, „The Consequences‟ will give an account of the 
impact the Japanese conquest had on British prestige and on the prominent figures involved. 
It will also look at its effect on the population of the country as a whole and the bearing it had 
on its trade and industry. The „Conclusion‟ will draw together the lessons and the lasting 
legacy of the failure of British Arms and governmental mismanagement. 
Sources 
I have had access to a considerable quantity of primary source material both in this 
country and in Singapore and Malaysia to assist my research.  I have focused my dissertation 
on the role of the civilian administration and drawn upon a number of rarely opened 
government documents in the National Archives in London, Singapore and Malaysia. 
Particularly valuable were the Records of Proceedings of the Legislative and Executive 
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Councils both of the Straits Settlements and the Federal Council. I also found the original 
correspondence in the colonial office files between London and Singapore invaluable. The 
CO 273, 825, 850 and CO 967 series were especially useful. Robert Heussler‟s seminal books 
and his papers in Rhodes House Library provided a mine of information on the development 
of the administration of Malaya and the leading personalities responsible for its governance. 
Conversely, the military campaign has been exhaustively examined and my 
bibliography reflects the valuable information I found among the books of eminent authors, 
historians and scholars. The official history of the campaign, under the authorship of Maj. 
Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby and published over 55 years ago, has stood the test of time.
24
 It is 
acknowledged by emeritus Professor Robin Higham, among others, as an accurate account of 
events leading up to the conflict and of the campaign itself.
25
 I have not come across any 
other works of this period where the author has challenged Kirby‟s version, which is dry and 
factual.  During its preparation, the only, and passionate critic, was Shenton Thomas. He felt 
that the disparagement of his government in the draft was unjust and that the account failed to 
mention the many civil defence measures he brought about.  His cri de coeur, against the 
perceived injustice of the official record, labouredly expressed in his written appeal, was 
rejected.
26
 The authorities considered Kirby‟s account balanced and a fair record of the 
situation and of the inter-service relations, both military and civil, existing at the time.  In 
1971, Kirby wrote a more judgemental account, free of official restraints, which was brutal in 
its condemnation of all the senior echelon and their petty squabbling, weak leadership and 
lack of tactical initiative.
27
   
The only attempt at an examination focusing solely on the performance of the 
administration was a private initiative by „The Association of British Malaya‟ under the 
chairmanship of Sir George Maxwell. It is a narrative compiled in 1943 describing the „Civil 
Defence of Malaya‟28 and the role and contribution of the civilians in this task.  Maxwell who 
was then retired, was previously an eminent senior colonial administrator in Malaya, as was 
his father before him. The account relied on information received from persons in Malaya at 
the time who escaped the invasion.  It is a dispassionate and factual description of conditions 
facing the civilian community and the civil defence preparations put in hand.  However, the 
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study appears to have been written hurriedly to ensure no blame or scorn was directed at 
innocent civilians who only did what was asked of them.  The book is frank about 
government failures in not warning the population of the danger, not making use of the many 
useful skills among the expatriate community and not keeping the people informed of the 
truthful progress of the war.    
Recently available and of particular value, is a small number of books translated from 
Japanese, written by members of the Imperial Forces and Japanese civilian administrators 
about their experiences during the war.  Also important are the records of lectures given by 
eminent Japanese academics at symposiums held in Singapore during the last few years.  
Their scholarly dissertations are compiled and published by the National University of 
Singapore.  They have thrown fresh light on some controversial and contentious events and 
explained others from a new perspective. I also found Eric Robertson‟s book „The Japanese 
File: Pre-War penetration in S E Asia‟ a valuable addition to the historiography of Malaysia.   
Acknowledgements.   
I am most grateful to authors, eminent academics and others who have spared time to 
talk with me. Among whom are; Emeritus Professor Nicholas Tarling, Dr. Brian Farrell, 
Peter Elphick, Dr. Philip Towle, Major General Clifford Kinvig, Brigadier James MacG 
Percival, Paul Kratroska, Sibylla Flower, Merilyn Hewel-Jones, Colonel Christopher Myers, 
Andrew Barber, Datuk Henry Barlow, Mohammed Hussein, Abdul Rahman, Captain Richard 
Channon RN, John Evans, Mako Yoshiura, Hara Fujio, Prabhakaran S. Nair, Sylvia Yap, 
Lucy McCann, Professor Susan Lim, Jonathan Moffatt, Malcolm Murfett and most 
importantly my supervisor Dr. Michael Charney.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
BACKGROUND 
The Japanese attack on Malaya was only one phase of massive and co-ordinated 
surprise attacks around the Pacific Rim and the distant Hawaiian islands. Simultaneously 
Japanese Forces attacked the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake Island and infamously 
Pearl Harbour. The date was 8
th
 December 1941.  Pearl Harbour however lies east of the 
International Date Line thus in Hawaii it was still the 7
th
 December.  It was a day that 
President Roosevelt of the United States said „would live in infamy‟. Seventy days after the 
first Japanese landings in north Malaya on February 15th 1942, Singapore surrendered. The 
Fall of Singapore compelled Churchill to declare „it is the worst disaster and largest 
capitulation in British history‟.29  The impact of this disaster was to have a profound and 
permanent effect on British prestige and authority not only in the Far East but also throughout 
the world.  Never again could Britain command the respect and display the confidence of a 
benevolent power. But apart from the injurious effect on image there was at this critical time 
the tangible and hugely more important loss of valuable territory rich in minerals and natural 
resources that was essential for the economy and the conduct of war. 
Despite much written evidence to the contrary, it is still commonly assumed that the 
Fall of Singapore came about because the Japanese invasion and assault on the island 
occurred unexpectedly and from an unforeseen direction.  And because the invaders came not 
by sea as expected, the fortifications of the „Impregnable Fortress‟, as Singapore was 
described, were so constructed that they faced the wrong way. However, the bald facts, are 
that not only was the direction of the Japanese attack correctly anticipated but also the 
beaches on the north east coast of the Malay Peninsula on which they landed were exactly 
predicted, and crucially even the date when they would invade. The failure of the defence of 
Singapore is not one of surprise and unpreparedness but instead a catalogue of civil and 
military mismanagement, procrastination, sinful lack of critical military equipment for all 
three services; untrained raw recruits euphemistically described and deployed as Infantry 
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Divisions; low grade military and civil leaders in the top echelons of command and defensive 
tactics bereft of determination and imagination.       
 
Before the Japanese invaded and when menacing signs clearly indicated warlike 
intent there was not then, or indeed any time thereafter, an agreed common objective.  The 
civil government had unambiguous instructions from the colonial authorities in London that 
the continued production of tin and rubber was paramount, while the military equally 
unequivocally, had instructions to defend „Fortress Singapore‟.  The divergent and often 
conflicting priorities between the Armed Forces and the Colonial Government in Malaya 
unquestionably led to a serious breakdown of resolute and co-ordinated effort.   
The Colonial Administration, with the Governor at its head, had an area of 
responsibility that also included the territories of Christmas Island and the Cocos and Keeling 
Islands in the Indian Ocean, and Labuan Island off the coast of North West Borneo. However, 
the activities in these places had no direct bearing on the planning and direction of the 
Malayan campaign.  Hence I focus on the main areas of administration.  My research is 
confined to the events, which occurred on the Malay Peninsula and the island of Singapore. 
First, it is necessary to examine how it came about that Japan undertook the suicidal step of a 
pre-emptive attack against the western powers.    
 
Japan’s Road to War 
It was Japan‟s grand strategy for territorial expansion in East Asia, particularly after 
the First World War that forced Britain to re-examine its capability to defend its Eastern 
Dominions and colonial responsibilities. Japan had already won two important wars; against 
China in 1894 and Russia in 1905, when she had established rights in the Chinese Province of 
South Manchuria and claimed a right to Korea. She also fought on the side of the Western 
Allies against Germany in 1914-1918 and at the end of the war in return for this support, 
sought an extension of her rights on the Chinese mainland in what was the former German 
sphere of the Shantung peninsula, as well as in Manchuria and Fukien. The Versailles 
Conference in 1919 confirmed these gains and she emerged from this conference with an 
enhanced status and a place among the major world powers. Her success and authority in 
these adventures increased her desire for territorial supremacy,
30
 added to which the Japanese 
people had for some time believed it was their natural destiny to control and lead the nations 
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of East Asia. „The Japanese people came to believe that the extension of their control over 
this vast region was both natural and destined‟31 Further, by 1936, there was the pragmatic 
and serious economic consideration of need for an accessible empire rich in natural wealth.  
At this point the Japanese nation was suffering a severe financial crises compounded by not 
having fully recovered from the world depression of 1929, and more than most she was 
heavily affected by the disintegration of the world trading markets.  Japan was no longer self-
sufficient in food.  She relied heavily on imported raw material such as non-ferrous metals, 
rubber and above all oil to sustain her industry and manufacture armaments for her armed 
forces.  The solution to the economic crises lay in the mineral and agriculturally rich lands of 
her East Asian neighbours.   
There in the crumbling British, Dutch and French Empires lay the oil, rubber, 
bauxite and other vital resources Japan needed so badly. 
32
 
 
          A further significant and pressing problem was population growth and the demand for 
more food and basic commodities. In 1868, the population of Japan stood at 32 million, and 
the area under rice cultivation was 6 million acres with a total yield of 125 million bushels. 
The average consumption per head of population, per annum, was about 4 bushels, so at this 
time there was enough rice to feed the country. By 1940, however, the population was 73 
million, while the cultivated area had risen only marginally to 8 million acres, yielding 325 
million bushels.  Consumption had risen to over 5 bushels per head, so there was a rice 
shortage of approximately 65 million bushels.
33
  Anticipating the mounting problem an 
eminent Japanese banker, Hirozo Mori, stated in October 1937. 
Our population is increasing, and this increase can be supported only by 
expansion of trade and industry, for which the nearest market is China and the 
Asiatic mainland.  Herein lies our economic future.  There is no gainsaying the 
fact.  We want the world and the Chinese people to understand and recognise it.
 
34
   
 
During this time the Japanese military increasingly determined government policies. 
Since 1900, the government appointments of Minister of War and Navy Minister were by 
Imperial Ordinance, held only by serving Army and Navy officers. By 1918, the army was 
already showing a willingness to act independently of civil control, noticeably in operations 
against Soviet Russia in Siberia.  By the mid 1930‟s Japan‟s political development and 
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strategy was dominated by senior officers of the armed forces.  Its national policy shifted 
inexorably towards military power and imperial expansion. 
35
  
By 1936, the Imperial Japanese Army in particular, had gained a predominant 
influence in the political life of the nation and openly proclaimed the need to establish a firm 
position on the Asian mainland, which was their way of saying that China must be 
conquered. The overture to establishing authority in the region was the promotion of a 
proposal that the nations on the Pacific Rim should form a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere” under the direction and authority of Japan.  The intention was that such a cooperative 
should first be attempted by peaceful and persuasive means.  If that failed then military action 
in both China and Southeast Asia must follow.  To prepare for that contingency the Japanese 
Government now turned its efforts to war production.  
Japan approached first China with the Co-Prosperity Sphere proposal because she 
coveted China‟s agricultural regions. However, with little regard for diplomatic refinement 
and displaying the disdain in which they held China the talks were unsuccessful.  Under the 
leadership of Chiang Kai Shek, and actively supported by the United States, and other Powers 
with special interests in the region, such as Britain and France, China refused to acquiesce to 
Japan‟s advances.  The political atmosphere between the two countries became precarious 
and with Japan‟s foreign policy blatantly and aggressively militaristic, even minor incidents 
between Chinese and Japanese troops became potentially explosive.  In July 1937, skirmishes 
began near Peking and quickly erupted into full-scale war. The Chinese Army performed 
poorly and in December China‟s capital, Nanking, was ravaged by the Japanese Army, 
Chiang‟s government fled to the interior.  Within the next year, Japan completed its conquest 
of eastern and central China and proclaimed a New Order in which the Western Powers were 
to be driven from eastern Asia.    
The United States and the United Kingdom were affronted, particularly by Japan‟s 
occupation of the southern Chinese seaboard, which prevented them from sending supplies 
direct to China by sea. In response, both countries resorted to sending aid overland through 
Burma on a highway, known as the „Burma Road‟. It ran from Rangoon to Lashio, northeast 
Burma, and onto Chungking, the new centre of Chiang Kai Shek‟s government. This vital 
support stiffened Chiang‟s resolve not to capitulate.  In reply, in February 1939, Japan 
occupied Hainan Island and five months later, blockaded British and French concessions in 
Tientsin. In a confrontational retaliation, the United States renounced its treaty of commerce 
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with Japan. This was a most serious commercial and economic setback. The Japanese 
government concluded that its destiny now depended on the acquisition of the natural 
resources (petroleum, bauxite and rubber) which were abundant in the Philippines, Burma, 
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. There was another motive behind this reasoning. At this 
time, 1939, a major war had erupted in the west between Nazi Germany and the nations of 
Western Europe and the allies urgently needed these very resources that Japan sought to 
control. Furthermore, Japan looked upon the outbreak of war in the west, and the 
overwhelming success of the German Blitzkrieg in Europe, as an opportunity to identify with 
the Axis Powers and persuade them to endorse its own expansionist plans in the East.  Most 
importantly, Japan noted that Germany‟s defeat of France left the way open for the 
acquisition of the French possession of Indo-China. An important foothold from which to 
launch imperialist expansion and, as Japan claimed, a bulwark to protect its own national 
security.
36
  In addition, it gave her the opportunity to consolidate her position in Peking and 
the treaty ports of Shanghai and Tientsin.  
Japan demanded that the British withdraw their token forces from China‟s northern 
cities.   Reflecting on the vulnerability of these small isolated garrison‟s, and the glaring fact 
they were of little military significance, Britain conceded and its troops were eventually 
withdrawn to bolster the forces in Singapore and Malaya.  In September 1940, Japan also 
decided that the moment was right to join Germany and Italy to form a „Western Tripartite 
Alliance‟. Crucially, she secured the other‟s endorsement for its New Order in East Asia.      
In 1940, with a population over 73 million, Japan‟s experienced Army consisted of 3 
million men and a modern equipped Air force.  By early 1941, adding the trained reserves 
under the age of 40, the total grew to reach 6 million under arms. The number of army 
Divisions rose from 20 to 50; air squadrons from 50 to 150 (5,300 aircraft).  And 
significantly, the naval combat tonnage shot up to over 1 million tons which then gave Japan 
a navy more powerful than the combined fleets of America and Britain.
37
       
Early in 1941, Japan, on the pretext of intervening in a conflict, which arose between 
French Vichy forces and Thailand over a long running border dispute, established a military 
garrison in Indochina bringing the Japanese military into Southeast Asia for the first time.
38
  
The garrison later that year increased in number to 40,000 troops and the occupation 
extended to cover the whole of Indo-china. Vichy France, as Japan had anticipated, was in no 
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position to resist.  Thus, by the middle of 1941, Japan had greatly expanded its territorial 
possessions: its armed forces had significantly increased and of these, the great majority were 
well equipped and battle experienced.  In addition to its army in China, it had strategically 
located air and naval bases in the southern reaches of East Asia - Formosa, Hainan and now 
Indo-china - and was poised to fulfil its declared imperial expansionist designs in the region.  
Even though Singapore was only one aspect in Japan‟s grand strategic design for the 
region, its location and thus its possession was a critical factor for the overall success of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Singapore lay at the junction of the Pacific and 
Indian oceans; from here, Japan could control the East-West Sea routes and dominate the 
movement of shipping. Possessing it would give added security to her line of communication 
to the south and deprive the allies of a base from which to launch counter-attacks.  Moreover, 
Singapore had recently completed the construction of a modern naval base capable of 
harbouring and servicing most of the Japanese fleet, and additionally, the Malayan hinterland 
was rich in important minerals and rubber.   
The Singapore Naval Base  
The change in the balance of power after the end of the First World War and Japan‟s 
expansionist aspirations persuaded Britain to acknowledge the need to maintain a naval force 
in the Far East.  In the light of these strategic changes, it became obvious that the British 
government had to look at ways to guard the nations trading sea routes to China and India. 
Furthermore, Britain had a responsibility for the maritime protection of Australia and New 
Zealand, both of whom were particularly alarmed about the growing Japanese naval strength 
and belligerent posturing.
39
 The United States in particular was concerned at Japan‟s naval 
growth, and in an attempt to curtail an arms race in the Pacific region and at the same time 
contain Japanese expansionist designs, the United States convened an International 
Conference at Washington in 1921.  
After much argument, the conference managed to impose universal limits and control 
on naval strength and naval bases relating to the maritime powers around the Pacific Rim. 
Following the „Washington Naval Treaty Agreements‟ the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(CID) London in 1922 sat to both reassess the effect of these changing political 
circumstances in the Far East and the proposed naval strengths in the region. The 
deliberations confirmed that a major naval base capable of accommodating and supporting a 
substantial part of the British Fleet was needed. „This was particularly important because of 
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the change-over of the Fleet from coal to oil-firing; for there were not enough oil tankers in 
the world to fuel the Fleet on a voyage to the East and maintain it there at sea‟40.  After an 
exhaustive study about possible locations, the Admiralty decided that Singapore was best 
suited both geographically and strategically as the location for the base. Until this point, 
Hong Kong was where Britain‟s China Fleet harboured, but it was both too small for the 
anticipated deployment and too close to the Japanese presence on mainland China.  
In 1824 when the Sultan of Johore ceded Singapore to Sir Stamford Raffles, acting on 
behalf of the East India Company, it was almost uninhabited, now it was a prosperous city 
port but its only defences were a few guns protecting Keppel Harbour.
41
 The selection of 
Singapore was not universally popular, and before work could begin, lengthy and fiery 
government financial debates took place about whether the whole project   was necessary.
42
 
The uncertainty further exacerbated by a change of government, which imposed new 
parameters on the plan and indeed at one point considered abandoning it.  In an effort to 
reduce the proposed budget a thorough examination of the intended facilities, its size, 
dockyard capacity, fuelling services, arsenal and the defensive arrangements were all subject 
to intense scrutiny.  After a number of false starts and compromises, the project finally got 
under way in 1926.
43
   
There was nevertheless, still disagreement about the important matter of how to 
defend this expensive new base.  The Admiralty and the Air Ministry had strongly divergent 
opinions about its protection.  In the mid-1920s, the perceived threat was likely to be an 
approach from the sea; the Admiralty favoured 15-inch guns and the Air Force torpedo-
bombers. At that time, there simply were not enough funds to have both.  The dispute over 
which service, Air or Navy, should have predominance of responsibility for the defence of 
the base continued until 1931. A less than convincing case was that the Air Force should 
prevail, but with the qualification, that the aircraft and the entire infrastructure needed to 
support them should be permanent fixtures and not a transient group rushed there in time of 
tension.  
The RAF maintained that in the prevailing conditions they needed to extend the radius 
of both their reconnaissance and offensive capability against seaborne enemy forces 
approaching from the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea. But the only airfields in 
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Malaya in early 1930 were commercial and on the west coast.  The conclusion was that three 
new airfields were required on the east coast of Malaya.   A government report (The Baldwin 
Committee),
 44
 however, recommended that the first stage of gun emplacements should go 
ahead, and take precedence. Moreover, before the second stage began the relative merits of 
both, naval guns or aircraft, must again be explored.  In July 1935, the Government relented, 
having secured funding contributions from Malaya, Hong Kong and New Zealand, and 
authorised work to begin on additional heavy gun emplacements and two airfields, as part of 
the second stage.
45
    Thus from the very outset there was no outright agreement on the 
necessity for a large naval base and there was certainly no consensus about how best to 
defend it.  
The Defence Criterion.  
The Naval Base was eventually completed and formally opened by the Governor, Sir 
Shenton Thomas, in February 1938 at a cost of £63 million.  It was in the end endowed with 
five 15-inch naval guns, six 9.2-inch and eighteen 6-inch as well as secondary armament. In 
addition, work had begun on a group of three airfields on the east coast of Peninsular Malaya 
one near Kota Bharu in the State of Kelantan, one at Kuantan and a landing ground at Kahang 
in eastern Johore. The army were barely consulted during the defence discussions; not even 
about the site selection for the East coast airfields, and as later transpired, defending them 
would be their responsibility.  
By the mid-1930s, it became apparent that the defensive measures needed for the 
protection of the Base called for a radical review. The scale of the likely threat had changed 
dramatically,  not only had the terrain of mainland Malaya opened up and the transport 
network improved, but also the major advances in the weapons of war had given the attackers 
a greater range of options and locations for invasion. The capacity, range and power of 
evolving weaponry of the three armed services had changed the circumstances of defence and 
called for a fundamental and fresh assessment of the perceived threat. It was becoming 
apparent to both the Army and Air commanders that the defence of the naval base also meant 
preventing an assault from Peninsular Malaya.  A year before the Base was completed in 
1937, the then General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya, Major General W.G.S. Dobbie,  
instigated a fresh study of the likely changing dangers facing the Naval Base and the forces 
and deployment needed to defend it.   
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His chief staff officer Colonel Percival, later ominously, promoted and appointed 
GOC at the time of the invasion, conducted the „Appreciation‟. The conclusions of the 
research were radical in that for the first time they unequivocally determined that the defence 
of the Naval Base involved the defence of the whole of the Malay Peninsula, enemy landings 
were quite feasible on the east coast of Malaya and indeed an enemy force could approach 
Singapore from the mainland. To reinforce his supposition the GOC tested the practicability 
of landings from the sea on the east coast during the monsoon period and not only were they 
perfectly possible but he also found that, conversely, poor visibility could seriously restrict 
allied air reconnaissance.  He also prophetically identified Singora and Patani in Thailand and 
Kota Bharu in Malaya as highly suitable landing beaches.
46
   The narrow Kra Isthmus joining 
Thailand to Malaya, like an „umbilical cord‟ no more than 35 miles wide suddenly assumed 
significant importance because they were so close to these sites. In 1939, the British 
Ambassador to Thailand, Sir Josiah Crosby, was also reporting that the Thai government 
officers were asserting that if the Japanese decided to strike at Singapore they would first 
land their forces at Singora.
47
   
The Administration. 
Until this point, the Government of Malaya was not directly involved in the defensive 
discussions, because talks were inconclusive and based on hypothetical conditions.  However, 
the Governor was aware of these new developments and his administration negotiated the 
securing of land for the proposed east coast airfields.   The governance of Singapore and 
Malaya before the Second World War, as mentioned, was complex and diverse.  The 
Governor‟s authority and administration across the Malay states was variable, each state 
having its own distinctive arrangements. In turn, these arrangements differed from the 
authority he exercised in the Straits Settlements. His relationship with the Malay rulers was a 
subtle arrangement of guidance through his representative, the British Adviser.  The sultans, 
while safeguarding their sovereignty accepted advice on how to improve and manage their 
parochial affairs. They did not however welcome interference in their direct authority or in 
religious matters.  The inevitable outcome was that administrative proposals from central 
government followed a recognised oriental process of lengthy discussions and subtle 
persuasion. The part played by the Adviser was therefore critical. He had to be fluent in the 
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Malay language, and it was helpful if he had more than a passing understanding of Chinese 
and Tamil, but crucially he had to have the patience of Job. It is important to note, therefore, 
that with this labyrinth arrangement all countrywide government schemes had to be processed 
by way of this ponderous arrangement, even matters of national emergency. 
Singapore on the other hand was, and had been since 1826, a British Colony and part 
of a union called the Straits Settlements.  The union consisted of Singapore, Penang, Province 
Wellesley and the town and territory of Malacca*   There are nine Malaya States and in 1896, 
four of them combined and became a Federation, Selangor, Perak, Negri Sembilan and 
Pahang (The Federated Malay States (FMS)). The remaining five were The Unfederated 
Malay States (UMS), Johore, Trengganu, Kedah, Kelantan and Perlis. The Colonial 
Administration in Singapore therefore was responsible to the British government, through the 
Colonial Office, for the administration, foreign affairs and protection of the Straits 
Settlements and the FMS and the UMS. Shenton Thomas thus inherited a clutch of titles, 
Governor of the Straits Settlements, High Commissioner to the Federated and Unfederated 
States and Commander-in-Chief.  
The Capital of the Federated States was Kuala Lumpur (KL) and the head civil 
servant the „Federal Secretary‟, domiciled in KL, represented the High Commissioner in 
everyday affairs. The FMS had its own assembly (Federal Council), made up of a Legislative 
and Executive council and Finance Committee. The remaining states, the UMS, had less 
formal assemblies with the „British Advisor‟ accountable to the Federal Secretary in Kuala 
Lumpur.  In effect, there were eleven different authorities running the affairs of Malaya and 
Singapore, all of whom had to be consulted before the enactment of any major legislative 
edict. The High Commissioner could not give orders to any of the sultans.  The “Protected” 
states were not possessions of the British Crown.  The inhabitants were “protected” but were 
not British Subjects. Sovereign power rested with the Malay Rulers.
48
   
The British personnel running all these administrative affairs came from the Malayan 
Civil Service (MCS).  The MCS, although not as well known as the Indian Civil Service, 
nevertheless regarded itself as an elite service, administering a very rich country with a 
complex multi-racial social structure.
49
 In 1940, the population of Malaya was about 5 
million, of which 2 million were Malays, 2 million Chinese and 1 million Indians (mostly 
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Tamils) and other races.  At the southern tip of the Malay peninsula lies Singapore Island 
with the Naval Base and its city of  half a million inhabitants.     
Governor Thomas, was a long serving civil servant, a colonial governor of the „old 
school‟ very much a man conscious of the dignity and the authority of his appointment. In 
1941, he was 62 years of age and had by then held office for seven years.  He had joined the 
colonial service in 1909 and after a quarter of a century in Africa, rose to the Governorship of 
Nyasaland and then of the Gold Coast (Ghana). He was surprised, in 1934, to be appointed to 
Singapore.  He was regarded a competent peacetime administrator. When war broke out in 
Europe in 1939, he was close to retirement as he had reached the official retirement age of 
60, in October of that year.  However, the Colonial Office considered that a change was 
undesirable and asked Thomas to remain in post,
50
 even though he had no military experience 
nor had ever served in the Armed Forces. It is worth noting that the staff of the Colonial 
Office London, were all Home Civil Servants, who themselves did not serve overseas. They 
had no experience of life in the colonies though they were solely responsible for the selection 
of officers for appointments throughout the British Empire.   
During the First World War, Thomas was serving in Kenya. He asked to be released 
from his appointment to enlist in the Services but his request was refused on the grounds his 
government work was vital.  Nonetheless, as Governor of Singapore, he held the honorific 
title of Commander–in-Chief, but until this point in his career, he had never been involved 
with or exposed to military affairs.  To further compound his inexperience there was a 
scarcity of military understanding among his civil staff, very few of them had any experience 
of military service. Consequently, when danger threatened, none among them had any 
comprehension of the enormity of the menace, nor did they grasp the extent of planning and 
preparation needed to protect a country from the inevitable destruction and death that 
accompanied an armed invasion.  
This lack of imagination and myopic view was later reflected in the administration‟s 
casual approach to civil defence measures.  Their world, in what they regarded as a remote 
corner of South East Asia, seemed isolated and safe. In mitigation of this outlook, it should 
be remembered that unlike Western Europe there was no war on their doorstep. The nearest 
conflict was the Japanese war in China, nearly 3000 miles distant. The annual cycle of living 
in the comfort and well-ordered routine of a prosperous country, focused on expansion of 
trade and optimising the country‟s natural resources, was the epitome of their concern.  Even 
                                                 
50
 Montgomery. Shenton. loc.cit. p 65.  
  
29 
 
so, it has been argued, that in matters of civil defence where the civil authorities lacked 
knowledge and energy, the military authorities had a responsibility to insist and galvanise the 
civil government, in a vigorous manner, both to educate the people in civil defence matters 
and to supervise the necessary preparations.
51
 This however, would have needed dedicated 
military personnel and they were simply not available. Besides, the Governor was against any 
overt measures, which he believed, would upset the population and importantly, hinder the 
incentive to increase the production of rubber and tin.   
In early 1940, the Governor left Singapore for his due entitlement of home leave: 
indeed, when asked to extend his tour beyond retirement age he had secured an agreement 
with the Colonial Secretary to do so. In the meantime, the international situation had 
deteriorated dramatically with Western Europe under attack by a rampant Nazi Germany, and 
Japan‟s volatile behaviour in the East displaying all the symptoms of a nation set upon war.  
Thomas„s departure at this moment has been harshly criticised as irresponsible.52  He left his 
post from April to December, and with all the uncertainty and danger attached to 
international travel, there was not, even then, any guarantee he would either arrive home, or 
indeed get back.  In the event, 1940 proved to be a year when many major decisions about 
Malaya‟s defensive posture, and the inevitable implications these posed for her trade, 
industry and economy, had to be taken.  Thomas‟s deputy, Stanley Jones, the Officer 
Administering the Government (OAG) in his absence, was not a man of strong character, and 
whenever possible avoided taking any controversial decisions, and was quite out of his depth 
in discussions of military strategy.  To add uncertainty, it was a time of significant change 
among senior appointments, both civil and military. There was growing and anxious concern 
in London that the management of military and civil affairs in Singapore was dangerously 
astray.   The War Office appointed a Commander-in-Chief, Brooke-Popham, while the 
Governor was on leave, and later the Home government appointed a Minister Resident, Duff 
Cooper.   
The War Forum. 
Shortly after the outbreak of war in the West, and before he went on leave, the 
Governor decided to form a Defence Committee, later called the War Committee of which 
Thomas was Chairman.  It‟s every day affairs were handled by a Secretariat, created for the 
purpose, under a Defence Secretary, C. A. Vlieland, a Malayan Civil Servant, appointed by 
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Thomas himself. Vlielend had twenty-six years‟ service in Malaya, and like the Governor had 
no military experience at all.  His task was primarily to co-ordinate the defence activities of 
all government departments. There was no written directive for the Committee, nor was there 
any precise agenda during its formative meetings.  It would seem that Thomas thought it no 
more than a good idea to have some type of forum in which to air views about general war 
precautions, but without a clear idea of its purpose. It was, in other words, an amateur affair.   
The Armed Forces were represented on this committee by their respective Service 
heads. The War Committee was empowered to discuss questions affecting the Services and 
the civil defence departments, but had no executive functions.
53
  In matters relating to 
defence in the Malay states, Vlieland was authorised to deal directly with the British Resident 
or Advisor in each of the States who in turn, and taking account of Vlieland‟s guidance, had 
authority to make decisions on behalf of the State. But, as noted, the committee had no 
agenda and kept no minutes. When the new Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert Brooke-
Popham, arrived in Singapore in October 1940, one of his first steps was to attend a meeting 
of the War Committee. Afterwards he wrote a letter to General Ismay then Chief of the 
General Staff (CIGS):  
…as you may know there is a War committee in Singapore…..I attended the 
only meeting that there has been since I arrived.  I was surprised to find that 
not only do they not have an agenda but that no minutes are kept; individuals 
make notes on scraps of paper on any point in which they are particularly 
interested.  On expressing my views I found to my surprise a certain amount 
of opposition on the part of the govt officials to keeping any record.
54
   
 
The date of this meeting was 4 December 1940, almost exactly a year later the country was 
invaded.  While of course the officials assembled at that time had no way of knowing what 
the future held, there was, nevertheless, a growing concern at Japan‟s irrational behaviour. 
Certainly, there were enough sinister indications to have encouraged them to engage in 
serious and recorded discussion. In the absence of any such documentation there is scant 
evidence of the early functions of this committee, but passing reference to its deliberations 
conveys a gathering that seemed to feed mainly on personality clashes, and that hampered 
rather than improved Malaya‟s preparedness for war.  Brooke-Popham had this to say in a 
letter to the CIGS: 
….you have doubtless heard of Vlieland, the Secretary for Defence.  I 
have seldom met anyone who is, so universally distrusted by government 
officials, by the Services and as far as I can judge by the civilian 
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community.  He also seems to have established procrastination as a fine 
art… he is however trusted by the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas.55  
 
In spite of these disparaging remarks and there were similar from others Vlieland drew up, in 
July 1940, a most accurate and prescient „Appreciation‟ for the defence of Malaya.  He 
uncannily predicted almost exactly the Japanese strategic plan for their assault on the 
Peninsula.  The Appreciation was his own unprompted initiative and the military hierarchy 
were grossly affronted that a civil servant, without military experience, should enter the realm 
of military strategy without even consulting them. 
The three Armed Services had their own separate command arrangements and had 
three separate headquarters locations on the island of Singapore.  The overall Naval 
Commander of the Far East, Admiral Layton, C-in-C China Station, had recently transferred 
his Flag from Hong Kong to the Naval Base in the northeast corner of the island, he had 
under his command a Rear Admiral Spooner directly responsible for the seas around Malaya.   
The Army was under the command of a Lieutenant General, General Officer Commanding 
(GOC) Malaya, whose headquarters was located at Fort Canning in south west of Singapore. 
The Air Officer Commanding (AOC), an Air Vice Marshal, was based at the RAF Airfield, 
Seletar, in the north of the island.  The Governor and his staff conducted its business from 
Government House, on the outskirts of the city; the other civil authorities and government 
departments were in various locations dispersed around Singapore. It is self-evident that 
when the three services established their command arrangements on the island there was no 
reason or compulsion, in early 20
th
 century, to co-locate. Nor indeed would the civil 
authorities have considered it necessary to be near the heads of services. It is interesting to 
note though, that even when the military outlook was worsening, the idea of a joint 
headquarters did not arise.  Throughout the campaign, there was no combined headquarters. 
Commanders got together periodically in the War Committee but their staffs worked from 
separate locations across the island. 
In October 1940, the new appointment of Commander-in-Chief for the Far East 
region took effect. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was given the directive of 
co-ordinating the activities of the air and land forces, and his area of responsibility stretched 
from Hong Kong to Singapore including Borneo, Burma, the Bay of Bengal and the 
operations of the British air forces in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). This was an absurdly large remit 
and area to cover, especially as tele-communications in this region were notoriously poor and 
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travel was fraught with danger. Moreover, a commander to have any impact on strategic 
planning would need an intimate knowledge of the countries in his domain. Brooke-Popham 
had no practical knowledge of this region.  
Before his arrival, there had been no overall commander of the three Services.  The 
Directive instructed Brooke-Popham that the GOC‟s, Land and Air Forces, would be 
subordinate to him, but control of naval operations was to remain directly under Commander-
in-Chief, China.   In practice, his task was to deal primarily with matters of major military 
policy and strategy. He was enjoined not to relieve his subordinate commanders of any of 
their administrative, financial or other normal command functions   By this untidy 
arrangement the Army and Air Commanders‟ continued to correspond and be instructed by 
their respective Branches in the War Office London, and the Navy remained quite 
independent of  the other two.
56
 It was obviously a command arrangement intended to mollify 
the vanity of commanders than improve inter service collaboration. Thus a confusing and 
disjointed chain of command was set up that would prove incapable of meeting the 
challenges ahead.    
The character of Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was nevertheless to 
have considerable influence on affairs from this point. He had retired from active service in 
1937, after a distinguished career.  He then accepted the appointment of Governor of Kenya 
from 1937 to 1939. Incidentally, a country and appointment well known to Thomas who 
served the then Governor for nearly 10 years. When war broke out in Europe, he was recalled 
to active service.  Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, who met Brooke Popham, 
wrote that he had borne the “white man‟s burden in many places and this had left his 
shoulders a little stooped.”57   Raymond Callahan also described him, in his highly critical 
account of these events, as being „like his aircraft, Sir Robert was something less than 
modern‟.58 Brooke-Popham established his General Headquarters (GHQ) after a period of 
uncertainty, in the Naval Base close to the Naval C-in-C. As Stanley Woodburn Kirby, in his 
official history, commented „The appointment of a Commander-in-Chief Far East, although it 
was designed to solve the problem of co-ordinating the defence of that area, did little more 
than add another cog to an already somewhat complex machine.‟ 59 
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In consequence, the military structure in place by the end of 1940 meant there were 
two Commanders-in-Chief, answering to two different authorities in London.  This was 
patently an illogical arrangement.  To add further complications, the important intelligence 
analysis division called the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB), reported directly to the Naval 
C-in-C, was under the charge of a naval captain, and located in the Naval Base.  The FECB 
was responsible for the compilation and dissemination of significant intelligence information, 
not only for the military but also for the clandestine civilian world. Recruited local agents, 
political staff in embassies and Consuls General and many others contributed invaluable 
information to the FECB.  Located in the naval base, however, it was remote from the other 
services and the naval C-in-C was seem as regarding it almost as his personal preserve.      
A Minister Resident. 
In September 1941, Alfred Duff Cooper, a Minister of Cabinet rank, took up his 
appointment as Minister Resident Singapore. The British Government, as noted, was 
increasingly concerned about the management and co-ordination of government and military 
relations in Singapore. Duff Cooper was commissioned with appraising and advising on this 
state of affairs.  At that time, he held the appointment of Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, a sinecure, and was seen as a suitable and available candidate. A month after his 
arrival, he filed his first report. Among a number of recommendations, he highlighted the 
anomalous situation: -   
… two Commanders-in-Chief, one for the Far East and one for China, 
live side by side at the Naval Base at Singapore, [this] does not appear to 
be a sound one in theory and in practice led to considerable 
inconvenience.  There are also a General Officer Commanding, Malaya, 
and an Air Officer Commanding, Far East, at the other end of the island. 
60
 
 
His most disapproving comments, however, were reserved for the colonial administration. He 
was taken aback by the pedestrian and lengthy processes of consultation among the various 
colonial government departments in Singapore and between these departments and their 
ministries in London over the most urgent affairs of state. The laborious peacetime procedure 
of seeking departmental agreement on all affairs was distressing, he maintained, but on 
matters of grave importance, the process was bordering on a dereliction of duty.
61
 
What becomes clear from this brief description of the higher direction of government 
affairs, is that a country which had never faced a threat more serious than occasional piracy in 
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the Straits of Malacca, had descended into a torpor from which only a persistent visionary 
could arouse it.  Such a leader did not exist in Malaya or Singapore, neither among Colonial 
officers nor Military Leaders.  The organisation and proposals for Civil Defence lacked 
urgency and decisiveness; there was much general talk in Legislative Council meetings but 
little action.  The incentive for planning Civil Defence was in any case undermined by a 
Governor, who on his return from leave, insisted that no visible defence precautions should 
be constructed because it would undermine morale and distress the population. Furthermore 
he would not agree to civil labour being redirected from industries and estates to help the 
army build defences and new bases for the air force. In his defence, it should be said, that his 
masters in London compelled him to maintain a high level of industrial productivity to assist 
the war effort and the economy on the grounds of „absolute priority.‟62     
 The outbreak of war in Europe, and the salutary lessons from the blitz of Britain, 
prompted some members of the Legislature to press the authorities to consider the question of 
protection against air raids. In Council, proposals for an air raid warning system and air raid 
shelters were tabled and considered.  However, the protective measures proposed, applied 
officially only to the Straits Settlements.  The FMS and the UMS were advised to consider 
similar arrangements.  Not surprisingly, this caused an outcry from expatriates. How was it 
possible, they questioned, to protect some and not others, particularly if such protection had 
direct consequences for the safety of the tin and rubber industries and the important 
employees who maintained these industries?
63
  The furore generated by this subject brought 
up the more fundamental issue of the best way of organising Civil Defence.  Most of the state 
authorities believed that control of civil defence measures should be in the hands of the 
armed forces.  The colonial authorities in Singapore disagreed. However, they did concur that 
the whole of Malaya should be included in all future civil defence measures, and although 
they were unable to insist that the FMS and UMS comply, the latter were strongly 
encouraged to do so. 
 
The Utilities of War. 
By the autumn of 1941, the total military forces in Malaya had increased to 
approximately 88,600.  They consisted predominantly of Indian troops but with a sizeable 
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minority of British, Australian, and Malay troops.  The breakdown by nationality was 19,600 
British, 15,200 Australian, 37,000 Indian and about 16,800 locally enlisted Asians. These 
numbers were well below the fighting strength previously asked for and approved by the War 
Office. In terms of fighting infantry units, they constituted 31 infantry battalions and their 
supporting elements.  The units were organised into one Australian and two Indian Divisions, 
with some in reserve. Singapore had its own garrison, two brigades, dedicated to the defence 
of the „Fortress‟.  In addition, Penang had a garrison of one battalion plus some support units. 
There were also fixed coastal defence and anti-aircraft batteries for Singapore, some airfield 
defence battalions and local volunteer units. There were however, no armoured forces.
64
  
Many of the troops had received only basic training and some had not been long enough in 
station to get used to the enervating climate before hostilities began.  Of the 37,000 Indian 
troops, many were scarcely better than raw recruits and a number were only 17 years of age. 
Importantly, they were bereft of trained officers and non-commissioned officers. With the 
urgent expansion of the Indian army, many quality units were „milked‟ of experienced officer 
and senior NCO‟s who were sent to form new battalions.  It was a euphemism to classify 
those arriving in Singapore as infantry „combat‟ Divisions. The 15,200 Australians also 
lacked experienced leaders and although slightly better trained had no knowledge of jungle 
warfare. The same applied to the British element. The remaining 16,800 local forces were 
equivalent to a militia, or in modern parlance, a Territorial Army. The members of these units 
were part-time soldiers whose primary employment covered the spectrum of Malayan 
business and industry; they had only rudimentary military skills acquired in brief periods of 
weekend training.  However, they had valuable local knowledge of terrain and spoke native 
languages, Malay, Tamil and Chinese.  
There were no British Divisions in Malaya at the beginning of the campaign. Later, 
and much too late to have any impact on the outcome of the battle, the British 18
th
 Division, 
then at sea en-route to Persia [Iran], was redirected to Singapore. Of the six British infantry 
battalions, three were in Singapore and the others assigned to the Indian Brigades. Indian 
units while a separate force within the British Military system, were trained and organised 
along the same lines as the British Army.  Equipment, however, tended to be somewhat 
lighter, there was less artillery, and fewer anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.  Officers were 
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both British and Indian. Incredibly, some young Indian soldiers arriving in Malaya had never 
seen a tank.
65
 
The Commander of the Army from May 1941 was Lieutenant General Arthur Percival 
(GOC Malaya).  He was described as the „eternal staff officer‟; an opinion reinforced by his 
appearance and personal manner.  He was tall, angular, raw-boned, somewhat stooped and 
had protruding front teeth.  His manner was low-key and he was a poor public speaker with 
the suspicion of a lisp.  He was, however, unquestionably brave, remarkably fit and active 
and, by general agreement, very bright, determined and quite unflappable.
66
 
The only non-Indian division in Malaya at this time was the Australian 8
th
 Division. 
While subject to Percival‟s operational control, it occupied a unique position.  Its 
Commander, Major General Gordon Bennett, was under instructions from his government to 
ensure the division remained a unified force and was not split or used piecemeal by Malaya 
Command without his approval.  Moreover, if Bennett was unhappy with any tactical 
deployment that infringed this arrangement, he was authorised to have direct communication 
with Australia. In effect, it gave him a right to go over Percival‟s head on tactical matters or 
indeed or any other reason. This autonomy, in the pressure of combat, severely restricted 
Percival‟s tactical options. Outspoken to the point of rudeness, sarcastic and impatient, he did 
not get along well with British regular officers and for that matter with anyone else with 
whom he disagreed, including many of his own staff.  His rasping personality did nothing to 
improve command relationships, and under the test of battle his leadership was found 
wanting.
67
 An official report compiled after the war commented: 
It was well known in Malaya before the operations and it was amply borne 
out during operations, that the Australian GOC was incapable of 
subordinating himself to Malaya Command or of co-operating 
wholeheartedly with other commanders.
68
    
 
A point of importance worth repeating, because it imposed additional problems on 
command and control, is that the composition of the Allied forces came from places as far 
apart as the United Kingdom, Australia, Malaya, Burma and British India; and they fought 
under leaders divided by differences of nationality, outlook, background, political allegiance 
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and language. As a force, they were neither equipped nor trained for operations in the close 
country of Malaya. It was overburdened with a road bound logistics tail: endless columns of 
motor transport moved men, equipment and stores. A glaring omission in the military 
organization however was the failure to enlist the local community for their language skills 
and knowledge of the terrain and above all to assist the combat troops prepare military sites 
and defensive positions.  Two reasons for this omission; one was the civil government‟s 
insistence that the local workforce was more urgently needed to keep the country‟s major 
industries functioning and second, the War Office, London, would in any case, only pay a 
derisory labourer‟s daily rate for those so enlisted.     
The Harbingers of War.         
From mid-1930, Japan‟s increasingly erratic and aggressive behaviour in the Far East 
created apprehension among the western powers, and gave Britain‟s Pacific Dominions 
serious cause for concern.
69
 Every political move or direct action by Japan, already closely 
monitored, came under more intense scrutiny from this point. Of particular interest was the 
expansion and deployment of her armed forces. Japan‟s war with China was closely observed 
and battlefield skills in this campaign were studied and analysed.  Japan‟s undisguised 
intention to extend her empire now gave the West‟s intelligence agencies the weighty 
challenge of determining the direction from which Japan would strike, and when.  
During 1940, when a growing number of intelligence precursors were detected 
indicating an unusual pattern of movement by Japanese military and naval forces throughout 
South East Asia - reports substantiated by a variety of diplomatic and civilian sources - raised 
serious concern at the War Office, London. Adding impetus to their fears, on 1 August 1940, 
the Japanese government proclaimed the “construction of a new order in Greater Asia”.  The 
Chiefs of Staff (COS) called for a comprehensive review of Singapore‟s defence plans.  The 
three Service Commanders then in post, C-in-C China (Layton) AOC (Babington) and GOC 
(Bond) compiled an Appreciation. On 16 October 1940, they presented their findings to a 
Defence Conference in Singapore.
70
 The discussions and conclusions of this conference 
confirmed, and added substance, to the growing awareness of Japan‟s intentions, the 
weakness of the allied preparations, and the serious shortage of vital war materiel.  Among its 
major conclusions was that the arrival of a relieving fleet would only partially safeguard 
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against a Japanese overland threat to Malaya through Thailand.  Second, it was necessary to 
hold all Malaya rather than concentrate on the defence of Singapore Island.  Third, it would 
now be the responsibility of the air and land forces to prevent the Japanese from establishing 
advanced air bases on the mainland and to stop any overland advance. Overall, they assumed 
that the Japanese had unhindered use of the ports and air bases in Indo-China and the 
railways of Thailand, that the Thais would maintain „forced neutrality‟ and that „before the 
opening of hostilities the Japanese would have established themselves in South Thailand‟.71 
The tactical Appreciation also concluded that the Japanese had sufficient forces for 
simultaneously launching an overland attack from Thailand and a seaborne attack on Malaya.  
These invading forces would be strongly supported by shore-based Japanese aircraft.  
Singapore was within range of heavy bombers operating from Thailand. Further, northern 
Malaya was within range of heavy bombers and reconnaissance aircraft operating from Indo-
China, and from light bombers and fighters operating from Thailand.        
Facing the urgent realities of the situation, the conference moved on to consider that the 
Japanese were likely to attack Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, Netherlands East 
Indies, Timor and communications in Pacific and Indian Oceans, either separately or all at the 
same time.  There could also be attacks on American bases in the Philippines and Guam.
72
 
Our first immediate consideration must be to ensure the security of Malaya 
against direct attack.  The Tactical Appreciation shows that the army and air 
forces in Malaya (including reinforcements now being provided) are, both in 
numbers and equipment, far below those required in view of the inadequacy of 
the naval forces available.  This deficiency must obviously be remedied 
immediately and we recommend that the further co-operation of India, Australia 
and New Zealand be sought without delay.
73
  
 
 The conference considered that a minimum of 566 aircraft was needed for the defence of 
Malaya and Burma.
74
  The harsh reality was that there were then only 88 aircraft in the area, 
of which 40 were obsolete - therefore, there should be a reinforcement of 534 modern 
aircraft.  In terms of army strength, Malaya was deficient by 12 regular battalions, 6 field 
artillery regiments, 8 anti-tank batteries, 6 anti-tank companies, 3 light tank companies and 
other units.    
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These important and prescient findings went to the Chiefs of Staff in London. The 
COS replied that they hoped to accelerate the dispatch of land reinforcements to Malaya and 
pledged to send 170 Buffalo aircraft, 40 Glen Martin aircraft, one squadron of flying boats 
and one squadron of Beauforts by June 1941.  They also approved the expansion of air base 
facilities in the north to allow for a concentration of two-thirds of the aircraft in either the 
north or south of Malaya.
75
 
At this same time (October 1940) by the direction of the C-in-C‟s the FECB compiled 
a weekly intelligence summary „The Far East Weekly‟ or „FEW‟. It was sent to the 
Admiralty, the Australian Naval Board, New Zealand Naval Board, Naval Intelligence at 
Ottawa, New Delhi, British Commands in East Asia and British representatives at 
Washington, Tokyo and Chungking and of course to the Governor‟s office in Singapore.  
Thus, every important department, national and international, concerned with the worrying 
developments in the Far East region, received it.  By the time Brooke-Popham took up his 
appointment in October 1940, therefore, there was in place sound arrangements to 
disseminate a steady flow of intelligence information from a variety of sources to western 
allies.  All the main diplomatic posts and trained military officials throughout East Asia were 
watching and reporting important intelligence clues. However, as always in the case of 
intelligence gathering processes, there was inevitably, some conflicting or inaccurate 
information leading sometimes to incorrect conclusions, but taken altogether, there was 
unmistakable and mounting evidence of Japan‟s preparation for imminent action.  A most 
obvious indicator of Japanese intentions was the level of mobilisation and distribution of its 
forces; these movements were closely monitored by FECB and other British agencies. 
On 2 July 1941, at an Imperial Conference in Tokyo, at which the Emperor himself 
attended, government ministers put before him their combined agreement that the nation‟s 
future lay in the dominance of the mineral-rich southern states of South East Asia.
76
  Japan 
had already decided it needed to extend its empire, and the country had to be prepared for 
war. However, even at this point, intense debate, mainly between the army and navy, 
oscillated between whether to focus expansion north against Russia or south against the 
Western Powers. Hitler was pressing Japan to follow his lead and to strike north, taking 
advantage of Russia‟s dilemma.  Certainly, this scheme appealed to a number of senior army 
officers but the more pragmatic among them felt such a move would do little to assuage 
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Japan‟s economic problems.77 Nonetheless, regardless of the north-south outcome, military 
preparations for either contingency were well underway and had been since 1940.  Even 
while she was conducting torturous political negotiations - with America in particular - over 
the harsh economic embargo, the Japanese Army and Navy were actively preparing for a 
general war.
78
   
The political dialogue between Japan‟s Embassy in Washington and the government 
in Tokyo had for a number of years been intercepted and deciphered, as had the diplomatic 
telegrams sent from its embassy in Berlin.
79
  Both the United States and Britain were fully 
aware of the convoluted procrastinating negotiations that Japan was conducting. The purpose, 
they realized, was to enable Japan to strengthen its hold on her recent territorial acquisitions 
in East Asia as well as gain time to enlarge its military arsenal.  The aid to China by the two 
western powers, via the Burma Road, was in part a response to these manoeuvrings and it 
was an effective irritant to the Japanese; indeed a concern they continuously raised during the 
negotiations.  From the point of view of both the USA and Britain, supplying China with 
armaments to enable her to continue the war with Japan meant that a significant part of the 
Imperial Japanese Army was committed to the Chinese campaign and unavailable for other 
military adventures.  The United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, recognising the 
harmful effect these important supplies to China were having on Japan, declared, “in order to 
deter Japan and place obstacles in the way of Japan‟s programme of conquest” [he] proposed 
giving large credits to China to aid their resistance to the Japanese.
80
   
Even though the interceptions via the US decipher system called „Magic‟ revealed the 
declarations of the Japanese government that „the Japanese Empire, to save its very life, must 
take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas‟81 inter-service rivalries within 
Japan still prevented a final decision on whether Japan‟s next move would be north or south. 
What was not in question was her determination to continue acquiring Asian territory. 
Military intelligence estimates in the final months before her assault on Malaya highlighted 
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the continuing preparations for further conquests to the south, especially against Thailand, the 
loss of which would clearly undermine the position of Malaya and Singapore.
82
 However, 
there were other interpretations of these same indicators.  Lord Halifax, the British 
Ambassador in Washington, learnt that the Americans believed the likely attack would 
indeed be southwards but judged the Japanese aim was to cut the Burma Road. By the end of 
October, Whitehall had also adopted this analysis; it had further support from Chiang Kai 
Shek, and Brook Popham both of whom, separately, believed the Burma Road was the likely 
target.
83
 One of the factors mentioned in support of the move south was that the flat country 
of Cambodia /central Thailand, which baked hard during the dry season, meant that runways 
there could be easily improvised. Shenton Thomas who travelled through this area in 
February 1939 confirmed this in a telegram to the CO in November 1941.
84
    
The stockpiling of vital war materials was also well underway, and in late October, a 
„Total War Research Institute‟ was established with the task of drawing up a comprehensive 
plan for the intended deployments.  Three divisions from south China were ordered to begin 
training for operations in tropical regions. They were despatched to Indo-China (where, as 
mentioned, Japan had already established a sizeable garrison).  Special studies began of the 
geography, terrain and climate of Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Thailand and Burma.  By 
early 1941, Japanese pilots were flying reconnaissance missions and taking illegal 
photographs over the Malayan coast and the Philippines. At the same time, the Ministry of 
War and Foreign Office were printing military currency for use in the southern area.
85
  It was 
at this time, signifying his Service‟s autonomy and disregard of government restraint, that 
Admiral Yamamoto Commander of the Combined Fleet conceived the idea of a carrier-based 
air attack on Pearl Harbour and ordered his staff to work out the problems posed by such an 
operation.
86
   
In mid-September 1941, E. W. Meiklereid, the acting Consul-General at Saigon 
reported that there were 25,000 Japanese troops and 70 aircraft in Indo-China, while 
Ambassador Crosby reported from Bangkok that his information gave the numbers as 23,000 
troops and 51 aircraft.  By the end of September, Brooke-Popham was able to declare that his 
sources gave slightly different figures; 25,000 troops and 50 aircraft. These were not 
significant discrepancies although strangely from these figures he remained convinced that 
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the Japanese were not yet ready to launch an attack on Thailand or Malaya.
87
  To add some 
conviction to his premise he said there were no signs of the up grading of facilities at the air 
bases or the presence of long-range fighters or heavy bombers, which he considered essential 
for such an attack.
88
  In any case, he announced, he remained of the opinion that any Japanese 
excursion would be northwards.  
On 22 October 1941, the British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, sent a 
very stiff critique to the Foreign Office in London, of Brooke-Popham‟s assertion of 30 
September.  Craigie was by now most suspicious of Japanese intentions and placed more 
emphasis on a Japanese move to the south.  In a pointed criticism of Brooke-Popham‟s theory 
of „northern attack‟, Craigie, referring to the talks then underway between Japan and 
Washington about the economic embargo, said: -  
…..should Washington conversations [between Japan and USA about the 
economic sanctions] break down, [an] immediate move southwards cannot 
be excluded despite weather conditions… Much of course depends on the 
outcome of the Washington talks, but even now, with tension as high as it 
is, and increasing economic distress caused by freezing measures it would 
take very little further pressure to drive Japan to rash enterprise.
89
            
                                        
During the latter period of 1941, the number of intelligence reports grew in volume 
and detail. Many reliable sources noted the increased movement of Japanese troops, shipping 
and aircraft. By the end of October, it was believed that the number of troops in Indo-China 
had reached 50,000 and that considerable quantities of equipment and stores were also being 
landed in both northern and southern areas of the country, including tanks (estimated at 100), 
transport vehicles, oil tankers, railway equipment and ammunition.  The Japanese had also 
taken over another two air bases in Cambodia and were giving top priority to the extension of 
air facilities at Saigon, Phnom Penh and two other air bases in southern Indo-China. 
90
 
On 17 October 1941, Captain D. Tufnell, the British Naval Attaché at Tokyo, reported 
that all units of the Japanese navy had been mobilised and were now on a complete war 
footing. The Chinese Ambassador to Singapore subsequently confirmed this. In addition, 
significantly, in the early months of 1941 the average number of Japanese merchant ships 
outside Japanese-controlled waters had stood at 162.  This rapidly declined from 79 in 
September to 50 at the end of the month, dropping to 25 by late October.  It was obvious that 
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there was some haste in getting Japanese shipping back to Japanese territories. Craigie again 
reported from Tokyo that there were indications that more reservists were being mobilised.
91
  
In this feverish pre-war period, diplomatic relations between Japan and the western 
powers, particularly the USA, were at breaking point. The Imperial Japanese Armed Forces 
were displaying unambiguous signs of war and indicating preparation for a pre-emptive 
assault. In Singapore however, even these alarms did not dispel the reservations in the minds 
of both the military and civil authorities that Singapore was a Japanese objective and that 
danger was imminent. Life continued at a leisurely pace, while no senior figure urged haste 
or proposed that the country be made aware and ready for war. Nothing was to deflect the 
Governor from his commercial Whitehall directive to increase the supply of rubber and tin.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A COLONIAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 
 
The governance of the Straits Settlements and individual States in Peninsula Malaya, 
which Sir Shenton Thomas inherited on appointment, was a system developed through trial 
and error, during the 150 years of Colonial rule. The varied provisions for guiding the affairs 
of each group was labyrinthine but workable. By careful control, and under the direction of 
experienced British civil servants, sensitive to the ethnic distinctions of the multicultural 
population, it worked perfectly well. However, as soon became obvious, the consultative and 
management procedures that worked in a measured, indeed leisurely, manner were unsuited 
to a crisis. Had the Governor the foresight to put the country on a war footing at the first signs 
of a crisis, he would undoubtedly have met resistance from a number of the Malay rulers. It 
was a country that never experienced any greater conflict than occasional piracy in the Straits 
of Malacca.  Thomas‟ first obstacle would have been to convince the rulers that there was a 
threat. Certainly, the remoter and poorer parts of east Malaya (where fatefully the actual 
landings took place) would not have understood the alarm. At this stage in its progress, 
Malaya was not a unified nation, communications were embryonic and the British while seen 
as benevolent colonial masters were nevertheless formidable masters. If the Japanese came, 
most people would consider their arrival, as simply a matter of one ruler replacing another.  
In addition, they would invariably have objected to the disruption and cost, entailed in 
preparations for defence. Under these conditions, galvanising the country and demanding war 
measures would have been a huge challenge for even the most determined of leaders.   
The manner by which administrative controls developed also meant that many 
government departments acted independently of central authority. For example, the forestry 
commission, the health department, the education department and others answered direct to 
their authorities in London. Furthermore, their head-offices in Singapore and Malaya were 
separate and autonomous and often located some way apart from each other. Inevitably, this 
led to poor coordination and even poorer inter department communications.  
The Governor residing in Singapore was President of the Straits Settlements Council, 
which sat in Singapore and President of the FMS Federal Council that sat in KL. The FMS 
assembly met about six times a year.  Apart from this bi-monthly commute to KL for 
meetings, there is no mention of Thomas visiting the countryside outside the capital or 
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meeting with the sultans of the Unfederated Malay States (UMS).    The existence of two 
Legislative Councils inevitably meant there was duplication of many administrative issues, 
not to mention the expense of running two similar large legislative chambers.    
The Emergence of a Colonial Administration 
Both the Colonial Office in London and a succession of Governor‟s recognised the 
untidy, fragmented, and unsatisfactory governance in this area.  What they did not agree upon 
was a solution to the problem. There were those who favoured tighter central control and 
those who championed decentralisation-passing governmental responsibility to the 
indigenous inhabitants. The issue was unresolved when Shenton Thomas took up his 
appointment as Governor; indeed his predecessor had been removed from the post because of 
the indignation he provoked by promoting the idea of devolvement.
92
 Thomas was told to 
defuse the furore, play down the whole debate about governance, and live with the status quo. 
It meant of course , that when war loomed, he was technically unable to insist that the nine 
Malay States conform to coordinated and countrywide preparations for a conflict.  He simply 
did not have the legal power to do so. It also placed him on a collision course with the 
military when their intended plans ran roughshod across state boundaries. The military failed 
to understand the subtleties of dissimilar state governments, or the constraints this imposed 
on Thomas‟s power, nor did they grasp the delicate sensibilities of the separate state rulers. It 
is worth remembering that until 1909 the northern part of the Peninsula was claimed by Siam 
(Thailand). Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu whose populations are predominantly 
Malay and Muslim, were governed by hereditary Malay rulers who sent tribute to Bangkok 
triennially in the form of Bunga Mas (gold and silver flowers). Their foreign relations were 
handled by Bangkok and their rulers had to be confirmed in office by the Siamese authorities. 
In return, these vassal states were entitled to Siamese protection and were allowed to live 
separately under their own laws, customs and rulers.  
 To not only integrate these states within Malaya but also require them to surrender 
their authoritarianism, called for lengthy and torturous diplomacy. Asking them, in addition, 
to accept British governance entailed compromise and measureable persuasion.  While the 
military saw their task in simple unequivocal countrywide terms, the civilian officials, on the 
other hand, had to manage the affairs of the country according to existing fragile rules.  In 
any case, in 1940, it was hard for them to conceive of any such grave and immediate threat to 
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the colony‟s existence that would call for highhanded disregard of well-rehearsed regulations.  
Besides, there was the country‟s welfare and economy to consider.                
The political and military conditions that prevailed in Malaya and Singapore in 1940, 
were quite different from those of in other parts of the British Empire.  After many years of 
directing and guiding the country‟s development, the administration had taken on a 
patriarchal, as opposed to an autocratic, approach to governing. The colony was an 
acknowledged success enjoying a healthy economy, the development and expansion of trade, 
the introduction of a modern communications infrastructure, and significant improvement in 
the health and education. Importantly, however, what the British failed to address and what 
was later to prove a serious shortcoming, was the creation of national unity – in other words a 
short-sighted acceptance of the local rulers various autonomies.  As already mentioned 
Malaya was a country of different nationalities, on the surface living a contented existence. 
However, as the war later exposed, it was a country with little loyalty to its British masters. 
What also unfolded was that the majority of the working class people regarded this latest 
invader quite simply as a replacement for the existing master. Even when the danger was 
obvious, there was little display of either panic or an urge to rush to arms to protect their 
legacy of security and quality of life.  Pragmatists say that this behaviour was a clear 
manifestation of the significant failure to foster loyalty and national identity. „There was no 
personal friendliness, no sympathy or understanding, no participation in common ideas or 
purposes.  On the surface there was complete indifference toward one another‟.93  
This situation is typified by events in Penang. It was the earliest British foothold in 
the area, first occupied in 1786 and remained the sole British enterprise in the Peninsula until 
the end of the 1800‟s.  By the early 19th century, however, the major islands of South East 
Asia, collectively then known as the East Indies, were within the “sphere of influence” of 
either the Dutch or the British.  At the time, the British used this concept to limit the 
commercial or political ambitions of rival powers while avoiding the expense of establishing 
additional outposts of empire.
94
  In 1824, in a move to prevent other western powers - 
(notably the French) - from establishing commercial links in the Malay Archipelago, an 
Anglo-Dutch Treaty was negotiated with the Netherlands. Britain now had exclusive 
influence in the Peninsula and relinquished all interests in the islands south of Singapore, 
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notably Java and Sumatra.  To consolidate further its own commercial dominance over the 
important west coast trading ports, in 1826 Britain decided to create a single administrative 
unit out of Singapore, Malacca, Penang, and Province Wellesley - known as the Straits 
Settlements. It remained under the control of the British authorities in India until 1867, when 
it was transferred to the Colonial Office in London. It was to become the base from whence 
the British influence was gradually extended throughout the Peninsula.       
  Relations with the remaining nine Malay States evolved gradually in a 
different manner. How, in each case, was determined by the commercial value of each state‟s 
natural resources.  At this stage, London was reluctant to absorb further territorial 
responsibility within the archipelago if there was little profit to be gained, even though some 
of the Malay States actively sought protection.  Persistent internecine disputes among a 
number of the Malay Rulers sometimes led to open warfare. Conflicting Chinese factions 
threatened to involve the Straits Settlements forcing Britain into some restraining action.
95
  In 
1874, when the State of Perak asked help to secure the shaky authority of its sultan, the 
Governor of the Straits Settlements signed The Pangkor Treaty in return for British 
protection. The sultan had to accept a British Resident whose advice had to be sought and 
acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay custom and religion.
96
   
The Pangkor Treaty was a turning point in political and commercial relations with the 
remaining states.   Malay rulers began to recognise the potential benefits of such an 
agreement: there was security, prospective economic development, and in a number of 
particular cases, the likely curtailment of aggressive Chinese commercial exploitation, chiefly 
in tin mining.  Following the example of Perak, three other states, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, 
and Pahang signed agreements with the British authorities seeking „Protected‟ status and 
accepted the installation of a „Resident‟. In 1896, these four Protected States were unified as 
the Federated Malay States (FMS), with its capital in Kuala Lumpur, the heart of the tin 
mining region.  A secretariat was established in Kuala Lumpur with a Resident-General at its 
head. It had jurisdiction over the residents in the four FMS and authority to represent the 
Federation‟s interests to the Singapore governor, who also became High Commissioner of the 
Federation.  Departments of Police, Public Works, Posts and Telegraph, Railways and 
Agriculture were now under a single director; a unified civil service was set up and proposals 
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were made for a common treasury.  To assure uniformity, all laws except those of a purely 
local nature, and all financial measures were decreed in Kuala Lumpur.
97
   Over the next ten 
years, further moves were made towards uniformity and centralisation and by 1909, a Federal 
Council was created with the Governor at its head and with the title of „High Commissioner 
of the FMS‟. The role of „Resident-General‟ was renamed „Chief Secretary‟.  In the process, 
the four FMS sultans lost their power of veto and the council was enlarged to include senior 
and influential businessmen from the tin and rubber industries, both European and Chinese.  
The Chief Secretary became subordinate to the High Commissioner rather than an 
independent defender of the Federated States rights, which he previously exercised in his role 
as Resident-General.
98
 
 By 1909, Thailand agreed to transfer responsibility for the four northern states 
(Terengganu, Kedah, Kelantan and Perlis) to Britain.
99
 The state of Johore was acquired in 
1914. Thus, direct and indirect control, of all the Malay States and Singapore was in the 
hands of the British Government. British authority, either in the form of a Governor, High 
Commissioner, agent, resident or adviser exercised control throughout Malaya and Singapore 
- now labelled British Malaya. It was a political arrangement that would remain almost 
unchanged until the Japanese invasion of 1941.  However, the four states above, and Johore 
remained un-federated; their sultans refused to join the FMS because they would not accept 
any erosion of their traditional royal powers.  They had  observed this decline in the sultans 
within the FMS.  Peninsular Malaya was therefore made up administratively of Straits 
Settlements (Crown Colony), the FMS and the UMS.   
In practice these development meant that the political, economic and administrative 
control of the three categories of suzerainty within Malaya and Singapore was in the hands of 
ten different authorities. This arrangement was the source of heated debate between the 
colonial office and officials in post.  In the 1920‟s and 1930‟s the situation led to a long 
running political argument about whether power should be centralized or decentralized.
100
 
Within the establishment indirect rule was long regarded as indispensable to maintaining 
authority over the Malay population.  The colonial authorities felt a large degree of 
centralised direction was necessary in a peninsula of such ill-defined state boundaries, uneven 
geographical distribution of natural wealth and growing ethnic immigrant conurbations.  
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Some officials worried that central control would lead to a lessening of respect for the rulers 
in certain circles; even so, until the outbreak of war, it was still evident that the prestige of 
sultans within their own states and their hold over rural Malays was still strong.
101
   
  In theory, the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements and the Federal Council 
of the FMS were independent of each other although much of the legislation enacted by the 
Straits Settlements was endorsed by the FMS.  The UMS on the other hand could and did 
resist rulings from the High Commissioner.  The colonial goal of creating an administrative 
unity for British Malaya was still unfulfilled by 1941.
102
  Despite general agreement that a 
union for Malaya was ultimately desirable, established political and commercial interests 
distrusted any change.
103
 With a system of consultative dialogue rather than pronouncements 
from the centre, even important matters such as the deployment of military units needed the 
agreement of the state into whose area they planned to move.  In his book, Speaking 
Generally, written after the war, General (later Field Marshal) Wavell gave an example of 
this cumbersome process … 
„about a week after war had broken out an important movement of troops was delayed by the 
police enforcing the customs barrier between two states and insisting on taking particulars of 
each lorry as it passed..‟ 104     
On average, the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements met in Singapore nine 
times a year and the Federal Council in Kuala Lumpur six times a year.  Additionally there 
were six Residents Conferences each followed by a Durbar.  These meetings were the forums 
for discussion and approval of major acts of legislation and the ratification of government 
expenditure.  Sub-committees undertook preparatory and investigative stages of important 
legislation before presentation to the Council for endorsement. The General Officer 
Commanding Malaya was ex officio a member of both the Executive and Legislative 
Councils of the Straits Settlements.  A reading of the Council Proceedings suggests a 
ponderous and pedantic process with procedural dialogue heavy in Victorian preciseness and 
spoken with laboured careful etiquette. Business was not conducted swiftly and purposefully.  
British civil servants following a well-trodden and well-defined path forged in the 
growth of an empire were determining the management of the country‟s affairs. „By the late 
thirties their instrument of rule – the MCS – was one of the most seasoned and self-confident 
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in the empire, secure in its local acceptance and in its reputation at home.‟105  In the later 
stages the Malayan Civil Service attained an image as an elite service. During the inter-war 
years, however, it had suffered a drop in the quality of recruitment and was regarded as less 
desirable than entry into the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Only a conscious recruiting effort 
and redesigned selection procedure restored the quality of entrants.
106
 Thus by 1940 the MCS 
was a highly efficient service comprising able, intelligent and dedicated officers skilled in 
their respective fields of administration. The arrangement of government departments and 
distribution of powers among the officers of the MCS followed closely the successful pattern 
practised in India.  
Sir George Maxwell a retired Chief Secretary, FMS, informed a London newspaper 
(Daily Telegraph, April 1942),  
I could not have wished to have a finer body of men under me.  The 
district officer made a point of establishing that direct personal contact 
which means everything in any difficulty or emergency, and the 
understanding and sympathy on the one side met with confidence and 
respect from the other.  Not only in the administrative branches, but in all 
the professional departments, the men were devoted, heart and soul, to 
their work for the country, and all were deeply attached to the peoples of 
Malaya.  In mutual understanding between the people of the country and 
the administration, Malaya has been unsurpassed in the Colonial 
Empire.
107
 
 
Their training and preparation was just as thorough as that of their Indian counterparts. All of 
them had to learn the Malay language and many also had a working knowledge of either 
Chinese or Tamil.
108
 In general, everyone served at one time or another in both the secretariat 
and rural posts, the intention being that every officer should understand both the central 
processes of administration and at a distance its impact on the community. Inevitably, there 
were those who preferred to retain the freedom and responsibilities of remote districts than 
return to the oppressive routine of the central bureaucracy.
109
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To support the civil servants, a Malay Administrative Service was created in 1910 in 
order to staff junior posts in district administration. A separate clerical service open to all 
nationalities born and educated in the FMS, (with preference for Malays), was also formed. 
The system worked perfectly well, but with one unforeseen weakness.  On the outbreak of 
war in December 1941, the affairs of this important region were being conducted by a corps 
of proficient officers abiding by a diplomatic process which had changed little from the days 
of Queen Victoria. As noted earlier, the impracticability of the system was that many 
different Malayan government departments answered independently to their separate 
authorities in London.  During an emergency, this revealed a serious flaw in the management 
of information. These independent departments sent, without consultation or verification, 
their view of events to their London bosses. Inevitably, this led to a serious loss of co-
ordinated endeavour and presented the London authorities with a confused and fragmented 
picture of events, sometimes even conflicting data.  Shortly after he arrived in post, Duff 
Cooper remarked on this duplication of effort “I was distressed to learn that the representative 
of my former Department, the Ministry of Information, was engaged on precisely similar 
work to that of a representative of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.  Two officials in fact 
engaged on the same task were reporting to two different departments in London”.110 
The Governor, appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, governed the 
Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements.  An Executive and a Legislative Council advised 
him.  The majority of the members of the Executive Council were MCS officials, while the 
Legislative Council, since 1924, consisted of equal numbers of official and unofficial 
members. The Governor as President of both possessed an ordinary and a casting vote to 
ensure an official majority.
111
  The 13 unofficial members of the Legislature were elected 
civilians made up of seven Europeans, three Chinese, one Indian, one Malay and one 
Eurasian. The disconcerting use of „unofficial‟ meant only that they were not government                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
servants. All members of the Councils were addressed as „honourable‟. 
The FMS had a Federal Council as the central authority and each state had its own 
State Council. In addition, they also had two further forums for political debate. A Residents 
Conference, held as frequently as the meetings of the Federal Council, comprised the High 
Commissioner and the four Residents. There was a Durbar, following each federal meeting, 
at which the High Commissioner presided over the four Rulers together with their Residents 
and the Federal Secretary.   The remaining five Unfederated States arranged their affairs 
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differently, not only from the Colony and the FMS but also to a degree different from each 
other.  The state of Johore provided an Executive and State Council and the Sultan himself 
presided over the Executive Council.  The others had one Council only which combined the 
functions of legislative and financial controls and was led by a Prime Minister, in the case of 
Trengganu, otherwise by Malay Chiefs and senior Malay officials. All of the UMS had 
British Advisers on their Councils.   
The Economy and the People. 
One of the major tasks of the colonial administration was to keep the economy 
growing and running efficiently. The two major commodities that gave Malaya its 
prominence in South East Asia in the early twentieth century were the rich and extensive 
deposits of high-grade tin ore and an abundance of cultivated rubber. Rice was also a major 
crop grown mainly in north Malaya, as was palm oil throughout the peninsula.  The First 
World War generated a huge demand for tin and rubber and, by 1920, Malaya was exporting 
more than half of the world‟s total rubber production (196,000 tons).  The demand for both 
commodities fell off during the economic slump of the 1929 but afterwards picked up again, 
with the emergent American car industry being a major consumer. On the eve of the Second 
World War, European companies owned 74 per cent of the rubber estates in Malaya. Of the 
remainder, 17 per cent by Chinese, 5 per cent by Indians and 4 per cent by other Asians, 
mainly Japanese.
112
 British companies owned the majority of the European estates. 
 The tin mining industry came to be dominated by the Europeans who in the inter-war 
years acquired abandoned mines from the Chinese. With revolutionary new methods of 
dredging, these ore deposits still yielded high-grade tin. European capital was heavily 
invested in the industry and in time control passed from the Chinese to the British. Chinese 
men continued to be the industry‟s labour force. Production of tin in the years preceding the 
war was about 90,000 tons per year.  In 1941, it was 82,188 tons. Rubber cultivation covered 
some 3,250,000 acres and in 1940 produced 505,749 tons and in 1941 to 31
st
 October, 
500,982 tons.  The sales of these commodities, mainly to the USA, were invaluable in terms 
of foreign exchange particularly at this critical period.   In 1939, Malayan sales to the USA 
stood at 235 million Straits dollars and exceeded the country‟s import expenditure by more 
than 12 million American dollars a month. No other colony matched these figures.
113
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The colonial civil administration had to contend with the demographic changes 
encouraged by a thriving colonial economy. A major concern of indigenous Malays was the 
high proportion and distribution of non-Malays in the country.  By 1931, the population of 
4.5 million in Malaya included 1.7 million Chinese, 1.6 million Malays, the remainder 
including Indians and others.
114
  The 1931 Census Report also showed that geographical 
factors were an important feature in the distribution of Malaya‟s varied population.  The 
indigenous Malays were predominantly concentrated in areas of agricultural smallholdings; 
there were also a number of mainly Malay fishing communities along the east and west 
littoral coasts.  The northern states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu were almost 
wholly Malay.    
The great variety of the population would produce its own negative consequences in 
the final events of the region. Some understanding of their differences is an essential part of 
an understanding of the outcome. Different races and peoples worked in distinct industries 
but had no motive or desire to enter into a multi- faceted society.  The Chinese community in 
Malaya, arriving mainly as traders from southern mainland China and settling along the 
western seaboard, were long established.  The Chinese were largely an urban society, and in 
time, whole communities moved into the hinterland where they came to dominate the 
lucrative tin industry. Chinese immigration further swelled in the early 20
th
 century, drawn by 
the economic opportunities of the increasing world demand for this commodity. However, the 
varied Chinese factions were accompanied by Chinese secret societies and criminal 
organisations, which thrived and took control of important industries like the large import/ 
export trading houses.  In particular, the secret societies tended to dominate the labourers who 
worked in the tin mines with great ruthlessness, even when control of the business moved to 
western management. The bulk of the Indian population on the other hand, worked on the 
rubber and tea estates where there were only a few Chinese and almost no Malays.  The 
Indians, mainly Tamils from southern India, were imported in increasing numbers to meet the 
needs of the expanding rubber industry, in large part.
115
   The Tamils were also attracted to 
the growing railways network and the ancillary work associated with it.   
At first the Chinese and Indians were seen as a transient population, but by the 1930s, 
significant numbers had either decided to settle or lacked the ability to return to their 
homelands.  Over time the three populations, Chinese, Malay and Indian, retreated into their 
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own communities. Their ethnic and cultural differences, were deepened by British perceptions 
and policies. Stereotyped attitudes meant that the Malays were effectively excluded from the 
modernising economy, as lacking the requisite drive and work ethic.  Their upper class was 
encouraged to think about an English public school-style education and a career within the 
branch of government, which administered the Malays.
116
  The indigenous Malays were 
regarded as rice farmers and fisher-folk, and their vernacular education was tailored to such 
modest aspirations. The growing towns and cities of British Malaya, predominantly populated 
by Chinese, became unfamiliar places to most Malays.  The Chinese were now a mixture of 
Straits-born Chinese, who took pride in calling themselves „the King‟s Chinese‟ and 
immigrants from mainland China. They differed from each other not only in language but also 
in their diverse ethnic groupings. Nevertheless, all had a traditional inclination to organise 
themselves into fraternal societies or triads to which they gave their primary loyalty.  
Administering  this diverse Chinese population required a separate department of government, 
known as the „Chinese Protectorate‟. The head of this department, „Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs‟, an MCS official, sat on the Executive and Legislative Councils of both the Colony 
and the Federal Council. At first the Chinese were allowed to manage their own educational 
systems, in Chinese Languages or English, but this came to be seen to be a flawed policy 
enabling the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Chinese leaders to control the content of the curriculum for their own propaganda. 
117
  Much 
later it was realised that some of these schools had become breeding grounds for the 
promotion of communist ideology.  The Chinese Protectorate department claimed that it 
„needed every scrap of advice and assistance it could get, for not only did Chinese affairs 
frequently assume all aspects of an empire within an empire but also of anarchy within that 
empire‟.118  Conversely, most Indians were effectively subjects of the rubber estates on which 
they laboured; their children received Indian language education untainted by any such 
political motives.     
Thus with most Malays in villages, Chinese in towns and Indians on plantations, the 
various ethnic groups basically lived in their own neighbourhoods, followed different 
occupations, practiced their own religions, spoke their own languages, and operated their own 
schools. Such separation of the communities made the emergence of nationalism, in the sense 
of a pan-ethnic movement highly unlikely. The racial divisions, intentional or not, almost 
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entirely avoided the rise of a united anti-colonial sentiment which many other Western 
colonies in Asia endured before the Second World War. 
119
  
In summary, most Malays tended to be loyal to their particular state and sultan. Clan, 
dialect, and a growing commitment to either the Kuomintang or the communists of China 
divided the Chinese. The Indians maintained their allegiance with their homeland and saw 
their existence in Malaya purely in terms of work opportunity.  Nevertheless, relations 
between the races were generally good.  The Malays welcomed the protecting presence of the 
British partly because they had a concealed but increasing anxiety about the growing Chinese 
presence.  However, this multinational arrangement while superficially satisfactory had a 
fundamental and important flaw.  There was no common bond of love of country uniting 
these disparate communities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
A Colonial Situation 
On the eve of the Second World War, Malaya was rich both financially and in mineral 
wealth, a colony efficiently run and with the brightest prospects.  The profits from its 
successful exports were reinvested in the country‟s infrastructure. Malaya had a better road 
network than any other country in the Empire, and a railway system that was extensive and 
expanding.
120
  All the services necessary for the country‟s health and efficient management 
were in place, hospitals, schools, telecommunications, banking, post, transport, judiciary, 
police, agricultural, fisheries and forestry commissions.   During the pre-war period, the 
administration of British Malaya allied with the healthy economy made for a contented 
people with no discernable evidence of dissatisfaction with the existing form of government.  
The British authorities were confident in declaring that in Malaya „good government was 
preferred to self-government.‟121 Even so, the nature of the colonial economy and its mixed 
society meant the administration always had to be alert for potential domestic strife. Strikes 
by workers for better working conditions and higher wages were not unusual. More worrying 
however, the rise of discontented Chinese believing that communism was a better form of 
government than democracy. There was also the problem of their engaging in habitual gang 
wars. While not unduly threatening, these activities caused occasional disturbances that 
disrupted the country‟s economy.   
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 Labour unrest had existed in varying degrees since the Depression of the early 1930s.  
Beforehand, from 1911 to 1931, the government encouraged unrestricted immigration from 
India, China and the Netherlands East Indies to provide much-needed workers for the 
booming tin and rubber industries.  When world prices in these commodities fell during the 
depression of the early 1930‟s, the government favoured the repatriation of alien labour.  A 
restricted immigration law came into force from 1931.  The new law left them vulnerable to 
the corruption of ruthless Chinese gang bosses able to prey not only on their desperation for 
work, but also to avoid returning to the starvation and population pressure in the provinces of 
Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi from which many labourers came. These same provinces 
however, were also the stronghold of the Kuomintang and the scene of anti-British boycotts 
and the immigrants brought their political values with them to Malaya. So concerned was the 
government that in 1927 it was forced to introduce an ordinance which provided for the 
deportation of undesirables. Later in 1931, while officially declaring the Kuomintang party 
illegal, in fact its curbed  behaviour was tolerated during most of the 1930‟s.122   
The first disturbances occurred among the Chinese labourers as the depression began 
to recede commodity prices began to rise and they felt they were not sharing in the returning 
prosperity.  In 1936, there was a serious strike among the tin-miners from the „Hong Fatt‟ 
mine in Selangor, which prevented operations for several days. Then both the Indian and 
Chinese employees of the Singapore Traction Company struck for higher wages and shorter 
working hours. This event turned out to be the longest and most serious strike in Malaya‟s 
history. In 1937, the largest known strikes in Malaya involving thousands of Chinese rubber 
tappers took place in Selangor; and in 1938 and 1939 a further series of serious strikes 
occurred.  In late 1940, the Indian rubber tappers demonstrated their sympathy for the 
Chinese labourers and also came out on strike, even though they were better paid and had 
considerably better working conditions.
123
  
British officials in Malaya were becoming increasingly concerned at the growth of 
radical ideas, especially those that threatened the socioeconomic framework on which the 
colonial government rested.  Their primary focus was on the Chinese community where the 
government‟s abandonment of responsibility for the education of the Chinese labour force 
was a major contribution to the propagation of left wing ideas.  These developments, strikes 
and anti-colonial May Day rallies in 1940, provoked a strong reaction from the authorities, 
and in July more than 200 communist leaders in Singapore and Malaya were arrested. The 
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colonial authorities in London were so concerned at the effect of the strikes on the vital 
production of rubber and tin that they suggested sending out a trained union official to 
examine the situation and advise on the introduction of the procedures of negotiation and 
arbitration. Perhaps inevitably, the „Government shied off this radical experiment and 
unwisely rejected this suggestion from the Colonial Office...‟124   
An important aspect of this period of civil and industrial unrest was the successful 
employment of the Police force to meet and contain many of the more violent 
demonstrations. The ordinary police officers were mainly Malays and Sikhs; the detective 
branch was largely Chinese with a few Indians. They were well trained and led by 
predominantly European officers.  The containment of some volatile and potentially 
explosive incidents earned them general admiration from not only the public but also the 
approval of the strikers themselves.  In the process, they accumulated considerable 
intelligence about the subversive elements, mainly among the Chinese community, who were 
using the industrial disputes to foment and spread communist doctrine. In summary, the 
internal industrial unrest and the nascent attempt to spread communist doctrine were no more 
than symptoms of disaffection; they did not indicate an attempt to create a subversive fifth 
column. They were however a worrying and inconvenient distraction at this time.   
Civil Servants and the Administration of Defence under Shenton Thomas, 1934-1942 
Sir Shenton Thomas was the senior government official during this time 
125
 and his 
arrival in the appointment was generally greeted as a welcome antidote to his predecessor Sir 
Cecil Clementi, a notable sinologist and previously Governor of Hong Kong. Clementi had 
not been popular because of his reforming zeal. He was of the school that advocated 
devolution of power from Kuala Lumpur, aiming to unify the country with Malays taking 
greater responsibility for government.  He proposed a Pan-Malayan Union. „Opposition was 
vehement. The Colony objected strongly to a proposal which swept away its foundation of 
free trade; the Unfederated refused to lie down with the Federated States‟.126 His consistent 
and inflexible promotion of this ideal was to be his downfall and in 1934, after only four 
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years in post, he was replaced by Thomas. The Colonial Office „confident of their ability to 
rule well, they also felt that self-government for a society so obviously divided on ethnic lines 
would be a disservice to the Malayan peoples‟.127  
Thoroughly briefed by the Colonial Office Thomas stayed well away from questions 
of self-government and the initial impression he gave was that he was there to learn and that 
he would take his time before making any comment.  The business community found him 
approachable, friendly and sound.
128
  When he assumed the appointment in 1934, he was 55 
years old and supposed it to be his last career appointment before retiring at 60. However, he 
was surprised and pleased when asked in 1939 to extend his service. Britain then at war with 
Nazi Germany the Colonial Office decided a change at that point was not desirable.  When 
Japan invaded Malaya in late 1941, Thomas was nearly 63 years of age.  Many observers 
have described him as an affable, sociable person, solid, imperturbable and unimaginative 
who rose to the position he held not through outstanding ability but because of long and 
conscientious service.
129
 Later, however, Thomas drew opprobrium for what was described as 
less than total commitment to the country. He showed little apparent personal incentive to 
plant deep roots for himself in Malaya or to gain a profound understanding of the local 
terrain.  Early in the job, he made a visible effort to visit and acquaint himself with the 
region, the country its peoples and their rulers, albeit he travelled in great style and comfort, 
but he never took the trouble to learn Malay, recognisably not a difficult language. He thus 
lost some of his standing with senior Malays by always having to rely on interpreters and 
perhaps, in a way, indicating that he had no more than a superficial and temporary 
commitment to the country. It was also noticed that after his initial foray, he rarely made the 
effort to visit outlying rulers.  He was, however, comfortable with his staff of Civil Servants 
who held the many senior administrative appointments.  
However, in a little known and rarely mentioned episode, he showed a disconcerting 
lack of judgement, which exposed a surprising lack of integrity. In 1938, he was confronted 
with a serious accusation of corruption within the Magistracy of the FMS. One of his 
colleagues, Sir Roger Hall, after a brief time in the position of Chief Justice to the Federated 
Malay States, asked to resign because he could not serve as the head of a legal system that 
was so venal, incompetent, and extensively corrupt. Thomas persuaded him not to resign but 
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instead to examine and report on the whole system of justice in the FMS.  Hall‟s account 
“Report of the Chief Justice into Allegations of Incompetency and Corruption in the 
Magistracy of the FMS”130  was a damning indictment of a legal system not only riddled with 
corruption but also presided over by many unqualified magistrates. So shocking was the 
report, Thomas suppressed it. A year later, the Colonial Office heard of its existence because 
Hall - who had anyway resigned from Malaya – brought up the subject while visiting London 
in a conversation with the Legal department at the CO. Sir Grattan Bushe, the head Legal 
Adviser, then challenged Thomas about the existence of the report. The Governor disparaged 
the document and claimed that in any case “it was a secret report for the Governor‟s 
information and was strictly confidential”.131  Bushe was astonished at this comment and 
rebuked Thomas reminding him that nothing in Colonial Territories should be withheld from 
the CO. Further, in an internal memo Bushe said „…in my view a Governor who hides from 
the Secretary of State such grave events as these, is doing the Colonial Office a gross 
disservice.‟132 Thomas‟s withholding information and dismissing bad news was a character 
defect that was to manifest itself again in the more serious circumstances of wartime Malaya.     
As noted, the business of administration in Malaya was a slow and indirect process 
that characterized Thomas‟ administration even after the outbreak of war in Europe. At a 
meeting of the Legislative Council in Singapore on 16 October 1939,  Shenton Thomas made 
a lengthy address to the chamber and among other things said : - 
When I addressed you at the Budget Meeting of last year I was able to 
give expression to the relief we all felt at being spared the horrors of war 
and the hope that we might be blessed with real enduring peace. That 
hope has not been fulfilled.  Great Britain is once again at war, fighting 
for the freedom of the world from Nazi domination.  In this, she has the 
full support of the British Empire which, as in 1914, has placed its whole 
resources at the disposal of the Mother Country in her hour of need. We 
know that victory will be ours… 
 Here in Malaya our duty is clear. Last year this country set an 
example to the Colonial Empire in its contributions to Imperial defence. 
The Colony of the Straits Settlements alone made a free-will offering of 
one million pounds, and decided to increase its annual contribution by $2 
million for a period of five years.  Most of the Malay States gave 
according to their means and I felt very proud that I should be [the] 
channel through which these voluntary tokens of loyalty were 
communicated to the Secretary of State…133 
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This comment and others throughout his speech underlines the difference between his 
authority over the Straits Settlements and his lesser influence in the Malay States. In the same 
address, he took the opportunity to raise a number of civil defence matters and warn about 
likely future food controls and the possibility of increased training for military volunteers. 
Further demonstrating the separation of thought and deed between the administrations, he 
explained that a system of broadcasts had been arranged for keeping the people informed by 
means of loud speakers. They would be placed in the most thickly populated areas of 
Singapore. Pointedly he spoke only of Singapore, not even the other members of the Straits 
Settlements let alone the FMS and the UMS. 
134
  
All military matters and particularly those relating to the defence of Singapore and 
Malaya during the inter-war years was the domain of the Armed Services. Although the 
government was not involved in the minutiae of tactical details, the Governor was fully 
informed of the detailed strategy and military intentions.  Until the possibility of war loomed 
larger, the civil authorities were content to leave in place the conventional arrangements for 
frequent scrutiny of the nation‟s defensive plans, to the GOC.  He controlled these reviews 
through a number of sub-committees, which assumed responsibility for various aspects of the 
scheme. Representatives of the other two Services and civil servants were appointed these 
where it was appropriate. One body dealt with the supply of food for the population of 
Malaya during war.  In August 1938, taking note of the changing international scene, 
Thomas, prompted by his staff, decided that emergency food supplies should be the subject of 
a separate study. He nominated a senior civil servant, C. A. Vlieland a man with twenty-six 
years‟ service in Malaya, to undertake this task.  Vlieland had never served in the armed 
forces but had a keen interest in military affairs and military strategy. Quite rightly, as part of 
his investigation, he examined the extant defensive plan. He concluded first that the defence 
plan was deficient in its scope and second, that the existing Defence Committee should be 
reconstituted to include greater civilian representation.  In a Memoir he wrote after he left 
Singapore, he recorded: - 
     Up to the end of 1938 the defence organisation in Malaya consisted of a 
Defence Committee with a set of sub-committees for various aspects of 
planning preparedness – food supply, transport, medical, A.R.P. Man-power 
etc.  The Army was overwhelmingly represented on all of these and 
exercised practically the sole initiative.  The GSO 3 at Fort Canning was the 
secretary of the Committee and a member of most of the sub-committees and 
his office was the only centre resembling a defence secretariat. No one with 
experience of committee organisations will need telling how such an 
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organisation would work.  It would I think not be unfair to say that the naval 
representatives were not much interested, the RAF was disgusted with the 
whole setup and busy civilian administrators, engineers, doctors and 
policemen regarded their duties on the various committees as a tiresome and 
time wasting chore. 
135
 
 
In response to Vlieland‟s report, at the end of 1938, Thomas brought together a 
number of the uncoordinated sub-committees, under the direction and control of the Secretary 
for Defence, Malaya, a new office to which Vlieland was appointed. As Thomas described it, 
the job „was, in effect, the defence branch of the Colonial and Federal Secretariats and the 
High Commissioners Office, and focused and co-ordinated civil defence policy and practice 
throughout Malaya.‟136  The Governor, as Commander-in-Chief, decided it was appropriate 
that he should be Chairman of this new Defence Committee and defined his task as that of 
considering questions affecting the fighting Services and the civil defence departments, 
although, as noted, nothing in his previous career had prepared him to preside over such a 
committee.  The heads of the three Services were all now members, which was a sensible 
adaptation; previously the Navy and RAF Commanders relied on briefings from their 
subordinate representatives on the various sub-committees.  In the case of the Air 
Commander, he positively welcomed the change as it gave him and his Service a much 
greater say in the formulation of policy. In due course, the Committee was increased to 
include three unofficial members of the Legislative and Federal Councils. The Commander-
in-Chief, Far East, and the Commander-in-Chief Far East Fleet, at their own request, were not 
substantive members but had an open invitation to attend, which they invariably did. When 
war broke out in Europe, the Governor changed the title „Defence‟ to „War Committee‟.  It 
met at irregular intervals at the discretion of the Chairman when he believed or was 
persuaded that there were enough serious matters calling for attention. However, while the 
committee was empowered to discuss questions affecting the Services and the civil defence 
departments, it had no executive function. In matters relating to defence in the Malay states, 
the Defence Secretary was authorized to deal direct with the British Resident or Advisor in 
each of the states who in turn, and taking account of Vlieland‟s guidance, had authority to 
make decisions on behalf of the state.  The War Committee had no agenda and kept no 
minutes.  
As noted previously (Chapter 1), this unusual and un-professional arrangement 
astonished Brooke-Popham and provoked him to insist that records be kept, much to the 
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irritation of the civil servants. Because earlier meetings were not documented there is no 
record of matters discussed or decisions taken. The gatherings were fractious and 
unproductive.  To add to Brooke-Popham‟s exasperation he found Vlieland‟s unhurried 
response to implementing committee decisions maddening „He [Vlieland] seems to have 
established procrastination as a fine art…‟ 137 
In April 1940, Thomas left Singapore for England for his due entitlement of home 
leave.  This decision was at the time and subsequently, strongly criticised as bordering on 
irresponsible in view of the escalating war in the West and the growing Japanese threat in 
East Asia.  He left the affairs of government in the hands of his deputy Stanley Jones, the 
Colonial Secretary, who became in situ the „Officer Administering the Government‟ (OAG).  
Jones, a long serving officer in the MCS, has been described by a colleague, Hugh Bryson, as 
„a dour type who found it hard to admit himself wrong; blunt and plain spoken….Jones was 
either complacent at best or defeatist at worst‟.138   In the event, 1940 proved to be a critical 
year both on the domestic scene and in terms of military and civil defence preparations.  
Decisions made during this period had far-reaching effects on later events and resolutions, 
that subsequent commanders could only change with great difficulty. In general, those in 
charge had to live with.   
The senior figures in both the civil and military organizations (the military 
commanders at this time were Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Lionel Bond, Air Vice-Marshall 
Babington and Admiral Sir Percy Noble), were ill-assorted, frequently disagreeing with each 
other and on a number of major issues quite incompatible. Vlieland‟s relationship with the 
military was especially abrasive. It is claimed by some that his elevation to the appointment 
of Secretary for Defence with direct and unfiltered access to the Governor bred in Vlieland a 
touch of megalomania.
139
  He treated most senior military officers with disdain and believed 
that he was their intellectual superior.  On his departure Thomas did not help matters by 
saying to his Secretary for Defence “Remember Vlieland, I rely on you to hold the fort while 
I am away and not let Bond get away with it.  Jones knows very little of the defence side, and 
you‟ll have to keep him straight”.140  
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Not long after Thomas left, Vlieland took it upon himself to compose an 
„Appreciation of the Defence of Malaya‟, in July 1940.141    It was a well-presented, prescient 
and accurate forecast of how he anticipated the Japanese would invade Malaya even to the 
extent of identifying the very beaches on which they in fact landed and how he saw the 
campaign developing.  It was intensely resented by the GOC as a gross intrusion into military 
affairs that were not his concern. Moreover, as the new GOC had only recently taken up his 
appointment and had fresh in his mind the War Office briefings that did not accord with the 
Vlieland appreciation, he was extremely offended by this interference.  Their professional 
relationship started badly and did not recover.  In addition, what soon became apparent to 
Bond, was that the „Appreciation‟ was supportive of the Air Commander‟s views of the 
defence of Malaya and this in turn led to the most fundamental disagreement between the two 
Commanders over the core concept of the defence plan.  In his Memoir Vlieland records
 142
: - 
 “It was clear from the first that General Bond‟s briefing by the War 
Office, no less than his own point of view, were going to make things 
very difficult…..He clearly thought that my functions should be strictly 
confined to “civil defence” and that defence policy and military strategy 
were no concern of mine, or even the Governor.  But worse than all this 
was that he told me specifically, at his first interview with me, that his 
orders were to defend Singapore and did not permit him to concern 
himself with the peninsula.  All this was more than tiresome. ….Until Sir 
Shenton went on leave in April 1940 the balance of power in defence 
councils was secure. The Naval C-in-C was still in Hong Kong and the 
senior naval officer in Singapore gave no trouble.  The Air C-in-C was 
wholeheartedly on the side of the Governor and myself, and determined 
upon the defence of all Malaya; and I had Sir Shenton behind and with 
me all the way”   
          
This outburst written in 1944, when Vlieland had been removed from his appointment 
and was back in England, conveys the passion and conviction with which he saw his role as 
Secretary for Defence.  It is a greatly inflated image of the task that he had described in the 
Straits Times newspaper of 30 December 1938 announcing his appointment. He detailed his 
duties as -  
 Wartime censorship arrangements. 
 Passive Air Raid precautions. 
 Maintenance of Food Supplies. 
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 Emergency transport organisations. 
 Mobilisation of manpower for maintenance of essential services. 
 Other social, economic and administrative readjustments, which are necessary 
in time of war.
143
 
The decisions of the War Committee applied unconditionally to the Straits 
Settlements but were offered as advice and guidance to the FMS and the UMS.  In the case of 
the Federated States, it was safe to assume the decisions would be steered through the Federal 
Council by the Federal Secretary, Hugh Fraser. However, with the five Unfederated States, 
the British Adviser of each put the matter before the State Council for consideration and 
authorization. The process of gaining unison patently took time, but there was no alternative. 
To change the various constitutional arrangements would have required major legislation, 
endorsed by the Colonial Office, and then fought fiercely through the layers of administrative 
State resistance.  There was a great reluctance to declare Martial Law in 1940, when the 
authorities were concerned to portray an image of confidence and reassure the nation there 
was no threat, (which most of them firmly believed it to be so, or certainly not a threat that 
could be dealt with), this was clearly not an option. Even later, when the country was on the 
verge of being overwhelmed, the British authorities could not agree among themselves to 
impose Martial Law.
144
               
 The scattering and distance of the three Services Headquarters from each other and 
these in turn from central government almost certainly inhibited the growth of unity and 
integration.  Government House was a very grand residence within its own generous park. It 
included a nine-hole golf course, was outside the city area and quite separate from other 
government departments, which were in a variety of buildings within Singapore city. 
A Third Commander-in-Chief and a Minister Resident. 
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham‟s mandate, as noted, was to co-ordinate the activities of 
the air and land forces. His area of responsibility stretched from Hong Kong to Singapore and 
included Burma. He was in post by the time Shenton Thomas returned from leave. Previously 
there was no overall commander of the three Services.  The Directive given to Brooke-
Popham was that only the General Officers Commanding Land and Air Forces, would be 
subordinate to him. Control of naval operations was to remain directly under the 
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Commander-in-Chief, China Fleet.   His task was primarily concerned with matters of major 
military policy and strategy.  He was not to relieve his subordinate commanders of any of 
their administrative, financial or other normal command functions.
145
 
A year later it was becoming apparent in London that even with Brooke- Popham in 
place the conduct and co-ordination of government-military affairs in Singapore were not 
running smoothly, and an additional senior government official was needed. The authorities 
in London decided that a Minister of cabinet rank should go to Singapore and give advice on 
the situation.  Duff Cooper was chosen. At that time he held the sinecure appointment of 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Previously he had been Minister for Information in 
Churchill‟s wartime cabinet, a post from which he was removed.   He arrived in Singapore in 
September 1941, and filed his first report the following month.  As mentioned earlier, he was 
astonished that two Commanders-in-Chief, one for the Far East and one for China, lived side 
by side at the Naval Base at Singapore, which he considered neither practical nor convenient: 
and he was particularly vituperative about the pedantic, leisurely, lack of urgency that 
permeated government business.
146
 
Thomas resented the arrival of Duff Cooper and was offended the London authorities 
felt it necessary to appoint a „Cabinet Minister Resident, Singapore‟147 He wrote: 
 “The news of Duff Cooper‟s appointment to the Far East had been received 
with little enthusiasm.  He had not been successful as a Minister of 
Information and had been demoted to be Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster. We felt we were being landed with a failure. We remembered Sir 
Stafford Cripps‟ description of him as a “petulant little pipsqueak”148       
 
It is probably fair to say, based on many written comments, that Duff Cooper did not 
relish his time in Singapore. He resented being away from London, by then the centre of 
international attention, and felt remote from his friends and his colleague Churchill. By his 
own admission, he missed the social scene in which he was acknowledged as a serial 
philanderer.
149
  He was not in a frame of mind to confront the parochial, insular and to his 
mind petty bureaucracy clogging the machinery of government.  Nevertheless, at this time of 
serious concern about Japanese aggressive expansionist behaviour, brutally frank honesty 
was called for together with major political surgery to jolt the inertia of the colonial 
government.   Duff Cooper did not get on with Thomas, thought Brooke-Popham too old, and 
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out of his depth for the growing military threat facing Singapore and Malaya. His first report 
to London after a month of observation and regional visits was comprehensive and 
perceptive. His major observation was that the complex and varied London Offices of State 
administering British interests in S. E. Asia led to confusion and territorial conflict. He 
pointed out that the diplomatic or consular representatives at Tokyo, Chungking, Bangkok, 
Manila, Saigon, and Batavia reported to the Foreign Office, while the Governors of the 
Straits Settlements and Hong Kong, to the Colonial Office. Further the Governor of Burma 
referred to the Burma Office, while High Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand 
represented the Dominions Office but usually had a diplomatic officer on their staff who was 
appointed by the Foreign Office.  To add to the complexity he added,  
The Governor of the Straits Settlements was also High Commissioner for 
Malaya, and Malaya was composed of a Crown Colony, of a Federation of 
Malay States and of group of Unfederated States, each of these three elements 
differing from the others in method of government and in other important 
respects. Here existed a system under which four different types of official 
reported to and received orders from four different departments of State….and no 
effort was made to co-ordinate the activities of the officials or the policies of the 
departments concerned.
 150
   
 
Looking at the future of the region, he foresaw it developing into a major world 
producer of industrial goods and an important provider of natural resources. To co-ordinate 
Britain‟s interests he recommended the creation of a Secretary of State for the Far East.  In a 
separate private letter to Churchill, he suggested the former prime minister of Australia Sir 
Robert Menzies for this role.  Churchill minuted at the bottom of the letter „I am against 
Menzies; I think DC should be told to stay there and do it himself.‟151   Duff Cooper‟s wife, 
Diana, who was with him in Singapore, anticipated this response believing that „Winston will 
think Duff comfortably out of the way and offer him the post.‟152 In the event, the proposal 
was made redundant by the Japanese invasion. Nevertheless, when the war began, he 
nevertheless volunteered to perform the co-ordinating duties suggested in his report „pending 
the appointment of a successor‟. In a reply from London, he was appointed „Resident 
Minister at Singapore for Far Eastern Affairs‟.153 
 In addition to pointing out the anomaly of having two C-in-C‟s, Duff Cooper 
remarked on the unsatisfactory intelligence gathering and dissemination arrangements. The 
Far Eastern Combined Intelligence Bureau (FECB) which while performing most useful 
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work, had a  serious flaw in that it lacked a civilian branch, there was a danger of the 
political, diplomatic and economic value of information not being correctly estimated.  
Moreover, because the Bureau had individuals reporting to different government departments 
„working independently of one another and sometimes in ignorance of each other‟s action, 
[it] could not be expected to produce entirely satisfactorily results‟. Further, on duplication of 
effort, Duff Cooper reported, „I was distressed to learn that the representative of my former 
Department, the Ministry of Information, was engaged on precisely similar work to that of a 
representative of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.  Two officials in fact engaged on the 
same task were reporting to two different departments in London.‟154      
He was also scornful that a useful and important Services Public Relations Office, 
which was sensibly set up at the behest of Brooke-Popham, was placed in the hands of a 
retired Naval Commander who had spent the previous twenty years as a Magistrate in Fiji. 
The press correspondents found him obstinate and quite out of his depth.  One of his female 
staff, Anne Kennaway, remarked in her book Journey by Candlelight.  „The Commander was 
right when he said he had no experience of Public Relations …He was totally unsuited to the 
job, knowing little of the press world and the correspondents were indignant at his lack of 
understanding.‟ 155 They complained of the severe censorship of their reports and of 
information being withheld from them. They were also contemptuous of material issued from 
GHQ dismissing it as propaganda. 
 To allay fears among senior figures, Duff Cooper explained that the purpose of his 
new appointment was to give the Commanders-in-Chief political guidance and relieve them 
as far as possible of extraneous responsibilities so that they could give their full attention to 
the conduct of the campaign.  Importantly, he was given the power to settle emergency 
matters on the spot when there was no time to refer to London and he could delegate to 
departmental officers authority to incur expenditure when he believed urgent action was 
necessary.   In this role, he assumed Chairmanship of a newly formed „War Council‟ 
replacing Shenton Thomas‟s local „War Committee‟, and while it was ostensibly a forum for 
the whole of the Far East Theatre, the majority of its agenda addressed only the immediate 
local problems. He also took control of the affairs of civil defence forming a Civil Defence 
Committee.  Membership of the new War Council was extended to include Sir George 
Sansom (Director of Publicity) and Mr V. G. Bowden representing the Australian 
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government and, if he wished to attend, Major General Gordon Bennett, the commander of 
the 8
th
 Australian Division.  
 The formation of the new War Council was not unanimously welcomed, Brooke-
Popham fought hard against its creation. In a secret and personal letter to Prime Minister 
Churchill, Duff Cooper said; -  
The Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, is one of those people who find it quite 
impossible to adjust their minds to war conditions. He is also the mouthpiece 
of the last person he speaks to.  When I informed him of my appointment he 
professed himself delighted, welcomed the idea of a War Council and was 
most helpful at the first meeting which we held the same afternoon.  That 
evening he dined with Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and at the meeting next 
morning he supported the latter‟s attitude in contesting the need for a War 
Council, and produced stronger arguments against it than Sir R. Brooke-
Popham could produce himself.
156
   
 
In this same letter, Duff Cooper took the opportunity to give vent to his personal 
jaundiced opinions of the leading figures in Singapore; he claimed that Brooke-Popham „is a 
very much older man than his years warrant and sometimes seems on the verge of collapse‟.  
Regarding Thomas, „the Governor is very much influenced by his Colonial Secretary, a 
sinister figure called Stanley Jones who is universally detested in the Colony, where he is 
accused of having been defeatist since the beginning of the war‟.  Regarding General 
Percival, the GOC, „is a nice good man who began life as a schoolmaster.  I am sometimes 
tempted to wish he had remained one‟.157  He then asked for Churchill‟s permission to sack 
Stanley Jones and replace him with the „admirable‟ Federal Secretary from Kuala Lumpur, 
Hugh Fraser.  
In the critical period leading to the outbreak of war, there was not only a cumbersome 
bureaucratic system of governance but also serious dissension, and debilitating jealousy 
among and between both the leading civil and military figures responsible for the safety of 
the country. The discord inexorably led to a fundamental dispute about preparations, both 
civil and military, to meet the growing and increasingly obvious conflict ahead.    By 
December 1940, there was a Secretary for Defence, Vlieland, disagreeing to the point of 
obstruction with the Army commander about the basic concept of the defensive plans. The 
Air Commander agreeing with Vlieland and barely on speaking terms with the Army 
Commander.  An Acting head of Government, Jones (OAG), quite remote and almost 
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disinterested in military affairs.  An elderly Commander-in-Chief, (Brooke-Popham), 
burdened with an impossibly large parish, and an old-fashioned unsure touch towards its 
military problems.  An ethnically divided population, not fully aware of the threat to its 
existence and quite unprepared for the rigours of war.   
By the middle of 1941, Vlieland, the Army Commander (Bond), and the Air 
Commander (Babington) had all been replaced; a Resident Minister for Singapore had been 
appointed and the Commander-in-Chief had been told he was to be relieved of his 
appointment. In addition, on Duff Cooper‟s recommendation, Stanley Jones, had been 
removed from the important and senior appointment of Colonial Secretary. Hugh Fraser the 
Federal Secretary from Kuala Lumpur replaced him.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE IMPRECISE BATTLE PLAN. 
 
The naval base at Singapore became the focus of British strategic military planning in 
the Far East even before its completion in 1938. What is often overlooked but of no less 
significance, was the fact that the island was also the seat of the Governor and centre of 
British power in the area. Together these two criteria made the island‟s protection of 
paramount importance. It is surprising therefore, that both the civil and military authorities in 
London did not, from the beginning, work together on formulating a common modus 
operandi that would have made the formulation of joint plans a lot easier. As it was, there 
were rudimentary differences between the government and the military in Singapore on the 
basic question of how serious was the threat to their region.  Each had a different perception 
of the Japanese threat, which in turn determined what they considered priorities.  As we 
know, in early 1940, the Governor was instructed, unequivocally, to direct all of Malaya‟s 
civil energy to the production of rubber and tin: not only because they were vital 
commodities of war, but also for the foreign exchange these products generated.  The 
military, on the other hand, were there to defend the naval base against a possible Japanese 
attack, and to this end needed not only all practical civil support possible, but also the country 
to be made fully aware both of the lurking danger and be put on a war footing - with all the 
manpower, preparations and training this entailed.  The Governor saw such a course as 
alarmist, and certainly counterproductive, because he believed it would affect the morale of 
the people, which in turn would prejudice the country‟s industrial effort.   
This was the background to the defensive plan, which the military staff attempted to 
draw up. These complex deliberations were made more difficult by the serious shortage of 
vital military manpower and equipment.     
The Strategic Importance of Singapore. 
Singapore rose to strategic prominence when Great Britain examined its global 
commitments in relation to its military capabilities in the wake of the First World War.  A 
significant factor when considering the Far East was that Britain was not comfortable with 
Japan‟s post-war expansionist behaviour. Even though Japan had been an ally of the west 
during the war, indeed Britain had signed an Anglo-Japanese Agreement with Japan in 1902, 
senior British military Chiefs concluded that Japan‟s aggressive tendencies posed a threat to 
its eastern trade routes and her Dominions in the southern Pacific.  The chief purpose of 
which was to „maintain the status quo in the extreme East and that the two governments were 
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entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies.‟158 However, in succeeding decades, 
Japan‟s behaviour appeared to ignore the principle of this covenant. Most noticeable was the 
significant increase in the size of its navy and an obvious intent upon an expansionist policy. 
A perceptible change in the international balance of naval power had taken place; the United 
Kingdom had ceased to be the supreme global naval force.  The United States now matched 
the tonnage of Britain‟s High Seas fleet and Japan was not far behind.  After its devastating 
wartime expenditure, Britain was in no position to embark on a shipbuilding programme in 
order to retain her naval supremacy.  In any case, America was concerned about Britain‟s 
continuing desire for naval dominance and were also strongly opposed to the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance still in existence.  Furthermore, Japanese naval power was clearly on the increase 
particularly in the Pacific region.  To address these concerns the United States called a 
conference in November 1921 in Washington. The result was the Washington Naval Treaty, 
signed in February 1922 by Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy.  Its main 
feature was a restriction on the size of the three major powers capital ships (United States, 
Britain and Japan).  The proposal was for a 5:5:3 ratio with a total tonnage of 500,000 each 
for America and Britain and 300,000 for Japan. Italy and France agreed to 175,000 tons each.  
Also incorporated in the Treaty was the agreement that the three major powers‟ would not 
build any new fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific area east of longitude 110 degrees, 
thus excluding Singapore.  In addition under United States pressure Britain undertook not to 
renew its Alliance with Japan when the agreement ran out in 1923. Churchill noted: “It is 
with great sorrow that in 1920 I became party to the ending of our alliance with Japan from 
which we had both derived strength and advantage.  But as we had to choose between 
Japanese and American friendship I had no doubt what our course should be.”159        
 In the light of the limitations of the Washington Treaty and of the changing political 
Far East scene, Britain sought to strengthen its position in the region.  In 1922, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) came to the conclusion that ideally Britain required a 
sizeable naval deterrent in Pacific waters.  However, the country‟s financial impoverishment 
made it impossible to maintain a fleet in both Home Waters and the Far East. The CID‟s 
answer was to establish a naval base in South East Asia to which the fleet could sail and 
harbour if the need arose. At this point, the CID lacked anyone with a vision to foresee what 
might happen if there were simultaneous threats at home and abroad.  Following an 
exhaustive and wide study about possible locations for such a base, the Admiralty decided 
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that Singapore was best suited both geographically and strategically.  After a number of false 
starts, due mainly to the anticipated cost‟s and the vacillating opinion of changing UK 
governments, the project did not finally get under way until 1926.  A portent of future 
civil/military relations arose in 1927, when a War Office Committee visited the site and 
learnt that the Government of The Straits Settlements was unwilling to make land available 
for military purposes without an assurance that no part of the cost would fall on the civil 
community.
160
    
How to defend the base was a major factor in the plans for its construction.  When 
considering the lengthy, acrimonious and opposing strategic views, which erupted, it is well 
to remember that ultimately the sole objective then was to protect the Naval Base in 
Singapore from any attack. In turn, this meant defending Singapore Island.  The base could 
not be defended, like some ancient citadel.  If Singapore fell, the base fell: the debate 
revolved around how best to defend it.  The earliest plans of the 1920s concluded that the 
most likely danger would be an assault from the seas and to counter such an attempt large, 
expensive guns were installed that could engage an enemy fleet at a range of 20 miles.  
However, over the following decade the changing face of battle altered the scenario.  Giant 
technological advances in all the paraphernalia of war, weapons, tanks, aircraft, ships, 
landing craft, changed the ground rules. A reappraisal of the defensive plan was essential.  
The topography (and climate) of the Malay Peninsula now featured prominently in all 
planning. These features were also to have a significant bearing on both the changing 
emphasis of the defensive plan and the likely conduct of a campaign. 
The Topography
161
 
It is essential to have the lie of the land in the Malay Peninsula in order to understand 
the military‟s options, and the obstacles that presented themselves. The long, narrow and 
rugged Malay Peninsula is nearly 500 miles long, north to south, and across the bulge in the 
middle, it is about 250 miles wide. It is some 50,000 square miles in area and often compared 
in size to England and Wales with the Isle of Wight equating to Singapore at its southern end.  
In 1940, the east coast was underdeveloped and sparsely populated except in the extreme 
north, and there was no continuous road along its length.  But there was, for example, a road 
from Johore Bahru, the most southern town, along the southeast coast to Endau a distance of 
104 miles, but here the road ended.  And while there were vehicular tracks which in the dry 
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season could be used to continue north it was not until Kuala Terengganu, two thirds up the 
east coast, that another road was laid running 103 miles northwards to the most north-eastern 
town of Kota Bahru capital of the state of Kelantan. The only unbroken communications 
between Johore Bahru and Kelantan was the railway, which wound its way through the 
central massif.   
 On the west coast, which as predicted was strategically more significant, lay the major 
road communications, there were 585 miles of good vehicular roads running from Johore 
Bahru to the Thai frontier in northwest Malaya, and this western strip was intensely 
developed both agriculturally and commercially. There was also a good railway network on 
the western plain that ran all the way to Bangkok.  In addition, a network of feeder roads 
covered the area.  The road surfaces were of first-class tar-macadam and the network of roads 
altogether covered several thousand miles.
162
  The railways were efficient and sophisticated 
with restaurant cars and air-conditioned coaches. British engineers built the system, initially 
for the haulage of heavy mining material and the transport of tin ore to cargo ships for 
export.
163
  
 Central Malaya consists of a mountainous range of densely covered jungle rising at its 
highest to over 7000 ft.  Lateral communication was confined to three roads across this range. 
Rivers abound in Malaya but they are usually short and rapid and since the introduction of 
intensive tin mining, many of them have silted up.  However, they were still an important 
means of travel, for local people living in the interior.  Many of the west coast rivers are 
navigable to small steamers and their waters run into the Straits of Malacca. On the long open 
east coast, sandbanks bar the mouth of every river and the heavy breakers from the northeast 
monsoon are an obstacle for those approaching the beaches from the sea.  It is these 
conditions, which persuaded early military planners that a sea assault here would be at best 
very hazardous.     
Malaya‟s climate, as described by the Europeans who lived there, is enervating by its 
monotony rather than actually unhealthy.  The weather is consistently hot, between 30 and 33 
degrees centigrade, and all times of the year is rainy.  While seasonal variations in the rest of 
the country are negligible, the east coast differs from the centre and the west with a monsoon 
season from November to March.  The absence of bracing winds and the prevalence of great 
humidity tend to have a depressing effect, especially on Europeans.
164
  In the days before air-
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conditioning, this is an important factor.   Major General Playfair, who became Chief of Staff 
to the C-in-C remarked  
“I have been to Malaya twice before and knew it to be a place where, for various 
reasons, the tempers of busy people become easily frayed; where it seemed more 
natural to take offence than „to laugh it off‟, and where criticism was more common 
than discretion.”165    
 
Apart from the coastal strips, which have been cleared and cultivated with rubber and 
rice, and the swamp areas and open tin mines, the remainder of the terrain is dense jungle.  
While the jungle is penetrable, physical endurance and exceptional navigational skills are 
needed.  Movement is painstakingly slow and in military terms, only small compact parties 
can get through.  The invading Japanese forces fully recognized the difficulties of jungle 
movement and confined their manoeuvres to rubber estate tracks, railway lines and accessible 
roads.   Although the east coast consists almost entirely of open beaches with limited 
communications, early studies, nonetheless, recognised that the real danger spots were 
Singora, Patani, in Thailand, the Kelantan coast, Kuantan and Mersing: they had aerodromes.  
If the Japanese captured them it would greatly accelerate their operations. 
Singapore Island itself consisted mostly of mangrove swamps and rubber plantations. 
The impressive Naval Base was on the northern shore facing the Straits of Johore. In the 
south lay the huge teeming metropolis, the City of Singapore.  In 1941, the city was a mixture 
of old and new, of baroque beauty and uncontrolled squalor.  Stately white Western buildings 
along broad avenues contrasted sharply with the low native houses in filthy crowded back 
streets.  Three quarters of a million people lived in the city.  Nearly 600.000 were Chinese, 
with Malays, Indians, Europeans and a broad mixture of other races making up a varied 
minority.  The naval base built for £63,000,000 (1937 prices) covered an area of 21 square 
miles and had the capacity to shelter the entire British Fleet.  There were two massive 50,000-
ton graving docks and a huge floating dock, which by an outstanding feat of seamanship was 
towed out from England.    
The dense tropical rain forests of the Peninsula were to have a defining effect on the 
course of the war in Malaya.  Not only did the vegetation limit military manoeuvre, but also 
restricted the civilian refugees.  The central massif further hindered the movement of people 
and supplies from one coast to the other. Military reinforcements had little time to 
acclimatise, to the debilitating tropical climate.    
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The Plan of Defence. 
The earliest discussions on defending the Naval Base revealed strong disagreement 
between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry.  In the early days, both Services agreed with the 
existing conviction that any attack on the base would come from the sea. The Admiralty 
favoured 15-inch guns and the Air Force torpedo-bombers.  There were simply not enough 
funds to have both. The Air Force argued that air power was more efficient than traditional 
fixed defences and were also cheaper since air squadrons designated for Singapore could be 
used elsewhere until they were needed in the Far East.  The Navy‟s response was that the 
planes might be busy elsewhere at the critical time and that it was much too risky not to have 
permanent protection in place.  The debate continued until 1931 when, in the light of the 
worrying international scene, the Admiralty admitted it could not keep a deterrent size force 
in the area. It was suggested that in the event of a threat a „relieving fleet‟ would sail from 
Home, but this would take time and without a permanent RAF presence on the island, there 
was a need for permanent fixed defences.    
A „period before relief‟, was the term used to describe the time estimated for the Navy 
to arrive. At first, this was calculated at 42 days. Based on this estimate, a less than 
convincing compromise was reached. The RAF would have primary responsibility for the 
defence of the Base until the fleet arrived, but with the qualification, that the aircraft and the 
infrastructure to support them should be permanent features and not transient groups rushed 
there in time of tension.
166
  However, the only airfields in Malaya in the early 1930‟s were on 
the west coast and commercial. On Singapore Island, three RAF stations were under 
construction at Seletar, Sembawang and Tengah.  To fulfil this new task, the RAF needed to 
extend the radius of both their reconnaissance and offensive capability against seaborne 
enemy forces approaching from the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea. This led to the 
requirement  for three new airfields on the east coast of Malaya.   A British government 
report (The Baldwin Committee Report)
167
 stated that Air Ministry‟s logic was unconvincing 
and suggested that the relative merits of both Services defensive plans should be explored 
further. In the meantime, the Baldwin Committee recommended that the first stage of gun 
emplacements should go ahead.
168
  In July 1935, following a further review, the Government 
relented and authorized work to begin on additional heavy gun emplacements and two 
airfields as part of the next phase of the construction.  The Base was completed in February 
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1938 protected with five 15-inch guns, six 9.2-inch guns and eighteen 6-inch guns as well as 
secondary armament
169
, all the guns were to be manned by the army.  The gun emplacements 
were not in the Base itself but covered all the sea approaches to the island east and west 
including some located on neighbouring islets. Two 6-inch guns on the tip of southern Johore 
at Penggerang.  All the fixed defences had armour-piercing shell, for use against ships, 
although a small proportion of shells, suitable for use against land targets were provided for 
the 9.2-inch and some of the 6-inch batteries. Many of the latter, however, had limited fields 
of fire.
170
  
In 1938, on completion of the Base there was still no definitive and unambiguous 
agreement among the Services about the best means of protecting it.  The heated debate that 
began when construction was first underway continued.  As time passed, the initial views 
about an invasion force approaching from the seas around Singapore was beginning to look 
less probable. In addition, even though in the growing debates there was an element of self-
serving promotion of their own arm, both Navy and Air Force recognised that until a Fleet 
arrived, the RAF would need to hold the fort.   
From Close Defence to Forward Defence 
 The plan that eventually evolved and was in place by 1941 went through a torturous 
metamorphosis. At its birth the predicted threat, in relative terms, was an uncomplicated sea 
assault on the island itself.  As the threat matured, it became a hugely complex dispersal 
against sea born landings on scattered beaches. And some of these beaches were located in 
neighbouring and uncertain Thailand. The essential amendments to the plan were dictated 
largely by the technical advances in projecting military force over greater distances with 
enhanced military hardware to support them.  The effect on defensive thinking was 
momentous. It meant transforming from close defence of Singapore Island to the vastly more 
challenging task of defending the base by deploying to the northern extremities of Malaya.  
The Governor and his Defence Secretary were involved in this debate because it affected 
their relations with the Malay states. The deployment of large numbers of military personnel 
in rural areas, even for civil defence measures, such as the selection and guarding of reserve 
food stores, still called for sensitive negotiations.  
As commented previously, early discussions firmly dismissed the idea that a ground 
force could approach Singapore from the north through peninsula Malaya.  The hostile terrain 
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and the undeveloped transport network was considered an intractable handicap.
171
 But during 
the lengthy gestation period of construction of the base (12 years) the rail and road 
infrastructure within Malaya improved remarkably and now there was the additional 
dimension of major advances in military technology and hardware. The British authorities 
vigilantly monitored the noticeably improving capabilities and military strength of Japan and 
concluded that while the threat remained the modus was changing. In 1937 fresh minds 
believed a sea borne invasion on the East coast of Malaya must not be discounted.
172
 The 
officer who challenged the entrenched perceptions and revolutionised thinking about the 
defence of the naval base was Major General Dobbie. In 1937, Dobbie became GOC Malaya. 
He was an officer with experience of combat and senior command. Commissioned into the 
Royal Engineers he served with great gallantry during the 1914-1918 war earning, among 
other decorations, a DSO. He was very religious, a devout Plymouth Brethren, and to the 
consternation of his staff would often call upon the Lord to endorse his military plans. After 
serving in Malaya he became Governor of Malta, an appointment he held with great 
distinction throughout its wartime siege.  
Shortly after taking up his post he pointed out to the Air Officer Commanding that 
with the small peacetime army garrison at his disposal he was not in a position to protect the 
airfields the RAF were constructing on the east coast. Moreover, their location made them 
highly vulnerable to enemy landings, as they were so close to the seaboard.   Dobbie decided 
a total reappraisal of the defence issues was essential, taking into account the restricted role 
intended for the army and importantly the Imperial Defence Committee recently declaring 
that it would now take 70 days for a Fleet to arrive after the outbreak of hostilities.
173
  He also 
felt not enough notice was taken of the major advances in military technology and the 
increased range of aircraft.  More than any of his predecessors, he demonstrated a keen 
awareness of emerging military technology and the fresh opportunities these developments 
created. To convince the doubters he arranged testing exercises to prove the validity of his 
beliefs: he assessed the practicability of landings from the sea on the east coast during the 
monsoon period, which the sceptics claimed was a most serious handicap for a beach assault. 
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He found not only was it perfectly possible to do so, but also that poor visibility could prove 
a major restriction for allied air reconnaissance, with the added difficulty that it would also 
reduce the efficiency of air attack on the enemy fleet.
174
   
In view of the fluctuating estimates from London about the length of the „period 
before relief‟, Dobbie was convinced that the figures were hypothetical and that no sensible 
plan should be founded on this uncertainty.
175
 It would be better to start from an assumption 
that the period could be indefinite and that consequently the Japanese would have a much 
better chance of success with a landward attack.  Added to this was the noticeably impressive 
quality of Japanese military hardware and the possibility of Japanese air attacks from 
advanced air bases.  Furthermore, there was the ambiguity about Thailand‟s political position. 
In Dobbie‟s judgment, the mixture of these key elements led him to the inescapable 
conclusion that the defence of Singapore meant the defence of the whole of Malaya.  
This fundamental change of strategy meant, quite evidently, that additional troops 
were required on the mainland.  Additionally, Dobbie made it very clear that Britain needed 
not only a large increase in air and ground forces but also stockpiles of stores, equipment and 
food to meet this contingency.   His important and prophetic conclusions identified almost 
exactly the eventual course of the campaign.  In his view the Japanese would first secure 
advanced air bases in Siam (sic) or Indo-China and would probably then land in Singora and 
Patani in southern  Siam and at Kota Bahru in Malaya, although additional landings might 
subsequently be made at Kuantan and Mersing.  The Japanese troops would then cross from 
east to west across the Isthmus of Kra and advance along the main roads and railways on the 
western side of Malaya to attack Singapore Island from the north.  In his opinion, the defence 
of Singapore needed to extend to the defence of Johore and particular areas of northern 
Malaya.  
This radical reassessment was endorsed by the other two Services, without much 
resistance.
176
 It is noteworthy that Dobbie‟s chief staff officer conducted this fresh 
„Appreciation‟, Colonel Percival, who was later to be appointed GOC.  The latter made an 
interesting comment on return to UK later in 1937 to take up a new appointment. General Sir 
John Dill, a future Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), asked Percival if Singapore 
was impregnable. He replied, “in my opinion, far from being impregnable it would be in 
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imminent danger if war broke out in the Far East unless there was an early realization in high 
places of the complete change in the problem of its defence which was then taking place.”177      
With this fresh view of the defence of the Naval Base, now supported by others, a 
series of probing assessments were initiated. These concluded that to meet this new focus of 
threat, and taking account of the terrain, the primary aim was how to prevent the enemy 
landing at all.   Unquestionably, this required superior air and naval power.  The army had the 
supporting yet considerable role of defending the airfields, the islands of Singapore and 
Penang, dealing with airborne landings, driving out any incursions, protecting the food 
resources, the rice growing areas and the main lines of communications.  Once again, the 
conclusion was drawn that the main responsibility for the defence of Malaya would be in the 
hands of the Air Force.
178
 Several obvious essentials emerged from this assessment. 
Primarily, a considerable increase in front line aircraft was vital; that the overall taskforce 
commander should be an Air Force officer; that a powerful fleet should sail for the area at the 
first signs of belligerence, and that the existing army garrison needed substantial enlargement 
to perform its new extensive and widely dispersed tasks. In response, General Dobbie started 
to organise defences in the southern area of Johore. Regrettably, this work soon had to stop 
because there were insufficient funds. He was authorised by London the modest sum of 
£60,000, for the construction of a series of machine gun blockhouses, which he had in mind. 
However, the British government was at least stimulated to authorize an increase of supplies 
for the Island to withstand - in a worst-case scenario - a siege of 180 days (6 months). 
Before Dobbie‟s period as GOC ended in August 1939, he attended an Anglo–French 
senior military commander‟s conference in Singapore in June of that year. It was convened at 
the request of both governments. In February 1939 Japan had occupied Hainan Island and in 
March the Spratly Islands. For the first time, Thailand‟s political stance in the unfolding 
turmoil was openly discussed, with the group acknowledging that country‟s crucial 
geographical position in South East Asia. Dobbie pointed out the dangers if Japan gained 
control or even had Thai agreement to the use of the Isthmus of Kra.  Besides their operations 
in Indo-China and Burma, the Japanese would be able to launch air attacks against Singapore 
from air bases within Thailand.  They could threaten Malaya by land operations against 
Penang, on one side, and against the east coast of Malaya in the neighbourhood of Kota 
Bahru on the other.  The delegation declared „Every attempt, therefore, by Japan to increase 
her influence in Thailand must be countered …any positive action by Japan in peace, such as 
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the dispatch of armed forces and military aircraft to Thailand, could only be regarded as an 
act of war against the Allies.‟179 In addition, to ensure the security of Singapore the 
conference further endorsed the recommendation that British forces in Malaya should be 
quantified and increased– „by two infantry brigades and other units‟.  Thus, for the first time 
an international warning was sounded about the danger to northern Malaya of attack via the 
vulnerable region of the Kra isthmus. Now the theory of forward defence was considered as a 
counter to this threat. The three Service Heads jointly acknowledged this proposition and 
continued to debate the best means of meeting it. It is noteworthy that the defensive 
protection proposed concentrated almost exclusively, on whether the navy or the air force 
would be the most potent force to deal with the threat. The army had a peripheral role. 
Refinements of the concept of „forward defence‟ continued throughout the 1930‟s and 
into 1940. During which time, Japan had become heavily embroiled in a war in China and her 
poor performance against the inferior Chinese forces became another factor in defence 
calculations.  The Dominions of Australia and New Zealand concerned for their own safety 
followed closely the vacillating defence debate because Britain had long assured both nations 
that the Royal Navy would guard the seas around them. They did not become involved in the 
details of the protective measures; their concern was more that the naval base in time would 
harbour a fleet big enough to guard the southern Pacific.      
Finally at this crucial stage all three service commanders agreed that more emphasis 
be placed on the prevention of an invading force ever reaching the coast of Malaya.  
Succeeding commanders during this period took up the debate refining and developing it.  In 
the critical 1940 period, when Britain was at war with Nazi Germany, the Royal Navy knew 
emphatically that it would not be able to send any deterrent-sized fleet to the Far East. In any 
case, whatever the size of force, they would not be able to send it with any speed (a 
judgement that alarmed the Dominions). The responsibility for the security of the naval base 
and the defence of Malaya now lay firmly with the RAF.  Discussions now concentrated on 
the question of the increased numbers of airplanes required, the particulars of forward 
airfields from which to fly, and the ground forces needed to defend those airfields. All of this 
assumed that the RAF appeal for additional aircraft would in due course, be fulfilled. 
The GOC, who succeeded Dobbie in August 1939, was Major General Bond.  He has 
been described as a man who, „..although of sterling worth and character … lacking in 
personality, kept himself aloof and was inclined to exercise control from his office chair.  He 
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seldom, if ever, studied his problems on the spot.‟180   Immediately on his arrival, he 
reviewed and endorsed the findings of the Dobbie Appreciation and added further 
refinements of his own.  Earlier that same year the Admiralty had again raised the official 
„Period before Relief‟ from 70 to 90 days and more worryingly, in June 1939, before the 
outbreak of war in the west, also claimed that it was  unlikely to be in a position to spare 
more than two capital ships for this task.
181
 Like his predecessor, Bond concluded that as the 
period before relief was becoming much longer than initial estimates and that the army was 
under pressure to extend its area of operations on a large scale he would need a substantial 
increase in the army garrison. Thus, he submitted a request to the War Office for his existing 
force to be significantly increased.
182
 He also took the opportunity to underline the signs from 
his intelligence sources indicating unusual Japanese interest in the area of the Kra Isthmus.  
The paucity of fighting forces to meet the possible new scenario also prompted the planning 
staff secretly to consider the firmly prohibited idea of pre-emptive action into southern 
Thailand. Bond calculated that such action, to forestall a Japanese move onto Malaya‟s 
northern frontier, would require at least an additional two divisions.
183
  He noted that there 
were some under strength local volunteer forces, but their training and equipment suited them 
only for static roles such as guarding installations. At this time the RAF strength was eight 
squadrons (four bomber, two torpedo-bomber and two flying-boat squadrons) a total of 
ninety aircraft.  Crucially, there were no fighter aircraft and the torpedo-bombers were 
obsolescent. In February 1941, this number was augmented by a squadron from India, 
bringing the total to 158.
184
  It was an insignificant improvement given the situation. The Air 
Officer Commanding assessed that these new circumstances required at least 566 aircraft, 
more than three times the number now in station.   
The Government’s Role 
Throughout this period of growing international tension and increasing concern, the 
Governor was fully aware about the level and uncertainty of defence preparations. Indeed, 
now that the defence of the naval base in Singapore entailed deploying sizeable military 
formations throughout peninsular Malaya, it was imperative that he know and assess the 
impact it would have on the community. However he was susceptible to the persuasions of 
Vlieland, his defence secretary, who openly agreed with Babington‟s view; that the safety of 
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the country was almost entirely dependent on the air force and per se the army‟s task was to 
protect the airfields. On this matter, Thomas clashed with Bond in September 1939 when the 
army commander justly claimed that with the existing shortage of soldiers he simply did not 
have the military strength to defend Singapore and the airfields - in remote locations 
throughout the peninsula. To reinforce his point and in an attempt to relieve some of the 
immediate manpower shortage, Bond urged the Governor to consider mobilizing the 
Volunteer Forces and Thomas agreed.  When Vlieland heard of this decision, he tried to 
persuade the Governor to change his mind. Vlieland‟s objection was that this proposal 
indicated premature panic and would adversely affect the country‟s morale.  Besides the 
government had a clear economic instruction from London against such a move.
185
  
Such was Thomas‟s quandary and reluctance to give decisive leadership that he 
referred the matter to the Colonial Office. His despatch of January 1940
186
 was not a balanced 
argument but made the case that while the GOC advocated conscription Thomas felt that such 
measures would adversely affect the production of rubber and tin which was his first priority. 
„I conceive it to be our duty to give absolute priority to the claims of industry‟ he stated. In 
any case, the very organisation of the Volunteer Forces was unsound. Many of its members 
would need to be exempted from duties such as civil defence. Their essential role was 
protection of the nation‟s economy.  Thomas added that in the absence of a fleet stationed at 
Singapore, a successful defence depended on the action of the RAF aided by any submarines 
and other naval vessels that might be on station.  Therefore he advocated a large increase in 
the RAF garrison even if this was to be at the expense of the army garrison.
187
  His views 
exactly mirrored those of Vlieland and Babington.    
The Overseas Defence Committee (ODC), considered the Governor‟s despatch in 
March 1940 and they ruled that the economic contribution of Malaya was of the first 
importance.  Any volunteer training should be of brief duration and training restricted to two 
periods, each of three weeks‟ duration.  Thus no more than one third of the volunteers would 
be enlisted at any one time.
188
   In addition, concerning Thomas‟s request for more aircraft, 
they replied „… there was in fact no immediate possibility of affecting such an increase that 
the governor had requested, or even of bringing the existing squadrons up to their wartime 
establishment.‟  Then added, incongruously, that they recognised the security of Singapore 
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was vital to the safety of the British Commonwealth in the Far East. Their decisions clearly 
do not reflect any grave concern.  
The reply was heavily influenced by the Foreign Office, which also emphasised that 
the Governor‟s priority was trade. In their opinion, Japan had been at war for some three 
years and was in no position to embark upon adventures against distant British bases. In any 
case, Japan was in the throes of an internal political crisis.
189
  Today it seems surprising that 
the military members of this committee who would certainly have been privy to the 
accumulating classified information indicating clearly Japanese expansionist intentions, 
allowed these comments to pass.  It was the British Government‟s policy to avoid war with 
Japan at any cost, despite the latter‟s irrational behaviour. In the spring of 1940, Britain‟s 
forces were heavily engaged in a desperate struggle in Europe and in the Atlantic.  France 
was showing all the signs of capitulation to the invading Germans and Italy was volatile 
openly courting Nazi Germany.  Early British strategy assumed the support of France, 
particularly in containing the Italians in the Mediterranean, but as the clouds darkened, it was 
becoming obvious that Britain was likely to end up alone. It followed that another war in the 
Far East would be disastrous.  The Chiefs of Staff gave a bleak appraisal about the situation, 
„Our own commitments in Europe are so great that our policy must be directed towards the 
avoidance of open clash with Japan.‟190  
The ODC‟s ruling added fuel to Bond‟s wrath. He decided to make his case direct to 
the War Office. In April 1940, he submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee his full 
Appreciation of the situation.  Far from dismissing Japan‟s debilitating war with China, he 
saw it as providing the Japanese with invaluable experience in all the demands of war. He 
called attention to the fact there were now Japanese forces in Hainan, and that they had also 
made economic penetration into Thailand.  It was now unanimously acknowledged that the 
Japanese could land at any time of the year on the east coast of Malaya. To add to this 
worrying scenario, the „Period before Relief‟ was now officially lengthened to 180 days.  
Bond had to reiterate that the defence of Singapore now meant the defence of the whole of 
Malaya and that called for a substantial increase in ground forces. However, he charitably 
accepted that with war raging in Europe, military manpower would be a near impossibility. In 
the short-term the answer was to increase the size and striking power of the air force.  It was 
clear that with the air force bearing the burden of responsibility, the commander in overall 
charge of the situation should be a senior RAF officer.    
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In June 1940, the Chiefs of Staff in London met to consider the Appreciation. For the 
first time they formally acknowledged „Owing to the increased range of aircraft and 
development of aerodromes, particularly in Thailand, we can no longer concentrate on 
defence of Singapore Island alone but must consider defence of Malaya as a whole, 
particularly security of up-country landing grounds‟.191  
It is important to remember that at the end of May and beginning of June 1940, the 
British Expeditionary Force was in the throes of its crucial withdrawal from the beaches of 
Dunkirk, and attention was concentrated on problems at the Home Front.  Even so, 
information and intelligence from not only Malaya but also Hong Kong, Burma and growing 
concern expressed by Australia and New Zealand about conditions in the region, prompted 
the COS to call for a fresh review of the strategic situation in the Far East. An added factor 
was that London was asking the two Dominions for additional military forces. The COS‟ 
conclusions were frank but discouraging.  They recognised that the rise of Nazi Germany and 
war in the West changed all their calculations dramatically.
192
 With particular reference to 
Malaya, they recognised that new military factors in the Far East radically changed the 
concept of the defence of the base and it was „more likely that they [Japanese] would attempt 
a landing up-country in Malaya and then operate southwards, under cover of shore-based 
aircraft, than that they would risk a direct assault on Singapore Island‟. In the light of this and 
the precarious sea communications, they considered, it is necessary to establish food reserves 
for the garrison and the civil population of Malaya for as long a period as possible. And 
finally,  
 
These factors all point to the necessity for the holding the whole of 
Malaya rather than concentrating on the defence of Singapore 
Island.  This clearly involves larger land and air forces than when 
the problem was one of defending Singapore Island.
193
     
 
With this clear recognition of the situation, the Chiefs of Staff offered the best 
practical support that current resources would allow. They undertook to provide 336 first line 
aircraft, but warned that they would not arrive before the end of 1941,
 
 and also increase the 
army garrison to the equivalent of six brigades and ancillary troops. However, the Chiefs of 
Staff having recognised the need for this level of manpower and equipment confessed they 
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were not then in a position to provide even one division, (three brigades) from existing 
resources. They would turn to the Commonwealth Governments and ask them to provide „the 
rough equivalent of one division and to equip it as far as possible.‟194  From this point 
forward all modus operandi and discussion of the defence of Singapore was inseparably 
allied to the defence of Malaya.   
At this critical time, Shenton Thomas was on leave in England. The Acting Governor 
Stanley Jones was the government figure at the centre of the maelstrom of military reports 
and information now arriving and was uneasy addressing them.   However, back in the UK, 
Thomas sensibly took the opportunity to meet with the Joint Planning Sub-Committee in 
August (1940) to reinforce the case he made in his despatch in February.  His despatch, it will 
be recalled, endorsed the Babington/Vlieland scheme of consigning the army to guarding 
airfields and vital installations while seeking a substantial increase in fighter aircraft. As he 
later admitted, while they found themselves „generally in full agreement‟ with his views they 
were unable to make any practicable change to the COS policy. The Joint Planning Sub-
Committee was no more than an advisory body to the COS. However, its measured opinions 
carried weight; clearly, they did not place the demands of the Far East Commanders very 
high. Singapore was not a priority and would have to wait.
195
  
In June 1940, prompted by the Colonial Office, Jones tabled and passed a 
Compulsory Service (Local Forces) Bill. It was a regulation that was to prove the source of 
ceaseless disagreement between the civil and military authorities.  This legislation directed 
that every European British subject of the prescribed age in the „Colony‟ was liable to 
compulsory service. However, the criteria that conscription was confined to only European 
British subjects dismayed and angered the military. Jones gave the excuse that this was as 
much as his staff could handle.
196
 At the same time, causing further consternation, he 
introduced an exemption clause.  The exemption stated that „Exemption would be granted on 
the grounds of conscience, unusual hardship or that the subject would be more usefully 
employed in the civilian capacity.‟  Bond and the other commanders protested against the 
exemption because it was to be monitored only by the civil authorities and the military had no 
right of appeal against the grant of an exemption certificate.   This led to hostility between the 
two so that finally, Jones agreed an amendment to include a right of appeal against exemption 
to be exercised by both authorities. Even so, civil – military differences about exemption 
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persisted. When Percival arrived in May 1941, he was immediately embroiled in the dispute. 
He saw the issue as a dreadful waste of time and energy but recognised  „there was always 
potential friction in these claims for exemption as the military authorities wanted all they 
could get while the government and business managers were equally disinclined to risk 
cutting their staff too much.‟197   The situation continued well into 1941 causing endless, 
pointless bickering among senior officials, even as international relations around them were 
seriously deteriorating.
198
   
At the same time, Jones was now inescapably embroiled in the differing views of 
defence strategy between Bond and Babington. Unlike Vlieland however, his support was 
more inclined to the Bond concept. General Bond now categorically asserted that the defence 
of Singapore, with the limited forces available to him, had to be concentrated in the south, in 
Johore.  He was adamant that he had no force available for the defence of airfields in up-
country Malaya except for a small unit for the protection of the major airfield at Alor Star in 
North West Malaya.
199
  Air-Vice Marshal Babington was entirely opposed to this plan and 
insisted that the security of the airfields was paramount. Any assault on the invaders would be 
launched from these bases: furthermore, the protection of Alor Star in particular, was vital: 
reinforcing air squadrons from India would land at this airfield.  The two commanders failed 
to resolve this fundamental matter effectively ruining all attempts at serious joint defence 
planning during their time in command.  Jones was simply out of his depth in trying to settle 
this difference. To avoid making a decision, he referred the whole issue to the Chiefs of Staff 
London. He got a less than helpful reply from London to his plea for guidance. The 
authorities justified the differences of opinion between the two commanders as being due 
principally to a lack of resources. In the meantime, he was ordered to place the defences of 
Malaya in a state of readiness at five days warning. 
Relations between the two commanders remained hostile and Bond in particular was 
enraged with Jones inability to arbitrate.   After the war, Bond wrote a letter to Thomas, 
declaring, „The trouble between Babington and me…was that he would never tell us what he 
was doing or could do; he forbade his staff to collaborate with mine, as they were anxious to 
do.‟200  In time, their irreconcilable differences led to both of them being relieved of their 
appointments. The naval C-in-C, Sir Percy Noble, an astute man with a keen judgement of 
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character, whose HQ was in Hong Kong until late in 1940, attended War Committee 
meetings when he was in Singapore.  He became very aware of the antagonism between 
Bond and Babington, the disruption this imposed on proper co-operation between the 
Services, and the deleterious effect on the civil administration.  He saw that this state of 
affairs was replicated at all levels between the military and the civilians. Noble also 
expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness the defence plans. After the war, he declared 
that although there were faults on both sides, the blame for the situation lay mainly with Air 
Vice-Marshal Babington.   
Noble was also aware that a number of unofficial members of the Legislative Council 
were dissatisfied with the civil administration‟s handling of the defence issue. There were 
strong feelings that the Governor should be replaced. He also expressed surprise that even 
after the fall of France, the Governor did not return quickly to his post from leave. Thomas 
had obviously failed to grasp the grave implications of this event for the security in Malaya. 
When Noble returned to England in September 1940 to start another job he took the 
opportunity to discuss these issues with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd. 
He recommended that in the long term both Bond and Babington should be replaced, but 
while feelings against the Governor were running high, a senior military officer should be 
placed in supreme authority, over the head of both the Governor and the Service 
commanders.
201
  Had Noble‟s advice been followed, with the choice of a man such as Wavell 
to be in overall charge, there might have been a very different outcome. Lord Lloyd agreed 
with Noble‟s plan, but succumbed to a terminal illness before it could be implemented.  
  The substance of the difference between Bond and Babington was that the latter‟s 
demand for airfield protection was founded on the hypothesis that the additional aircraft he 
requested would need the landing space at these east coast bases.  Bond refused simply 
because he did not have the forces to meet the demand. Furthermore the War Office had 
made it clear that they could not supply extra soldiers.  The whole defence plan designed to 
protect a naval base in Singapore, yet it had no battle fleet, - merely a few elderly ships - and 
according to the Admiralty was unlikely to receive any substantial naval aid. In the words of 
a later historian „It was a sentry box without a sentry.‟202  
Food Reserves 
While the military commanders were barely on speaking terms another important 
matter arose causing further hostility.  When Jones received the instruction to put the country 
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on a five days‟ alert, the Colonial Office also asked him for information on reserve rice 
stocks.  A few days later Jones was instructed that all possible steps should be taken to 
increase food stocks to the utmost extent. The War Office advised that rice storage and 
milling capacity should be dispersed throughout the country.  Jones had to make all the 
arrangements in close liaison with Bond.  The matter of food reserves, rice storage and 
milling developed into a major altercation between the administration and the military.  Jones 
replied to the Colonial Office that, on the advice of his Secretary for Defence (Vlieland), the 
reserves of rice amounted to two months‟ supply and that to disperse them would be very 
difficult, and cost a lot of money, and man hours, and that the present arrangements were 
quite satisfactory. Bond only heard of Jones‟s reply through the War Office who reported this 
answer to him. He retorted that it was fallacious and that he had not been consulted by Jones. 
Moreover, he objected strongly to the building of rice storage facilities in the vulnerable 
northern region of Malaya and was incensed to hear that, in spite of his objections, Vlieland 
had authorised the construction of a second 50,000-ton rice store in this same area.
203
 
After the war, General Bond replied to an enquiry from Thomas about this matter, 
(the incident arose while Thomas was still on leave). In his later account, Bond included an 
extract from his 1940 diary. It clearly discloses the extent of confrontation and depth of 
animosity, which existed at that time. He told Thomas that he had been talking with Jones 
and putting in writing his recommendations about building up food reserves. Bond also 
warned Jones of the danger of accepting Vlieland‟s advice at face value. Jones should satisfy 
himself personally on these important arrangements.  Jones expressed every confidence in 
Vlieland even when Bond informed him that Vlieland had been making decisions on both the 
level of food reserves and the location of the storage facilities without consulting him.  In 
itself, this was bad enough, but to compound the problem Vlieland was not even discussing it 
with his civilian colleagues directly concerned in the matter. Vlieland openly asserted that 
„the military reinforcements arriving were causing food problems‟ and that „it would be better 
to have no reinforcements and so avoid the difficulty of feeding them.‟204   
The matter became notoriously controversial. It was further aggravated when Bond 
suggested at a War Committee meeting, (at which no minutes were taken), that the Joint 
Victualing Board should be able to submit their views about food storage in writing to the 
War Committee. That way matters were transparent, discussed and resolved. He noted in his 
diary that „the AOC (Babington) and the Secretary for Defence contested this.‟  When the 
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new naval C-in-C, Admiral Layton was drawn into these arguments he telegraphed the 
Admiralty pointing out that Jones had failed to consult either him or Bond about this 
important matter, that he disagreed with the views expressed, and it was strategically unsound 
to hold reserve food stocks near a possible front line.  The Colonial Office then instructed 
Jones to reconsider the position, particularly the advisability of locating the largest food store 
near the important Alor Star airfield.  In a hand written footnote in Bond‟s diary, Shenton 
Thomas has remarked, „It seems clear from these extracts from Gen. Bond‟s diary that 
between May and November 1940 there has been, to say the least, differences of opinion 
between Jones (prompted by Vlieland) and the Service Heads on the question of food 
supplies.‟205     
 It was into this divisive, hostile and potentially dangerous civil-military milieu that 
the Chiefs of Staff, with Churchill‟s agreement, in 1940 sent Brooke-Popham as the Far East 
Commander-in-Chief.  Regrettably, they did not follow Admiral Noble proposal and give the 
new Commander supreme power. They arrived at what was clearly seen as an unsatisfactory 
compromise. His charter was responsibility for the operational control and training only of all 
British land and air forces in the Far East and did not include naval forces.  In an attempt not 
to offend the sensitivities and independent authority of the three services and the civil 
administration they ended with a hotchpotch arrangement.  Brooke-Popham had no power 
over the civilian authorities neither in Malaya or any other territory in his area of 
responsibility. In fact, Brooke-Popham had no power to enforce decisions necessary for the 
defence of any country in his region and effectively became another cog in an already 
unwieldy organisation.  In keeping with the situation, he was regularly reminded in his 
London briefings before departure, that British policy was to avoid war with Japan.  The COS 
also ordered a trawl of suitable candidates to replace both Bond and Babington.
206
     
Matador  
The idea of a pre-emptive advance into Thailand to secure and deny likely Japanese 
landing beaches at Singora and Patani matured as the patently inadequate resources severely 
limited normal defensive plans. In April 1940, General Bond first articulated this idea in a 
memo accompanying his Appreciation, „Can the idea of offensive action against the Japanese 
Forces established in Thailand be excluded?‟207  Increasing intelligence information and other 
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obvious indicators such as the growing number of Japanese in the region, (ostensibly as 
businessmen but manifestly military personnel on reconnaissance missions), identified the 
area as a highly likely invasion zone.  Dobbie‟s study of the region had already revealed its 
eminent suitability as a beachhead.   Any force landing in the area would have not only 
excellent road and rail facilities for a quick breakout from the bridgehead, but importantly, 
airfields nearby for air support and a harbour facility at Singora.
208
  Moreover, the enemy had 
various assault options from this site, either crossing the Isthmus of Kra at its narrowest point 
and or dividing its forces to advance on several axes - including going directly south to the 
nearest Malayan border crossing at Kota Bahru. The clear conclusion was that containment at 
the landing zones and indeed the possibility of preventing them landing at all was the evident 
solution.  However, the forces opposing the landings would need to be at least a division size, 
in place at selected locations, with enough time for preparations and ready to fight an 
aggressive and determined foe.  The embryonic plan was give the name „Operation Matador‟. 
This idea became an increasingly favoured solution and a best option - reinforced by 
senior commanders predicting, „…if we allow the Japanese to gain a foothold in Malaya, the 
battle is lost.‟209 However, it had a number of serious difficulties. Above all, the British 
governments‟ insistence that war with Japan must be avoided at all costs, and that to violate 
neutral territory in this highly sensitive region would provide their enemy with a casus belli.  
The British Ambassador in Thailand, Sir Joshia Crosby, was adamant that Thailand was a 
friend, and with a little nurturing, could prove a useful protagonist against Japan. To invade 
Thai territory would be a gross affront and offer Japan an excuse to come to the aid of an 
Asian neighbour.
210
  Then there was the question of how to provide a dedicated division size 
force for the task, together with the very considerable volume of defensive stores and 
equipment required.  Men and equipment would need to move by rail and road across the 
Isthmus and it could not be assumed, if this was an unprovoked invasion of neutral territory, 
there would be no resistance. The need to judge precisely when to launch Matador was 
crucial. The force, for obvious reasons, could not cross into Thailand too early, nor 
conversely, arrive late at the landing beaches.  A careful time appraisal to take account of all 
likely circumstances was fundamental.
211
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Brooke-Popham, learnt about Matador early in his appointment. He gave it his full 
support and asked that it be researched in thorough detail. He then put the proposal before the 
Chiefs of Staff in December 1940.
212
 It was given cautious support. As always, while 
recognising the benefits of pre-emptive action, the COS refused to allocate additional forces 
for the task. Moreover, as the danger of provoking Japan was so great they would retain 
authority to launch such a sensitive operation – if indeed it went ahead. The Chiefs of Staff 
asked about the tactical implications of using some of the existing forces in Malaya for 
„Matador‟. In addition, they wanted to know, how much notice is required to despatch men 
and materiel in time.
213
  The planning staff in Singapore arrived at an unsatisfactory 
comprise. They nominated a division already allocated a defensive task in north Malaya, 
thereby giving them a confusing dual role of „perhaps‟ defending territory near the north west 
border or „possibly‟ launching a thrust across the Isthmus of Kra into eastern Thailand.  
Moreover, they estimated only thirty-six hours warning for the embarkation. Later this was 
judged to be totally inadequate for such a complex operation.
214
    
The Governor’s Return 
When Shenton Thomas returned from leave in December 1940, he found a quite 
different environment from that which had existed in April.  Some personnel close to the 
centre of government were feeling frustrated and insecure about the lack of preparation. 
There was general dissatisfaction at the lack of urgent practical support from the military 
authorities in London. Whether or not Thomas recognised it, there was a sense of unreality in 
the administration where officials appeared unable or unwilling to recognise the gravity of 
the growing threat from Japan.  He also found in station a new C-in-C, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Robert Brooke-Popham, who had assumed command on 18
th
 November 1940.  He also found 
a modest increase in the military garrison with the arrival of two British battalions withdrawn 
from Shanghai and a divisional headquarters (11
th
 Indian HQ) and two infantry brigade 
groups, without artillery. Less satisfactory was the promise of additional aircraft.   
One of the first tasks he had to perform was to dismiss Vlieland.   There is no written 
evidence describing the grounds for the decision but credible speculation suggests that before 
Thomas returned to duty, he was made aware that both Bond and Babington were to go as 
well as Vlieland, a catalyst for the disunity.  Vlieland described Thomas‟s first War 
Committee meeting on 13 December 1940, the event signalling his demise.  
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When I entered the council chamber and took my old seat at his right hand, 
Sir Shenton did not greet me, or even look at me.  He opened the 
proceedings by inviting B.P. (Brooke-Popham) to speak.  The C-in-C then 
made a savage attack on me….No one said a word. Bond and Layton 
nodded their approval and my friend the AOC could not rally to my 
support in defiance of his Air Chief Marshal.  Sir Shenton remained silent 
with bowed head.
215
      
 
 Brooke-Popham charged Vlieland with consistently refusing to co-operate with Bond and 
deliberately using delaying tactics over the initiation of measures necessary for the defence 
of the civilian population.
216
 The following day, Vlieland tendered his resignation and asked 
that he be allowed to leave the MCS.  Although he did not leave Singapore until February 
1941, he took no further part in the administrative affairs of the government.  The current 
British Adviser to the State of Perlis, Mr C. W. Dawson, replaced him.  
  The Governor‟s early impressions of the new C-in-C were very favourable and in his 
hand written letter to the CO about how he found conditions generally after the dismissals 
he said, „B-P is an immense tower of strength and knows the difficulties of a civil 
government as the result of his years in Kenya.‟ However, his further comments disclosed 
his rising frustration with the military and their endless petty grievances.  Nevertheless, he 
added, that Brooke-Popham was someone to whom he could express his difficulties with the 
Army and the Air Force, which had improved little while he was in the UK.  He found Bond 
pleasant enough, but a man of one idea and his staff of little help. The idea was that the 
army should have what it wanted and everyone else should scramble for what is left. For 
example, the army wanted 1000 beds reserved in civil hospitals in Singapore. Thomas 
rejected the idea and spoke to Brooke-Popham about it:  „One word form B-P and they have 
come down to 500‟. He also noted that they were in discussions with the WO, without 
telling him, about senior staff appointments, which would have affected his immediate 
associates. However, as he observed in a tone of defeat, „I don‟t worry, I just decline and all 
goes well.‟217    
  By the end of 1940, Bond had two Brigades in Singapore and a further Brigade (12
th
 
Indian Bde.) in the area of Mersing on the east coast. In north Malaya in place to protect the 
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important airfield of Alor Star he had 11
th
 Indian Division, although it consisted of only two 
Brigades (6
th
 and 8
th
). Lastly, two independent battalions were stationed on the island of 
Penang and in Taiping.  In February 1941 an Australian divisional headquarters, 8
th
 
Australian Division HQ, with one brigade under command (22
nd
 Australian Bde.) arrived in 
Malaya. Major General Gordon Bennett was in command. On 9 April 1941, the
,
 Indian 
Division, (less its artillery), arrived.  Now that the Indian contingent constituted a large part 
of the ground forces, a Corps Headquarters arrived from India with Lieutenant General Sir 
Lewis Heath in charge. Thus by the end of April, Bond would have 26 battalions, the 
minimum he calculated was needed, if and only if, the RAF had it first line strength.  On 24 
April, Air Vice-Marshal C.W. H. Pulford succeeded Babington and on 14 May, Lieutenant 
General A.E. Percival replaced Bond. Both officers were chosen primarily because they had 
shown an ability to work successfully in a joint services environment. However, it is also a 
fact there was little choice, the demands of the western war exhausted the supply of able 
leaders.  Percival was promoted for the appointment; acknowledged as an outstanding staff 
officer, his leadership had never been tested in the echelons of high command. On the other 
hand, his subordinate (Heath), was a soldier with huge campaign experience having served 
throughout his military life in the Indian Army and before moving to Malaya had 
commanded a division in the east African campaign. As Kinvig noted in his book „…their 
appointment to serve together in the circumstances of 1941 was singularly ill-advised. All 
seemed well in the relations of GOC and Corps Commander until the Japanese struck. They 
rapidly deteriorated thereafter.‟218 Percival and Pulford, in contrast, got on well together and 
from the beginning insisted on the closest cooperation between their respective Services.   
 In April, before Bond left, he made a rather curious remark; later it was regarded as 
dangerously irresponsible. While visiting Singapore, the British Military Attaché in Tokyo 
(Colonel G.T. Ward) gave a lecture to a selected senior audience about the Japanese army, a 
subject about which he was clearly competent to talk. Without any exaggeration, he 
expounded on the impressive qualities of the Japanese soldier, their superb physical fitness, 
their ability to move long distances both day and night with a minimum of personal effects, 
and with their spirit in overcoming all obstacles. Furthermore he declared they were well led 
by junior sub-unit commanders, possessed a fanatical patriotism, esprit de corps, and would 
never surrender.  The senior officers of the General Staff were highly trained and dedicated 
men. In essence, Ward tried to dispel the dangerous and entrenched opinion that the 
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Japanese army was a poorly motivated, weak, badly led organisation, with poor mechanics, 
drivers and air pilots who never operated at night.   He had seen them fight against the 
Chinese with astonishing aggression and fierce courage.  They should not to be 
underestimated, and they would prove a formidable foe.  After Ward had finished, Bond 
rose to his feet and made a fateful pronouncement: 
 …while the lecturer has told you that the Japanese army is very efficient 
and that the Japanese know all about us in Singapore, this is far from the 
truth….What the lecturer has told you is his own opinion and is in no way a 
correct appreciation of the situation.  I will now tell you that every morning 
the telegrams which the Japanese Consul-General sends to his government 
in Tokyo are placed on my office table and from these I know what the 
Japanese are up to and just how much or how little they know about us.  If 
this is the best the Japanese can do, I do not think much of them and you can 
take it from me that we have nothing to fear from them.
219
    
 
If Bond genuinely believed his own words, why did he persist in his tenacious struggle 
throughout his period in command for more men and equipment? It would seem a pointless, 
costly exercise.  If he was trying to play down any fears that the Attaché‟s talk may have 
generated, he went too far. The enemy was dangerously underrated – a classic military error.   
During this period of growing tension and undeniable indications that the Japanese 
were close to committing an act of war against Britain, there was disharmony both within 
the government and between it and the military. It was a grave error not to embark on 
serious planning for civil emergencies; only a confused policy on the location and storage of 
rice reserves was put in hand. The lethargy and tempo of the administration in dealing with 
crucial civil defence matters reflected its scepticism on the threat of war.  The military were 
disunited, and had still not agreed a plan for the defence of Singapore. Although the army 
received some reinforcements - albeit untrained -, the additional aircraft that were essential 
to its ill-conceived plan had not arrived. In the words of the historian, S. Woodburn. Kirby, 
it was „a chain of disaster.‟ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CIVIL DEFENCE IN DISARRAY. 
 
In the post-war Despatches written by each of the senior Service Commanders
220
 and 
in the many academic analyses of the disastrous Malayan Campaign, legitimate claims have 
been laid against the inadequate and ineffective arrangements made for civil defence and the 
poor coordination between the military and civil authorities. Civil defence was barely 
considered before the outbreak of war, even when Japan was aggressively expanding in South 
East Asia. Perhaps more surprisingly, following the outbreak of war in Europe, there were 
still only vacuous verbal declarations of intent.
221
 In the Extraordinary meeting of the 
Legislative Council called on 26 September 1939, when the Governor addressed the 
gathering with a prepared statement about Britain‟s declaration of war against Nazi Germany, 
he failed to warn the Council and the people of the possible knock-on effect this could have 
for Malaya.  Expressions of loyalty and support for the King Emperor and the Empire at this 
time of peril, which were endorsed by all, and assurances of further financial support for the 
Imperial war effort were made Yet even at this critical time other routine business took 
priority in the formal proceedings. Thomas, having little personal experience of the ravages 
of war, failed to express concern about possible regional consequences. He may have thought 
that a war many thousands of miles away to the west was of little immediate concern. It is 
nevertheless surprising, in the light of this cataclysmic event and Japans outrageous 
behaviour, that he did not at least attempt a prediction of the political and commercial impact 
of an attack on the region. By virtue of his appointment, General Bond the GOC Malaya, also 
attended these Council Meetings but there is no record in the minutes of any comment from 
him either.
222
 At succeeding Council meetings during 1939 and early 1940, not even a plan 
for civil defence was mooted. It is not until after Thomas went on leave that members of both 
councils become concerned about the government‟s laissez-faire attitude. The public became 
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aware of the danger when Britain suffered military setbacks in Europe and Japan embarked 
on aggressive expansion in the east. It should be remembered that the criticisms levelled at 
Thomas and his administration over the issue of civil defence rarely mention the exceptional 
circumstances that existed in Malaya. To make a fair assessment of his role in later events, 
we have to remember the broader picture at this time. 
The war in Malaya was unlike any other war that Britain had fought. Thomas pointed 
this out, in his post-war notes.
223
 Not only was the climate and terrain inhospitable, but it was 
a war of defence in a country that had never endured major conflict. Local people had no 
comprehension of what war meant. Malaya was a country governed by a foreign power who 
had assumed responsibility for its protection. The country was a mosaic of social and cultural 
values.
224
  It would have been a mammoth task to equip and train several thousands of 
Malays, Indians and Chinese for the civil defence services. For a start, the majority spoke 
only their own language, a somewhat more basic issue than a lack of arms and equipment. 
Nothing of this kind had ever been undertaken in any British Colony. Moreover, most of the 
British civil who had to galvanise the population had no experience of preparations or of 
military affairs in general.   Neither the Governor nor any of his senior civil officers had 
served in the Forces during the First World War. (Astonishingly, during post–war 
recriminations it was claimed that of the 224 officers in the MCS on January 1940, 61 of 
them had in fact served in the Forces in the Great War.)
225
  There was no grasp of the 
enormity of the civil defence task or the knowledge or skill to put the state on a war footing. 
Given the lack of comprehension among the civil authorities of the dangers ahead, senior 
military officers had undoubtedly a duty to exercise their knowledge, take responsibility for 
preparations, and insist that the administration listen and follow their advice.  It was an 
obvious military responsibility, which they failed to acknowledge until it was too late. 
Adding to the ordeal, there was the matter of different forms of governance. Without 
imposing martial law, the Governor had limited direct authority over the Malay states.  
Instead, as happened, he had to accept at face value, the various civil authorities‟ claim that 
they were addressing civil defence procedures. He was reluctant to press matters further as he 
felt that insisting on civil defence measures could prejudice the economic directive imposed 
on him by the Colonial Office. After the war, in 1947, on his return to England Thomas wrote 
an early report about Malaya‟s war effort. He wanted the authors of the official history to 
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take account of what he believed was the very considerable contribution of the civil 
administration during the conflict.  He also included a comprehensive list of what he saw as 
the duties of the civil government about civil defence. It was indeed all-inclusive and covered 
just about every issue of civil defence. However, there is no known record of this list being 
officially published before or during the campaign. The existence of such a document would 
have unquestionably helped all parties to know the scale of civil defence duties, and would 
have avoided later accusations of who was responsible for what. Conspicuously, however, 
even in this list there is no reference to passive defence measures such as the construction of 
air-raid shelters, ARP (Air Raid Protection) Wardens, warning systems, protective 
precautions, rescue teams and auxiliary fire services.           
In 1954, following the publication of the Official History
226, and in spite of Thomas‟s 
attempted intervention, the civil authorities were heavily criticized, for their inadequate and 
belated civil defence arrangements. In response, Thomas wrote a further personal report 
which he was unable to get  published. It was to be one of many attempts to vindicate the 
Colonial Governments‟ war preparations and was entitled „What Malaya Did‟.227 He points 
out that as early as 1938, a Defence Committee existed and sub-committees of this 
organisation „were responsible for planning the several aspects of civil defence‟.228  He adds, 
that later in the year it became apparent that this arrangement was unsuitable and the 
functions were taken over by departments of the ordinary type whose executive heads were 
responsible to the Government, not to the Defence Committee.  In effect, it meant that during 
this period there was no central authority coordinating the various elements of civil defence. 
For example, those government departments concerned with agriculture became, responsible 
for rice production and the storage of reserves - at least in theory. However, even this 
arrangement was unsatisfactory and by October 1939, it was replaced by a set of civil defence 
departments that were linked to the Government through a new office of Secretary for 
Defence, with Vlieland in charge.  Effectively this office was the defence branch of the 
Colonial and Federal Secretariats and the High Commissioner‟s Office. The intention was to 
focus and coordinate civil defence policy and practice throughout Malaya, with the exception 
the Unfederated States.  On the outbreak of the European war the Defence Committee, 
renamed the War Committee, was still chaired by the Governor. The heads of the three 
services were members and in due course, the Committee was enlarged to include three 
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unofficial members of the Legislative and Federal Councils.
229
  On the ground, these new 
arrangements made no difference to the existing lassitude, characterised by the fact that no 
written minutes of the meetings were compiled.  
Thomas prima facie assertion in his unpublished reports and his ceaseless post facto 
exculpate correspondence implies the inauguration, development and expansion of 
appropriate responsible authorities to meet the growing defence challenges. These assertions 
are entirely without substance.  Most of the schemes did not start until late in 1940, when 
Thomas returned from leave, thus precious induction time was lost. There was no urgency or 
clarity in the written instructions to those in charge of these matters, day to day. There was no 
co-ordination of effort, no written record of decisions agreed.
230
  Moreover, any such 
decisions would have applied technically only to the Straits Settlements, although the FMS 
would almost certainly have fallen into line. However, the UMS frequently balked at and 
occasionally refused to comply with civil defence directives, particularly if they involved 
expenditure or manpower.  In reality, very few of the civil defence measures agreed at War 
Committee level filtered down to subordinate authorities particularly in the FMS.  If they did 
they were either ignored, given only perfunctory attention, or attempted in an amateurish 
manner.  The War Committee may have assumed their proposals were undertaken, but 
without a system of physical checks and written instructions, they were quite ignorant of the 
outcome.  In many instances, instructions were passed by word of mouth to the parties 
concerned, and left at that.  At the same time, the War Committee itself was in turmoil with 
the Army and Air Commanders disagreeing with each other,
231
 and Vlieland adding to the 
dissention. The OAG, Jones was confused and unable to assert his authority.  All in all, civil 
defence matters were a low priority and given scant attention.
232
 However, the issue of rice 
reserves did receive attention.  As noted in the previous chapter, it was raised and discussed 
before the Governor‟s departed in April 1940. It arose again during his absence and became a 
source of venomous dispute.   
In early 1939, the Commissioner of Customs was appointed „Food Controller‟. To 
assist him a Food Stocks Reserves Committee was formed, consisting of experts with 
knowledge of the preservation of essential commodities.  Its primary aim was to anticipate 
the possible restrictions on the import of these essentials in the event of war in the West.  
Rice was naturally the most important article of food; the annual consumption was about 
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900,000 tons of which two-thirds were imported.  The committee set about arranging to 
purchase enough supplies from external sources to last for at least six months and preparing 
storage facilities.  One problem was that milled rice would not keep sweet for six months so 
be un-milled padi (rice in the husk) had to be procured - which was bulkier needing greater 
storage space and milling close at hand.  (Later, it was found by experiment that if milled rice 
was stored after mixing with powdered lime it would remain sweet for much longer).
233
  It is 
clear from government memoranda that the authorities failed to consult the military 
authorities on the choice of storage sites.
234
 As protection of the rice was to be the army‟s 
responsibility, it was clearly essential that it was involved in the choice of location of the 
facilities. Vlieland had already decided on his own account that the largest and most 
important storage depot would be near Alor Star in the very north of Malaya. Later in his 
unpublished memoir, he stated:   
...the Alor Star granary scheme was a purely civil undertaking which was 
never mentioned still less debated in the War Committee….The civil authorities 
that is to say the Governor, the Food Controller and I decided upon the storage of 
padi…The Alor Star scheme was worked out largely by Sir Shenton himself 
without consulting the military who were in any case resolutely disinterested in 
anything we did in the Malay States.  That particular stupidity was only forced 
on us by the military, by manoeuvre of dubious propriety, in November 1940.
235
       
 
 This statement contradicts General Bond‟s assertions in his diary entries throughout 
most of 1940. He writes of his exasperation with the OAG because the latter failed to curb the 
excesses of Vlieland whose independent decisions regarding storage, reserves and locations 
were taken without even consulting the government Food Controller let alone the military.
236
  
Bond‟s key point was that the Alor Star granary was too far north for security and that the 
reserves should be either relocated or greatly reduced. In spite of Bond‟s warnings, Vlieland 
went ahead with plans to increase the storage capacity at Alor Star.  Later, Vlieland felt his 
decision was justified when Babington decided on the airfield at Alor Star as a vital forward 
air base, needing sizeable army protection.  Moreover, with the arrival in theatre of two 
reinforcement Indian Brigades, Vlieland persuaded the OAG to telegram the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies in London, to confirm that with a sizeable military presence in the area 
of Alor Star, the granaries would be secure and reorganisation of the rice stocks was 
unnecessary.    
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 When Bond learnt of this exchange, which had occurred without his knowledge, he 
enlisted the support of Admiral Layton. Jointly they informed the War Office that Vineland‟s 
comments had not been discussed with them, and in any case, they disagreed with his views. 
Bond noted in his diary, „Layton spoke to the AOC (Babington) who had reluctantly agreed 
to [the] undesirability of keeping food reserves in the front line.  Vlieland was very upset at 
C-in-C‟s action which he regards as military interference.‟237 At the same time, much to 
Vlieland‟s irritation, similar arguments arose about other food essentials with the military 
intervening when they learnt indirectly of a policy that would have a bearing on their own 
plans.   
Passive Defence 
The matter of Passive Defence measures during 1940 was a topic that was of 
increasing concern to the population or more correctly that element of the population aware 
of the growing danger. With the deteriorating international situation, the predominantly 
European community, became more restless about the laissez faire approach of the 
government and began to question its commitment to the issue. The subject was raised 
regularly both in Legislative Council meetings and in local newspapers.  Many felt that few 
visible precautions were being put in place and urged the government not only to do 
something about it, but also to be seen doing something about it.
238
   An unofficial member of 
the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, F. D. Bisseker was a particular and conscientious 
campaigner about passive defence. In November 1940, he challenged the government‟s lack 
of energy or any dedication to what he considered essential preparations. In the Council 
Chamber, he made a lengthy and impassioned speech: 
We are not at concert pitch yet though, and much effort at organisation is 
necessary still in passive defence measures before they can grow into a 
state of efficiency which will permit of the units concerned rendering full 
service in the case of need.  St John‟s Ambulance and the Auxiliary Fire 
Service are not equipped even yet.  A.R.P. communications are inadequate 
and I doubt very much if there are stirrup pumps and self-organised rescue 
squads in even half a dozen houses and big blocks of buildings in the 
whole Colony.  I know of no air-raid shelters and there is yet no evidence 
of that protection which effective sand-bagging can provide.  I commend 
these deficiencies to the notice of the Secretary of Defence. The stressing 
of difficulties in providing these essential measures or the cry “it cannot be 
done” smack to me of defeatism. The sooner we realise they have got to be 
done the better will be our welfare.
239
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  He went on to catalogue the deficiencies in equipment, the lack of practical support 
or indeed gratitude shown to the many volunteers. Furthermore, the absence of instruction, 
supervision and guidance had resulted in disillusioned advocates resigning.  He then 
pointedly blamed the authorities for the inadequacies and, in particular, the Secretary for 
Defence (Vlieland). Bisseker believed Vlieland should personally be directing this task and 
making his presence visible throughout the nation, encouraging and inspecting the few 
schemes established.  His address ranged over many related matters that he claimed were 
topics of great interest to the public.  Why, he wanted to know, had the government not 
resolved the „question of taxation for the purpose of raising funds for the prosecution of the 
war – we are lamentably behind our time in our effort.‟  And, he noted, that a joint (Straits 
Settlements and FMS) committee had been formed in September (1940) to examine civil 
defence matters and it was not until the end of October before they held their first meeting. 
When he enquired of a member why it had taken so long, he was told that there was not much 
enthusiasm for the task.  The OAG replied that passive defence was now receiving his 
consideration and although he could not express himself positively, many of the matters 
mentioned were being „considered‟ and he was able to give this assurance. Moreover, 
regarding Bisseker‟s view of the functions of the Secretary for Defence, he felt that it was 
much more important that the Secretary for Defence should be in Singapore co-ordinating the 
defence measures.
240
   
The next meeting of the Legislative Council took place in December 1940, by which 
time the Governor had returned from leave and was in the Chair, Bisseker revisited the 
subject of passive defence and made another lengthy and heated address expressing profound 
disappointment that nothing appeared to have improved. There was, he said,  
No indication given that even an investigation would be made into some of 
my claims regarding lack of organisation and co-ordination, and much less 
was there any promise that if what I maintained to be the existing state of 
affairs was found to be correct, action taken to rectify would be taken.
241
  
 
He was particularly incensed at the idea that „a case had to be made in each and every 
instance before further expenditure was embarked upon.‟ 
Bisseker drew attention to the poor comparison between Malaya‟s efforts and those in 
UK, citing newspaper reports that London alone had provided public shelters for 1.4 million 
people and the government had ordered the provincial authorities throughout Great Britain to 
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do likewise. Bisseker wanted to know why in these seriously worrying times the local 
government of Singapore could not also order the entire nation to begin vital and urgent 
preparations.  The Governor‟s laconic reply encapsulates his apathy to the gathering storm. 
He doubted that 
… the public should themselves accept the responsibility of looking after 
themselves as we do at Home.  It may be interesting to hon. Members to know 
in that part of East Kent in which I lived [on leave], save in one town, I do not 
think I saw a single public shelter within 10 miles of our village.  Any shelters 
that we had were put up by ourselves and used by ourselves…..and in any case 
the matter is not easy, in fact, it is very complicated, and what we might do in 
Singapore would, I feel, not necessarily be suitable for Penang, Ipoh, Kuala 
Lumpur and so on.
242
   
 
In the formal procedure of Council meetings the Governor made his remark in the form of a 
closing address, so that it was impossible for members to refute his remarks. He is unkindly 
dismissive of Bisseker‟s obsession with Passive Defence. The following day‟s newspaper 
noted, however, „that comparisons with UK were dissimilar and entirely inappropriate.‟243 No 
mention was made about his irritation with Bisseker and his almost dismissive contempt for 
the petty details of civil defence. It is also surprising to find, according to the minutes, that the 
GOC (who invariably attended these meetings), made no comment nor offered any advice. A 
forum like the formal Council meeting would seem to have offered an unrivalled opportunity 
for a professional military comment about civil defence.        
The reason for the lack of air-raid shelters in Singapore was actually known as early 
as 1937.  The newly formed Defence Committee had in fact discussed the question. They 
concluded that owing to the high water table in Singapore, shelters could not be sited 
underground, and the higher ground was mostly utilized as Chinese cemeteries and thus was 
inviolable. However, earthed-up large concrete cylinders was proposed as a sensible and 
workable substitute.  The Government rejected this idea and decided to follow a plan similar 
to that employed by the Dutch authorities in Netherland East Indies (NEI), which was to 
disperse the population on warning of an air raid to „Dispersal Camps‟.  In Singapore, such 
camps with a capacity to house 350,000 people were built later, some miles out of the city, at 
a cost of over one million (local) dollars. Light, water, communal kitchens, stores of food, 
trained commandants and wardens were provided.  Significantly it was pointed out at the time 
that shelters miles out of town were impractical in an emergency, most air raids, of course, 
were emergencies.  Another proposal was to give protection for vital workers and others, with 
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shelters above ground along some the great wharves. The Singapore Harbour Board, an 
independent authority, decided against it.
244
 A decision that would be deeply regretted.                                           
 Before this war Bisseker had been General Manager of a tin smelting works in 
Penang, where he also resided. He was elected to the Legislative Council as an Unofficial 
Member in February 1940. From the very beginning of his tenure, he pursued the authorities 
relentlessly over what he considered their apathetic approach to civil defence.  His 
persistence made him most unpopular with senior government figures. Governor Thomas 
later wrote „Bisseker constituted himself the critic of everything that had been done.  He 
himself had done nothing to help in defence preparations and was not even a member of any 
Passive Defence Unit.‟245 This remark is not entirely true; Bisseker‟s offer to help was never 
taken up, though he was involved unofficially in several passive activities in Penang. Later, 
during the last days of Singapore, he played a major role in the civil defence arrangements as 
second-in-command to the Director General Civil Defence, Brigadier Ivan Simson.  
However, even after Thomas‟ period in captivity, he still harboured a dislike for Bisseker.  In 
correspondence to Sir John Shuckburgh (Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office) on 
14 November 1945, said „I hope you will sift most carefully any statement made by Bisseker 
of Penang.  He is quite untrustworthy, and his war effort was confined to making 
opportunities for himself and others to escape.‟246 
There was clearly a debilitating and acrimonious relationship between the Governor 
and this member of his Legislative Council, who from other documentary evidence was 
primarily concerned to spur the authorities into constructive civil defence action. At a time 
when the authorities needed all the help they could muster, such hostility was disgraceful. As 
will be seen, Bisseker became an energetic and dominant figure in the final days of 
Singapore‟s descent.  He continued to badger the government about civil defence throughout 
1941, while at the same time giving credit when obvious advances in certain areas were 
achieved. But he was far from satisfied with overall results. He was not the only member of 
the Legislative Council who expressed concern about civil defence matters. There were 
others, but he was undoubtedly the most voluble and persistent. The refrain of civil defence 
lethargy was also taken up by Kuala Lumpur. The minutes of a Federal Council meeting held 
in October 1940, show that a council member, one W.G. Blunn, expressed similar dismay at 
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the lack of tangible evidence of progress, or indeed the matter being taken seriously. He said 
that since a Secretary for Defence was appointed in January 1939: 
Very many minute papers must have been exchanged in the last twenty-
two months between that officer in Singapore and the various officers 
concerned in the Federated Malay States.  But as honourable members will 
agree, minute papers are rather like the music in the circular bass.  In the 
words of the song, “they go round and around” until eventually something 
emerges.  In the meantime however, people who may feel their lives are at 
stake, are inclined to become rather impatient, waiting for the outward and 
visible sign…..everybody should know exactly where to go, what to do 
and how to do it….they should be instructed as to the signals which would 
be given in the event of an attack from the air and how to behave in such 
circumstances…and enlightened as to the kind of shelter they should 
seek.
247
         
 
A number of other members at this meeting endorsing the same view as the colony 
raised supplementary questions on passive defence matters.  The President of the Federal 
Council is the High Commissioner but on this occasion, it was the OAG (Jones) who stood in, 
as Thomas was on leave.  It must have been glaringly apparent to Jones that civil defence was 
now a countrywide concern and at the front of everyone‟s mind.  It is difficult therefore to 
understand the Governor‟s argument, that allowing the military to be seen preparing 
defensive positions would harm the morale of the Colony. People needed reassuring and it 
would certainly have been a comfort to see that at least the Services were taking the possible 
dangers seriously and taking appropriate action.   
       Two particular issues concerned Bisseker; the dissemination of information to the 
public, to counter propaganda being broadcast by foreign radios; and the conflict in demand 
for labour between the military and local businesses. The military were unable to offer a pay 
scale comparable with the civilian sector, because of the fiscal restraints imposed on them by 
the War Office. As a result, they were unable to recruit badly needed labour. Bisseker 
believed the local government had a financial obligation to assist in the effort.
248
 
On the matter of keeping the people informed, the Governor had strong feelings on 
being selective with official government information, particularly those statements he judged 
to be alarmist. He took a close interest in what particulars were released into the public 
domain.  Within the government machinery, there was already in place, before the war, a 
sponsored „Department of Information‟. Until this point, there was little for it to do and it met 
infrequently, and in any case, its military related content was heavily censored. After the 
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outbreak of war, London appointed a Director of Propaganda, Sir George Sansom, a 
distinguished diplomat and Japanophile, and the department thereafter assumed a more 
prominent and important role. At the same time the military authorities set up a „Services 
Public Relations Office‟ but as noted in Chapter 2, it was under the control of a long retired 
and disastrously incompetent naval officer. It caused more anguish among journalists than it 
did to provide a service. (See also Chapter 6).   
Among the list of civil defence duties of the civil government, which Thomas 
catalogued, was the vital matter of the preparation and execution of various denial schemes.  
This list, as noted, was compiled after the war and as became embarrassingly evident during 
the campaign, little planning went into this important task. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that this particular issue was a post facto addendum.  In the middle of December 
1941, when the Japanese were already well down peninsula Malaya, London became alarmed 
at the failure to impose a delay on the Japanese advance through denying them important 
resources. In panic they gave the quite impractical instruction of an unrestricted scorched-
earth policy.  From the Colonial Government‟s point of view, this would have been seriously 
damaging to the indigenous Asians who remained behind, however uncomfortable survival 
might be. Following a series of exchanges between Singapore and London, it was agreed that 
certain essentials such as public utilities, power plants, water supply and food produce would 
not be touched.
249
  Businesses, estates and mines, owned by Asians, were also to be avoided 
unless they were obviously of particular value to the Japanese. Everything else of importance 
was to be destroyed.  This urgent exchange of communications at this point in the war 
validates the fact that no plans had been prepared beforehand to deal with such a contingency. 
However, the speed of the retreat was so great, it was almost impossible to apply a scorched-
earth policy, except in a few cases.  Decisions on this matter had to be delegated to the 
military commanders on the ground.  In the case of large and important installations such as 
the coalmines in Selangor, the destruction of which would be complex and take some time, it 
was left to the owners to comply. Not surprisingly, they turned to the army for assistance. 
Military sappers already under pressure had to be diverted from other essential tasks to attend 
to these demolitions.
250
                     
The Volunteers 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, was a small body of military volunteers in 
Malaya. In the main, they were full-time civilian employees but at regular periods they 
volunteered for brief training where they learnt basic military skills. In the event of an 
emergency they would be inducted to full time service.  The total number of volunteers was 
not large. In December 1939, there were 514 officers, 9,604 men in total; of this number 298 
officers, and 1,819 men were British.
251
  By June 1940, the numbers of the latter had dropped 
to 269 and 5,488 because they had returned to UK to enlist in Britain‟s Armed Forces.  Of 
those remaining the Straits Settlements Volunteer Forces (SSVF) comprise the largest force; 
with four infantry battalions, (two in Singapore, and one in Malacca and one in Penang) in 
addition to some supporting units; a Light Artillery Battery, an Engineer unit and some radio 
Signallers, all in Singapore. There was also a small number of naval and air force volunteers.  
Each of the four FMS states had an infantry battalion and a small number of signallers and 
gunners. Three of the five states of the UMS (less Perlis and Terengganu) had between them 
one infantry battalion, and a very small number of others trained in miscellaneous military 
skills - in addition to the volunteers, there was one regular Malay Regiment, an infantry 
battalion - a second of which was raised in April 1941.  Regular British army officers 
commanded these forces while the NCOs‟ were both British and Malays.   
These numbers should be set against the total number of British civilians of suitable 
age available for enlistment.  In 1939, there were only 9,000 British males in Malaya. So 
worrying was the rush of young able-bodied men to return to UK to enlist, that the 
government had to impose a ban on further departures because these men held vital 
management jobs in crucial industries. From that point, only a few with special circumstances 
were allowed to go.  Of those who did not join the Volunteers, a high proportion worked in 
one of the various civil defence organisations.  It was calculated that after compulsory service 
was introduced in June 1940 and all the exemptions had been scrutinised only 11 per cent of 
Malaya‟s European male population was exempt from war service for reasons other than 
health. Such decisions were invariably connected with the vital tin and rubber industries.  In 
his 1947 Report, „Malaya‟s War Effort‟, Thomas gives examples of the consequences: a 
mining company with 88 European staff of which 59 were mobilised was left with 29 men to 
run fifteen tin dredges, six hydraulic mines and a head office.  Of those not mobilised the 
majority joined the civil defence organisation as air-raid wardens or the auxiliary fire service. 
A commercial firm with government contracts in engineering and electrical installations that 
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employed 53 European technical specialists, had 26 mobilised.  The remainder were engaged 
in vital military contracts and could not be released, but they also joined the civil defence. 
Thomas noted that European women also played their part in the defence effort, in one 
district where 35 British women were resident, 15 served in the Medical Auxiliary Service 
and many of them travelled 10 or 15 miles to attend training and practice sessions. Thomas 
adds that large numbers of Asians also participated in such initiatives and that the civil 
defence units „…represented an excellent cross-section of the population as a whole, 
operating in every district and made up of people of every race…..during the campaign most 
of them did their work well and stuck to their posts.‟252 It is important to note that the Asian 
male population was not included in the compulsory service order. 
It is noteworthy that  the Thomas Report uses the term „districts‟ which is a reference 
to the municipal zones of Singapore. Most attention is given to the Island‟s efforts; the 
remainder of the Straits Settlements - Malacca, Penang and Province Wellesley – closely 
followed closely the Singapore pattern. However, there is little mention of civil defence 
efforts in the FMS and the UMS. The former did make similar though less extensive efforts 
as the Straits Settlements. The UMS on the other hand paid little attention to such 
preparations The counter argument put forward
253
 was that a nationwide comprehensive civil 
defence scheme would have taken years and endless time to prepare and maintain. Not only 
was this impracticable, but it conflicted with Thomas‟s  wish to present an image of 
confidence:  
„It was the governor‟s wish that civil morale had to be maintained and 
confidence in the immediate future.  Hence the Japanese threat was minimised 
and their ability to invade Malaya was belittled.‟254  
Such comments contributed to the growing strained relationship between the military 
and the civilians.  In the many accounts of the fall of Singapore, there is a recurring refrain of 
general and mutual disdain. The soldiers arriving in Singapore from war-torn Britain had 
practically no understanding of the colonial environment. In particular, they had no 
knowledge of the delicate governmental relationship between the British administration and 
the Malay Rulers.  And they were taken aback by the detached, almost surreal view of the 
threat, and the affluent undisturbed lifestyle of the people:  
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„The European population were possessed of a supreme confidence born 
of complete complacency.  With a few notable exceptions, their attitude 
to the war in general and the chances of it coming to Malaya was one of 
complete indifference.  I have heard it said by civilians that it would be 
better if the army were not in Malaya – they would attract the Japanese, 
whereas without them it would be possible to make satisfactory terms 
with the Japanese! That was in the summer of 1941.‟255  
 
Even at the very senior levels a civil servant in a position to know better was reported 
by Brooke-Popham to have said to him in relation to air-raid precautions, „My dear Air 
Marshal, I‟m convinced that the possibilities of war against Japan are at least 500 to 1 
against.‟256   
To the military, intent upon preparing defences, what seemed to be obstructionism by 
civil servants, was often no more than concern by the administration for the susceptibilities of 
the Asian population that they governed, and of the rights of the Malay States, which were 
not British colonies but protected states with considerable internal autonomy. A senior civil 
servant later wrote: 
Co-operation was difficult.  The Services and the civilians were working to 
conflicting directives, the first to get ready for war should it come; the second 
to maintain maximum production of tin and rubber and their swift despatch to 
Europe and America.  This led to innumerable clashes of interest: priority for 
labour, for transport, for interference with normal business or damage to 
rubber estates or interruption of supplies and so on.  Added to this was some 
irritation to the civilians to be ordered about somewhat peremptorily on 
occasions and to find their clubs and cinemas over-run by hordes of 
newcomers who seemed to have far more spare time and money than we did! 
Don‟t forget that the civilian population was generally working extremely 
hard; full blast at peacetime production and all that went with it plus mounting 
war work, usually at evenings and over weekends.
257
  
         
A further irritant was that British service personnel in Singapore paid income tax at 
the very high wartime rates pertaining in Britain, while the local civilians did not; a point the 
military resented and pointed out.   The British expatriates and civil servants in Singapore 
were probably more resentful of the disruption to their well-regulated and comfortable lives 
caused by the influx of the military, than was the case in up-country Malaya. In Singapore, 
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the European civilians saw the military quite simply as brutal and licentious soldiery. A 
revealing incident is recounted in Russell Braddon‟s memoir „The Naked Island‟. After 
enlisting in the Australian Artillery, he was posted to Singapore in August 1941, and had with 
him a letter of introduction to an elderly lady socialite who was a friend of his grandmother. 
He was told she could always be found in Raffles Hotel at Sunday lunch. He went to Raffles 
and was asked to leave almost immediately by one of the staff because a lady guest objected, 
and that anyway, the hotel was „out of bounds‟ to soldiers.  The lady, who had objected to his 
presence, without knowing him at all, was none other than his grandmother‟s friend.258   
In peninsular Malaya, many Europeans lived a different life style with a large number 
of them settled in remote areas. Of course, in major towns such as Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and 
Taiping there were significant numbers of such residents.  For many of the up-country group, 
the arrival of the military brought a welcome variety to their often-monotonous lives. 
Nevertheless, there were still remarkable incidents in the northern predominantly Malay 
states where they were still heedless of the danger. For instance during vital deployment 
British troops were asked to move further away because they were too near a Malay kampong 
(village).  While it was difficult for the military to understand this prejudice, since they saw 
being in Malaya „to defend these people‟, it was equally hard for the administration to 
contend with the clash of cultures, and persuade the Malays to accept these unusual 
circumstances.  Many of the Malay kampongs were remote and lacked communication. Thus 
the arrival of military forces without warning or reason, was bewildering for them.  
In an interview with General Percival after the war, the writer James Leasor, in his 
study „Singapore‟ recorded Percival as saying:  
On the civil side, far too little attention had been paid to the people who did not regard 
themselves as British, but as Malays and Chinese. The civil side did not seem to realise 
the complications of fighting in their own country.  The civilian population were 
naturally saying to themselves, Who‟s coming out top dog here? And they were 
waiting to see who was going to be top dog, so there wasn‟t very much help from 
them.  
“To start with, it took a very long time to get any overall decisions from the 
rulers out there, because in the end you had to go to about a dozen different people to 
get a decision.  This occurred time and time again. 
It caused great delays because a lot of these people were pretty dilatory in 
replying.  It took weeks or months to get a decision on general policy regarding the 
building of fortifications and so on….259     
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 In Malaya, a Political Intelligence and Security Branch was in place. Until the 
declaration of war in the West, it was a small but efficient organisation, concerned mainly 
with „Malayan Security‟ as reflected in its local title. After September 1939, it 
comprehensively extended its task beyond its parochial interests and increased its 
responsibilities.  It consisted of a number of intelligence organisations, all of which were 
concerned with the local political scene. They also took an interest in the political affairs of 
neighbouring countries, especially those which affected them. The Inspector General of 
Police SS (Straits Settlements) A. H. Dickinson was in overall charge, organising its activities 
through a number of subsidiary bodies.   Malayan Security co-ordinated the activities of all 
the Malayan Police Forces: the SS, FMS and the UMS, in the collection and collation of all 
political matters affecting security.  Malayan Security worked most closely with the Far East 
Combined Bureau (FECB).  
The FECB in turn maintained a close working liaison with intelligence officers and 
Service Attachés in Tokyo, Shanghai, Tientsin, Chungking, Bangkok and Hong Kong from 
whom they received reports.
260
  Besides the naval, army, and air intelligence sections, the 
FECB consisted of other specialised units: the Far Eastern Security Section; the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) or MI6 Section; the shipping section; and the signals intelligence 
section.  The Far Eastern Security Section was responsible for surveillance on persons or 
organisations working against British security in East Asia, particularly enemy agents 
engaged in subversion, espionage or sabotage.  The SIS had agents spread throughout East 
Asia, focusing mainly on Japanese activities and intentions.  The shipping section traced and 
studied the movements of foreign shipping.
261
 
The signal intelligence section concentrated on interception, deciphering, direction 
finding, and traffic analysis of Japanese wireless messages.  This work included the top secret 
“Y” or “Ultra” deciphering of Japanese military and diplomatic codes. Thus from its wide 
network and sources, the FECB was able to interpret the trends in East Asia and provide C-
in-C China and Brooke-Popham, with up to date analysis of Japanese intentions.  In addition, 
the Land and Air Commanders had their own small intelligence gathering cells and provided 
the C-in-C‟s with situation reports.  Furthermore there were daily and bi-weekly intelligence 
summaries from London that covered the whole world and occasional parochial reports 
compiled by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).  Furthermore, the Naval Headquarters at 
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Ottawa kept Singapore informed of changes in Japanese shipping patterns.  There was also an 
exchange of information with Dutch and American service authorities in East Asia.  A 
Defence Security Officer was responsible for military security and counter-intelligence 
within the Forces, while the Malayan Security Service concentrated on internal security and 
Japanese infiltration in Malaya.  
 It is banal to say that intelligence gathering is an essential activity at all times, but is 
particularly vital in periods of uncertainty. What is less certain is the value attached to such 
information and the use made of it.  The interpretation of unusual behaviour only becomes 
significant when there is a heightened sense of alertness.  If the prevailing view is that 
conditions and relations are more or less normal, important precursors are sometimes 
overlooked.  The general feeling of security evident in Malaya in early 1941 was based on the 
opinion, expressed officially by specialists that Japan was most unlikely to risk hostilities 
with Britain and the United States simultaneously, and this led to an air of some 
complacency.  Although there were some specialists who distrusted this attitude, it is no 
exaggeration to say that from the Governor downwards, among civil servants and soldiers 
alike, there was a belief that, at best, there would be probably no war with Japan; at worst 
they would make no move until February 1942.
262
   When the regional Commander in Chief, 
General Archibald Wavell, visited the area in late 1941, he reported „My impressions were 
that the whole atmosphere in Singapore was completely unwarlike, they did not expect a 
Japanese attack …and were very far from being keyed up to war pitch.‟263  Yet the governor 
and his senior staff were kept fully informed on intelligence developments by the military. In 
addition, there were reports from London and despatches from the neighbouring British 
Ambassadors and Consul‟s General.  
One incident caused some uneasiness among the intelligence community and raised 
concern about the security of sensitive information passed to the Governor.  During a dinner 
party in Government House, at which several senior officers were present, a cipher telegram 
from London arrived for the Governor. Thomas summoned the Eurasian clerk in charge of 
his office to decode the cable.  Next morning, one of the officers informed the IG Police 
(Dickinson) of the incident and commented that „horrified by the fact of entrusting a Eurasian 
subordinate, in wartime especially, [with] the decoding of secret cipher messages‟.  The other 
military guests also complained separately to London.  The result was a demand from the 
highest levels, for an explanation from the governor, which he gave sufficient to the situation. 
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However as Dickinson commented „the feeling of suspicion and lack of confidence in the 
Governor to which the incident gave rise was never completely erased.‟264       
The policing arrangements in Malaya reflected the disparate governmental 
administration that were in place.  The Colony of Straits Settlements had its own Force with 
an Inspector General at its head.  The Federated Malay States also had its own Inspector-
General.  The Unfederated States had their own Police Forces quite separate from each other 
and separate from the SS and FMS.  Neither of the Inspector-General‟s had any authority in 
the UMS and could only enter in an official capacity by invitation of the Sultan. In late 1940, 
after considerable debate this agreement was changed: the introduction of the „Malayan 
Security Intelligence Committee‟ meant that the IGP of the SS had the right of entry in 
respect of security matters.   It then became possible to co-ordinate intelligence information 
across the whole of Malaya, and to some extent, across the region.  The intelligence 
authorities proclaimed that this move was„…the answer to the co-ordination of all police 
executive action and policy in the excessively complicated (from the police point of view) 
lay-out of the Peninsula.‟265  By the time war came, it was still an immature organisation. In 
its embryonic period, there were incidents of poor co-ordination by inexperienced officials, 
particularly in the UMS.      
 The internal matters, which were of most concern to the security committee, ranged 
from determining the extent of Japanese penetration in Malaya, and effectiveness of any 
attempts at subversion. The behaviour of the Chinese was scrutinised as well as their reaction 
to the growing danger. Similarly, the activities and conduct of the indigenous Malays, and the 
other nationalities was closely monitored.  Of these groups, the Japanese living and working 
in Malaya were the focus of close surveillance. At the time and after the war, opinion was 
divided about the impact and value their presence made on events.
266
  Nearly every village 
throughout Malaya had a Japanese barber‟s shop, nearly all photographers, providing both a 
photographic service and development facilities were run by Japanese, and they had a large 
fishing fleet, with bases in Singapore and Batavia, trawling the seas around Malaya and 
Netherlands East Indies.
267
  In addition, there were a number of Japanese owned tin mines 
and rubber estates. The traders had been in location long before international relations 
deteriorated, and almost certainly most had arrived in Malaya genuinely seeking work.  
                                                 
264
 Elphick.  The Pregnable Fortress. p.152. 
265
 Thomas Papers. Enclosure. Dickinson. “Memorandum on the organisation for the control of political 
intelligence in Malaya” Jan. 1946. . Mss.Ind.Ocn.S. 341 RHL 
266
 CO 273/671/9. 1943.    
267
 Robertson. Japanese File, passim. Also Shennan. Out in the Midday Sun. John Murray, London. 2000. p 213. 
  
113 
 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that their established presence and intimate knowledge of 
the country, and the peoples, was of value to the Japanese intelligence authorities. Out of 
loyalty, these traders would observe and report on matters they were asked to target. 
Doubtless, there were „sleeper‟ agents among them and indeed, they probably helped 
organise subversive activities.  However, some British civil servants clung to the assumption 
that most were law-abiding citizens merely following their trade, and doubted the aspersions 
cast upon them, as expressed by Colonel Grimsdale in his unpublished account of his time as 
the senior army intelligence officer in F.E.C.B.: 
I remember being shown a police report on a certain Japanese [that] the Special Branch 
believed to be an important link in their intelligence organisation.  Funds did not permit the 
thorough investigation which the case clearly merited, and the report concluded with a 
request for a comparatively small additional sum.  The paper was annotated in the margin 
by the Governor himself.  His comments included “this is pure alarmism”.  Further down I 
read “more alarmism”; at the end was the terrifying remark “there is no Japanese menace in 
Malaya.”  In the face of such official discouragement from the highest quarters, it is 
remarkable how much success the police had in tracking down some of the highly 
organised Japanese fifth column.  But the lack of reasonable financial resources forced 
them to drop many promising lines of investigation and enabled the Japanese to develop 
their subversive activities largely unmolested.
268
       
            
The Japanese Consul General in Singapore, Toyoda, was a known conduit for the transfer of 
intelligence information to Tokyo, and his encrypted signals, as noted, were monitored and 
decoded.  Much of his intelligence material was of poor quality, often inaccurate, and 
sometimes misleading.
269
  By the law of averages, there were also times when he gained 
useful material.  
  In a lengthy note written by Dickinson after the war, in response to Thomas‟s 
ceaseless search for rebuttals of the charge of failure of his Administration, he said: 
In the early days of the campaign there was a good deal of loose talk of a native Fifth 
Column.  There is no evidence that any such thing existed as an organised entity…The 
absence of an organised Fifth Column does not postulate the absence of a Japanese 
Intelligence – cum- Espionage organisation.  The police for years had maintained as close a 
watch as circumstances permitted on the Japanese Community and its contacts.  Intimate 
liaison was maintained with the Dutch Authorities in all Japanese affairs.  But for the (UK 
Govt.), policy of „appeasement‟ more action could have been taken on the evidence 
available than was in fact ever permitted. For thirty years, the Japanese community in 
Malaya had been permitted to pursue with complete immunity, the collection of 
intelligence and the mapping of the bye-ways of the countryside. Much of this 
“intelligence” information was routine and available to anybody who wanted it, with 
common sense and a pair of eyes in his head…  The Japanese Community of Malaya, some 
three thousand five hundred strong, was as a “security” [risk] but not a local political 
problem.
270
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The loyalty and activities of the Chinese population were also under close 
surveillance.  The Chinese was broadly divided into two main persuasions: those confessed 
communists, members of the Malayan Communist Party and supported the communist regime 
in mainland China; and those who sympathised with the government of Chiang Kai Shek, the 
Kuomintang.  In addition, there was a small group, pro- Wang Ching Wei; their sympathy lay 
with that group of Chinese in China, tolerant of Japanese occupation. (Wang Ching Wei was 
briefly leader of the Kuomintang after the death of Sun Yat Sen in 1924). The security 
committee claimed that the pro – Kuomintang was probably the most powerful group, but the 
communists were the more active and vocal.  The Wang Ching Wei party proved to be no 
great danger to the authorities, and in any case, on the outbreak of war, all known members 
were arrested and placed in detention. There was no evidence that they ever engaged in fifth 
column activity.  The other important group of Chinese were, of course, those who were 
second and third generation citizens, and described themselves as „King‟s Chinese‟.  They 
were genuine loyal adherents of the British Empire, but as danger drew near, they became 
susceptible to pressure to declare an affiliation to either one of the other two main groups.  
The Kuomintang and the Communists of Malaya, following an uneasy truce between these 
two major parties in China, formed a “United Front” which on the outbreak of the Malayan 
war absorbed all Chinese with the exception of the Wang Ching Wei party.   According to 
Dickinson, in his report to the Governor, „the Chinese as a race were anti-Japanese and 
genuinely pro-British‟; but he qualified this remark by adding; „only providing the 
administration‟s sentiment coincided with their local interests, and did not clash directly with 
the dictates of Chungking.‟271  The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), an almost entirely 
Chinese organisation, similarly followed any lead given by the communist party of China.
272
  
In 1940, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the MCP planned and directed a number of violent 
strikes, seriously affecting the production of rubber and affecting the allied war effort.  It 
needed strong police action to restore the situation.  It was noticeable, however, that 
following Germany‟s attack on Russia in June 1941, the MCP offered wholehearted co-
operation with the authorities in Malaya, against „our common enemy‟.273 Nevertheless, the 
fervent loyalty of the Malaya born Chinese was never in doubt and later criticism disparaged 
the failure to enlist them as an irregular force to fight their most hated enemy.  The 
government‟s reluctance to do so was because of the fear raised by the Malays that they could 
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not countenance an armed Chinese people in their midst. Once again, the lack of cohesion in 
this historically heterogenous population was a crucial factor. 
         The indigenous Malays, as assessed by the security authorities, considered 
themselves superior to all other Asian races.  Although there was no serious nationalist 
movement among the Malays in general, their local press had for many years expounded on 
Malay racial pride and general superiority.
 274
 The Malay Intelligentsia showed signs of some 
movement towards nationalism, activated to some extent by influences from the Netherlands 
East Indies where nationalism was running strong, and by the local Malay Press.  Malay 
youth, cultivated by their more advanced and politically sensitive type of teacher, was 
beginning to stir.  The Japanese administration, seeing possibilities in this Youth Movement 
(Kesatuan Muda Melayu) attempted to advance it by persuading a known Malay agitator, 
Ibrahim Yaacob, to purchase a prominent Malay newspaper, with Japanese capital. The 
scheme was brought to an abrupt end and Ibrahim arrested.  It was generally acknowledged 
that the purely Malay political undercurrents were embryonic and of little cause for concern; 
most Malays were apathetic to politics. What was of more concern was their reliability under 
duress.  It was thought that in general they would be loyal to the British interest but that no 
great reliance could be placed on them. It was expected that among the younger men there 
would be a certain amount of co-operation with the Japanese army.  Although pleasant, the 
male ppulation were thoroughly unstable, did what was expected of them, and took the easiest 
path to their own greater comfort. 
275
   
     The Indian element of the population consisted mainly of Hindus, although there 
were also a significant number of Sikhs and Muslims.  Their normal behaviour was generally 
peaceful, and the labour classes were graded as „an ignorant section of the population, 
interested only in the quiet pursuit of their livelihood‟.  They were nevertheless susceptible to 
the powerful persuasion of fervent Indian Nationalists, embodied in the comparatively well 
educated class of lawyers and teachers. This Nationalist group, set up by well organised local 
Indian Associations answering to a Central Indian Association of Malaya, bid for complete 
control of the Indian population of the country on a strongly Nationalist basis. While such 
associations were few in number, in 1940, their movement was seen as potentially powerful 
and dangerous.  
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The Sikh community came in for the most damning security assessment.  Their group 
was strongly organised within itself, through the influence of the Gurudwaras, (temples). 
Further, it was susceptible to the anti-British propaganda emanating from the many districts 
of the Punjab and, curiously, from America. According to IGP Dickinson‟s report, it was a 
community that – „contributed nothing to the welfare of Malaya, and could only be 
considered parasitic, stupid and likely to be openly anti-British in the event of disaster 
overtaking British arms.‟276   In his post war comments to Thomas, Dickinson remarked that, 
as it turned out,  
„…the Sikh community are reported to have behaved badly, co-operating fully with the 
Japanese in the more brutal aspects of their treatment of the civilian population. „It must be 
added however that instances of great loyalty and devotion on the part of some individuals, 
have been recorded.‟277   
 It is evident, from the documentary evidence, that the civil administration simply did 
not see a need for urgency in the introduction and preparation of civil defence measures.
278
  
The population, as represented by people like Bisseker on the Legislative Council, made their 
demands for action, volubly and forcibly, but met with resistance and were regarded as 
alarmist. The government was at pains to project an image of calm and restraint.  Even at this 
time, little effort was made to alert the populace to the potential risks, or to inform them of the 
simple and basic protective precautions every household and business premise could organise, 
at no great expense. In spite of the mounting evidence from diverse but highly reliable sources 
of Japan‟s irrational behaviour, the governor was still reluctant to acknowledge in public that 
there might be danger ahead. He even refused to authorise the building of shelters. 
Furthermore, his administration failed to demand concerted action from the Malay states, in 
summary there was no unity of purpose. Even the possible evacuation of civilians was never 
even confidentially discussed. Senior government officials in the Malay states were given no 
briefing whatsoever about their responsibilities in the event of an emergency.  In this 
dismissive atmosphere, the authorities inevitably disregarded the possibility of a scorched 
earth policy.  
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     CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RESPONDING TO THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
By late 1941, the effects of the economic and trade freeze imposed on Japan by the 
United States, Britain and other Allies, were having a crippling impact on the Japanese 
economy.
279
  In an attempt to lift the imposition and break the deadlock Japan engaged in an 
endless round of diplomatic discussions, with America. These talks took place in 
Washington.  While these daily meetings were underway, United States intelligence 
intercepted the Japanese delegation‟s reports to Tokyo.280 The reports disclosed that Japan 
was intransigent and had already made up its mind that the only solution to their problems lay 
in acquiring their own independent supply of vital resources, by force if necessary, and not 
depend on Western munificence.  
Governor Thomas in Singapore was aware, through British diplomatic channels, of 
the dangerous impasse reached in Washington. In addition, from his military colleagues, he 
was fully aware of the continuing build up and deployment of Japanese Forces in South East 
Asia.
281
 In the twelve months, since returning from leave, both his administration and the 
military hierarchy had undergone considerable change and as a result were in continuing 
turmoil.  Thomas had been obliged to replace Vlieland, (Chapter 4). Now, with claims 
reaching London of lack of co-ordination and disagreement between the civil and military 
authorities, he had imposed on his administration, to his chagrin, the appointment of a 
Minister Resident. Duff Cooper, a minister of cabinet rank, arrived to investigate and report 
on these allegations. In addition, both the Army and Air Commanders were replaced.  
Lieutenant General Arthur Percival now commanded the Army and Air Vice-Marshal Walter 
Pulford commanded the Air Force. The C-in-C Far East, Brooke-Popham, also warned (on 
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Nov. 5) that he was to be replaced. Churchill endorsing these changes, and in an attempt to 
soften the blow to Brooke-Popham‟s prestige, explained that the military emphasis had 
changed. The Army, he rationalised, were now bearing the bigger responsibility „the defence 
of Singapore should be entrusted to an army officer with up-to-date experience.‟282  This was 
a smokescreen; there had been no change in the defensive plans, the central tenet of which 
still rested on the ability of the air force to destroy an approaching invasion fleet at sea. The 
officer chosen to replace Brooke-Popham was Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownell. 
From early 1941, the military authorities became increasingly alarmed at Japanese 
unrestrained aggression and now regarded an invasion as a serious possibility. Defence 
preparations, within the materiel limits imposed upon them, became injected with new 
vigour. New arrivals, including senior commanders, had to learn hurriedly the detail of their 
areas of responsibility and busy people had to surrender valuable time to brief and instruct 
them.  The civil administration, on the other hand, did not appear to be infected by the sense 
of urgency visibly mounting among the ranks of the military.  On 1 December, the colony 
was placed on a state of alert and a „Proclamation‟ issued, calling up all the Naval, Army and 
Air Force Volunteers, but even this did not appear to alarm the civilian authorities.  Thomas 
noted in his diary that he received a telephone call from the Colonial Office, „7.00 am tel: 
[sic] from CO saying position getting worse‟ and „Meeting with Brooke-Popham, Percival 
and Jones [Colonial Secretary]. Called out the Volunteers.‟283  The pace and tempo of 
government affairs did not change. Matters relating to war preparations continued 
ponderously, and were beset by bureaucratic evasion of responsibility.  The passing of 
memoranda seeking urgent decisions on defence matters still moved leisurely between 
departments. It even continued after the outbreak of war, until Thomas, on 15 January 1942, 
belatedly declared that the time for passing inter departmental memos was over, people had 
to take decisions.
284
  This twilight period, just before the deluge, has been the described 
variously by historians as surreal.   
On 24 July 1941, the Vichy government announced that it had agreed to the 
„temporary occupation‟ by Japan of strategic bases and airfields in Indo-China as a 
„temporary measure undertaken to protect Indo–China.‟ In the House of Commons the next 
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day, Mr Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, described that the Japanese Government had 
presented demands to Vichy for the occupation of naval and air bases in southern Indo-China. 
Moreover, it was quite evident the conclusion of a definite agreement was imminent, and it 
had been clear for some time that this aggression was premeditated by Japan. Perhaps an in 
attempt to alleviate concern, he added that certain defence measures had been enforced in 
Malaya „in view of the plain threat to our territories which the Japanese action implies.‟285 On 
the 26 July, The Straits Settlements Government Gazette announced that Japanese assets in 
Malaya were frozen. On the 28 July, Hanoi officially announced that the Vichy Government 
had permitted the Japanese to utilize eight aerodromes in southern Indo-China, including 
some on the Thai border, and that Japanese troops had begun disembarkation.
286
  Later in the 
year, 26 November, the American Consul at Hanoi had learnt through the French secret 
agency in Indo-China that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus on 1 December, 
without previous warning, from the sea and by land from Indochina.  This message was 
repeated to Singapore the following day.
287
  Even this clear warning did not rouse the 
government to issue a general alert.  Thomas broadcast to the country that there was little to 
fear and if anything untoward should arise, arrangements were in place to deal with it.
288
 As 
late as 6
 
December, when an invasion fleet had been seen in the China Sea, he still failed to 
recognise the reality of the situation. An interesting note recorded in the unpublished diary of 
Mrs Muriel Reilly
 289
, one of his cipher clerks working in Government House, seems to 
confirm his state of denial: -    
6
th
 December 1941.  He (Shenton Thomas) came into my room and sat down on the edge 
of my table and very solemnly said “well Mrs Reilly I have got bad news for you.  We are 
at war!”  I put down my pencil and said “well we‟ve been expecting it for a long time now 
– let‟s be thankful it didn‟t happen a year ago when we had that scare” He looked at me 
over the top of his glasses and replied “oh! You didn‟t ask me with whom we are at war”- 
I answered “But of course you mean Japan” at which he laughed and said “Ha! I thought I 
would catch you – no, we are at war with Finland.”   As he walked away laughing, I 
called after him “Oh! I thought you were going to prepare me to expect a Jap bomb on my 
head at any moment” – at that he returned and said “what did you say! Japanese bombs in 
Singapore!  You can take it from me there will never be a Japanese bomb dropped in 
Singapore – there will never be a Japanese set foot in Malaya.”   
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Singapore was now the focal point for international journalists, positioning themselves for the 
coming struggle; they also observed and reported the unreal normality determinedly followed 
by its citizens.
290
  
In this same period, leading to war, army manpower had been increased by 
reinforcements of young recently trained recruits from India, and an Australian Division, 
though this division in early 1941 was only one Brigade strong. It was later reinforced by 
another brigade, and was commanded by a colourful but prickly Australian, Major General 
Gordon Bennett. However, vital military equipment had not been forthcoming; there was still 
no armour, a serious shortage of artillery, heavy anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank weapons. The 
promised modern attack aircraft, Spitfires, Hurricanes and torpedo bombers to replace the 
dated and ancient Brewster Buffaloes, Hudson‟s and Vildebeeste, had not arrived;.  The 
British Ground Forces in Malaya in December 1941 totalled 88,600.
291
  This number was still 
short of the desired figure Percival and his predecessor had calculated was essential for the 
defence of Malaya. Their calculations concluded that the number required was 100,000. In 
terms of combat troops, they were short of seventeen infantry battalions and two tank 
regiments.   
At the outbreak of war, there was a government in some disarray and in a state of 
lethargy. It was not only quarrelling among itself but also disagreeing with the military about 
war preparations and led by a Governor apparently in denial about a possible war. The 
country was neither psychologically prepared for conflict nor on a proper war footing.  The 
military, under an array of new commanders, short of manpower and the many materiel 
essentials, which for years they had appealed. In particular, it was without the modern 
aircraft, a vital factor above all, for the execution of the defensive plan.       
The Opening Moves 
The invasion of Malaya began in the early morning of 8 December 1941. Timed to 
coincide with Japanese assaults on the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake Island and 
Pearl Harbour. In the case of Pearl Harbour, which lies east of the International Date Line, it 
was still 7 December. The invasion began with sea-borne landings at three places in the 
northeast region of the Malay Peninsula.  The main assault group landed unopposed at 
Singora and Patani two coastal towns in Thailand on the eastern seaboard of the Isthmus of 
Kra and the third at Kota Bahru in Kelantan, close to the Thai border.  Two days previously, 
the 6 December 1941, at 13.40 hrs, the approach of the Japanese invasion force was detected 
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at sea, southeast of Cape Cambodia, 300 miles from and heading towards north Malaya. It 
was observed to be a Force of considerable size, at least 26 Transports, in two groups, with an 
accompanying armada for protection, of cruisers and destroyers. A lone Hudson aircraft from 
Kota Bahru, which was then flying a reconnaissance mission in the area, reported its 
presence.
292
  The sighting was communicated immediately to GHQ Singapore and more than 
an hour later at 15.00 hrs, the information was passed to Percival who was in Kuala Lumpur 
visiting III Corps Headquarters.  Percival and Heath, the Corps Commander, consulted a map 
and both concluded that on its present course the convoy was heading for Singora.
293
  After 
the war, Percival wrote in his „Despatches‟, his „Command was at the fullest degree of 
readiness, but there was no undue alarm, owing to the view that the Japanese expedition was 
directed towards Siam (Thailand).‟294  In the light of his prescient appreciation of 1937, when 
he predicted that this was the very strategy Japan would use to approach west Malaya, it is a 
surprising statement. In apparent contradiction he added that they (he and Heath) believed 
that this sighting of an approaching invasion force would trigger an order [from the C-in-C] 
to proceed with „Matador‟.  If he believed the „expedition‟ caused „no undue alarm‟, why 
consider that „Matador‟ should be set in motion?295 
The 11
th
 Indian Division, in the Alor Star area, nominated for Operation Matador was 
already on standby and at short notice to move.  Heath now instructed the Divisional 
Commander, Murray-Lyon, to reduce the warning time to “instant readiness” and to move 
trains and road transport to the start position.  Percival caught the late afternoon civil flight 
back to Singapore, and was in his HQ, at Fort Canning, by about 6.30 p.m.  Percival makes 
the comment, in his book, that on arriving at his office „I was a little surprised to find out that 
Matador had not been ordered.‟296 This is also a curious statement for two reasons. First, it 
reflects poorly on the relationship between himself and the C-in-C, in that he did not 
immediately telephone Brooke-Popham from Kuala Lumpur to discuss the sighting, even if it 
was half-expected. It was after all an event of momentous portent. Second, a large portion of 
his meagre forces was to be despatched into neutral Thailand.  It would have been perfectly 
understandable, indeed expected, that a GOC seek clarification before despatching a major 
unit on a hazardous expedition. A further indication of the curious relationship is that 
Brooke-Popham turned to his naval colleague, Layton, to discuss the implications of the 
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sighting. While it was perfectly reasonable to seek a nautical assessment of the navigational 
course of the flotilla, it was odd not to include both the ground and air commanders in these 
important deliberations.  At that point, both C-in-C‟s agreed a decision on Matador should be 
delayed to make quite certain the convoy was, without doubt, heading for Thailand.  There is 
no record of Percival, on his return, attempting to contact his C-in-C, after learning that 
Matador had not been authorised.  It was not until late evening (9.00 p.m.) the following day, 
7
th
 December, when Brooke-Popham had confirmation of the direction and intention of the 
invasion force that Percival went personally to see him to explain that it was now too late to 
undertake „Matador.‟297  Brooke-Popham officially cancelled it at 10.30 pm. that evening.298 
The Governor was aware of the deliberations taking place regarding Matador. On 7 
December, he received a copy of an urgent cable sent to London by Sir Josiah Crosby, the 
British Ambassador in Thailand.  It said that on learning about the sighting he visited the 
Thai Foreign Minister: „I have just seen Thai Minister and we send you the following 
message from us both.  For God‟s sake do not allow British Forces to occupy one inch of 
Thai territory unless and until Japan has struck the first blow at Thailand.‟299  Undoubtedly, 
such a strong plea did little to help Brooke-Popham make a dispassionate and purely military, 
decision. This was not Crosby‟s first entreaty about not violating Thai territory.  His lengthy 
time serving in Bangkok (37 years) and obvious affection for the Thais, some claim, made 
him blind to their scheming dialogue with the Japanese.
300
 Moreover, his diplomatic 
telegrams expounding the Thai allegiance to the west and to Britain in particular, were 
dangerously misleading.    Sir Andrew Gilchrist, who at the time was a junior diplomat 
working for Crosby in Bangkok, notes that „rumours of a „Matador‟ type operation by British 
forces were now (Dec.1941) in general circulation.‟301  Moreover, a „Magic‟302 decrypt of a 
Japanese diplomatic telegram reported a suggestion by a pro-Japanese member of the Thai 
cabinet that the Japanese Forces should provoke a British invasion of southern Thailand 
enabling „Thailand to declare war on Britain as the aggressor‟.303   It would seem that Crosby 
either ignored these distasteful indicators or simply did not want to believe them.   
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Thomas learnt of the Japanese landings at Kota Bahru, according to his diary, when 
Percival telephoned him at 1.15 am on the 8
th
 December.  He then ordered, as prearranged 
with the police, the arrest of all Japanese in Singapore and the seizure of Japanese powerboats 
in harbour.  Nearly every secondary source describing this event differs, both about the time 
Thomas heard of the invasion, and his reaction.  According to Noel Barber, he is alleged to 
have said, on hearing the news from Percival, „Well I suppose you will shove the little men 
off!‟304 A comment repeated in several books on the campaign. Thomas, however, says that 
at the time of the call he was working on a cipher telegram and that later, at 4.00 am, he 
received a call from Pulford warning him of approaching hostile aircraft. He then phoned 
Rodgers of the Harbour Board and Jeans (head of A.R.P.) to alert them.  However, by the 
time the Japanese aircraft arrived over Singapore, all the city lights were fully illuminated; 
there was no blackout.  The official history states that the civil defence organisation did not 
respond because the headquarters of the Air Raid Precautions was not manned
305
, this version 
obviously calls into question the veracity of Thomas‟s diary entries.  When this event, the 
matter of the unpreparedness of civil defence of Singapore, was investigated after the war, 
Thomas defended his position by claiming that he was not forewarned of the likelihood of an 
air raid. In addition, to support his case, he had a letter from the officer in charge of civil 
defence who wrote “the point is that „brown-out‟ [precautionary dimming of lights] was not 
ordered for the night of the 7/8 December, and my recollection is that it was not given on 
Service advice.  Therefore, the A.R.P. was not manned, nor was the municipal services 
alerted in any way.  They were in their beds as on any other night in peace-time.”306   
Brian Montgomery in his book „Shenton of Singapore‟ claims to have irrefutable 
evidence, both a written account and a verbal record by a naval officer that Thomas was in 
fact at a vital conference at the Naval Base at 2.30 am on 8 December.
307
 While there an „Air 
Raid Warning Red‟ was declared, during which they all took shelter. At this conference, in 
addition to Thomas, were Brooke-Popham, Admiral Phillips (the new C-in-C Far East Fleet), 
Pulford, and senior army officers, but not Percival; additionally there were a number of staff 
officers in attendance. It is claimed that at this conference, called by Phillips, the decision 
was taken to put to sea the two capital ships and their destroyer escort (Force Z) to meet the 
Japanese invasion in north Malaya; and that Thomas‟s endorsement of the mission was 
pivotal. This decisive conference is also mentioned in Marder‟s book „Old Friends New 
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Enemies‟.308 However, there does not appear to be any documentary evidence to support the 
claim that such a conference took place.  According to Montgomery, no official minutes were 
kept for security reasons, but he gives a very full account of the entire event, related to him 
by the naval officer, Lieutenant Commander J. W. McClelland. He explains that this naval 
officer was not part of the proceedings, but deliberately slipped into the room at the request 
of Layton, who had not been invited to attend. McClelland wrote a full account of the 
meeting and after the was war interviewed by Montgomery to corroborate his record.  What 
is strange is that Thomas makes no mention of this critical meeting, even in the privacy of his 
diary.  The Naval Base was about 20 miles from Government House and at that hour it would 
have taken about 30 minutes to drive there. If the meeting did indeed take place, it is hard to 
imagine that Thomas was back at Government House by 4.00 am, to receive Pulford‟s 
warning of an air raid, which by then, in any case, would have been superfluous. This 
mysterious meeting is also given prominence by Sir Andrew Gilchrist in his book „Malaya 
1941‟, he believes this gathering did in fact take place, and is credibly reported.  Both 
Brooke-Popham and Thomas were people with whom he was personally well acquainted, and 
the remarks attributed to them during the meeting are, he believes, entirely in character.
309
 
Gilchrist‟s endorsement only serves to make Thomas‟s failure to reveal this conference, in 
any record, extraordinary, and further, raises further misgivings about the accuracy of his 
diary entries.  What is not in contention, is that Singapore was bombed at 4.15 am on 8 
December, there was no air-raid warning, the city was fully illuminated, and the Civil 
Defence organisation was unprepared.  
Commanders-in-Chief, Brooke-Popham and Layton, later that day, 8 December, 
issued an „Order of the Day‟ stating confidently: 
“We are ready.  We have had plenty of warning and our preparations 
are made and tested…..We are confident. Our defences are strong and our 
weapons efficient….Japan has made a grievous mistake….We see before us a 
Japan drained for years by the exhausting claims of her wanton onslaught of 
China.”310   
 
Ten weeks later these prophetic words were to ring hollow.  Hardened members of the press 
corps, on receiving a copy of the „Order‟, gave vent to cynicism. George Hammond, editor of 
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a local newspaper the „Tribune‟ said “I can‟t believe anybody could deliberately tell so many 
lies.”311                 
The unit selected for „Matador‟, 11th Indian Division, consisted of two Brigades only, 
under command of Major General Murray-Lyon.  The Division was deployed in north 
Malaya in the state of Kedah. As noted earlier, it was given dual and conflicting roles. Either 
prepare for deployment to a defensive position near Jitra, eighteen miles south of the Thai 
border, with the task of covering the important airfield at Alor Star. Alternatively, remain on 
alert in anticipation of the Matador operation, an offensive advance.  “The two possible roles, 
which were in no way compatible, increased immensely his [Murray-Lyon] difficulties”.312 In 
these circumstances, the Divisional Commander had little option but to have his command on 
continuous alert ready to move at short notice. Indeed, he had already moved two of his 
battalions to the railway station at Anak Bukit ready to entrain
313
. This high state of readiness 
meant that little time could be devoted to the construction of the defensive position. In any 
case, they needed to have ready loaded on transport; quantities of stores for the rapid 
construction of defensive positions at the destination and the possible repair of bridges en-
route. These same materials were needed for the defensive site at Jitra. His plan envisaged the 
division departing from ten Assembly points many miles apart and as time was going to be of 
the essence, he could make a quicker move from his deployment area if his forces were at 
instant readiness and not confined to trenches. During this waiting period, there was the 
additional handicap of appalling and incessant monsoon rain without protection or relief. “It 
was raining…it hadn‟t stopped for days…there was the devil‟s own deluge.  I had never seen 
such a storm.  You couldn‟t see more than twenty yards”.314 On 6 December 1941, the 
Division first learnt of the sighting of the Japanese convoy in the Gulf of Thailand and 
ordered to the highest state of readiness.
315
  To add a further testing element to the Divisional 
Commanders mission, he had responsibility for a small force (“Krohcol”, two battalions) 
tasked with advancing along the Kroh – Patani road to ambush any Japanese, which might 
approach from that direction.  Kroh, where the column was assembling, was a 100 miles 
away from Murray-Lyon‟s Headquarters, and communications were very unreliable.   
Neither of these pre-emptive opening moves was successful.  In the case of Matador, 
the lengthy period awaiting confirmation of the invasion fleet‟s destination left it too late to 
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deploy the Division.  And, in the case of Krohcol, again, a late decision to order this move 
was followed by a less than determined advance by the Column against some opposition, 
identified initially as Thai Police but later suspected as Japanese in Thai police uniforms,
316
 
prevented them from getting anywhere near their objective. With the cancellation of Matador, 
11
th
 Division now turned at this late point to the alternative task and deployed to defend the 
Jitra area.  They returned, dejected, to poorly and partially prepared defensive positions; 
trenches now flooded with rain water. They had to erect barbed-wire barriers, lay anti-tank 
mines and fresh telephone cables.
317
 These exhausted, wet, and raw troops, some of whom 
had never seen a tank now confronted a rapidly advancing battle trained Japanese force 
supported by tanks. The ensuing battle was swift and brutal. The Jitra position was quickly 
overrun with the Japanese employing a tactic that was to be a feature of their remorseless 
advance down peninsula Malaya. Attacking the main defensive position frontally, while at 
the same time sending supporting column‟s around the flanks to encircle the position, cutting 
the lines of communication and withdrawal routes, then falling upon the defenders from the 
rear.   
This early engagement of the war in Malaya was disastrous and set a pattern and 
standard for subsequent actions in the campaign.  The official history explained that the 
„action at Jitra was a major disaster for the British forces in Malaya…and the deployment of 
11
th
  Division at Jitra led to defeat in detail‟.318  Errors of command and control, lack of 
clarity of purpose, poor communications and inexperienced, demoralised troops facing a 
cohesive, trained and resolute enemy were the main ingredients of failure.  The British forces 
were in disarray following the defeat at Jitra.  
A most serious flaw revealed during this action was the poor radio communications, 
between all formations, upwards and downwards; primarily because there were simply not 
enough radio sets available, but also because the signal ranges between existing sets in close 
country was very poor.
319
  The civil telegraph and telephone systems or a despatch rider, in 
many instances, provided the sole means of communicating.
320
 An example of this problem 
was when Brooke-Popham and Percival were speaking to each other on a trunk call; the 
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operator interrupted to say, “Your three minutes have expired, sir”, and cut the connection.  
They were discussing an extremely vital military matter.
321
   
   It could not have helped that Corps Headquarters was located in Kuala Lumpur some 
260 miles behind the forward units and the GOC in Singapore a further 230 miles away, and 
bizarrely, Percival even found time on 8 December, the morning of the invasion, to attend a 
meeting of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council. Thomas opened the Council 
proceedings with what was either a show of British phlegm, or another example of his failure 
to grasp the significance of the outbreak of war with Japan.  
Before we proceed with the orders of the day I wish to make just a short statement.  At 1 
o‟clock this morning a Japanese force attacked the beaches of Kota Bahru. The Force 
consisted of a cruiser, four destroyers, two armed merchantmen and some transports.  They 
were engaged by our forces and the last news is that all the surface forces appear to be retiring 
and that the ships are sailing north.  There were a certain number of Japanese left on the 
beaches.  They have been roped in and those that are making off in boats are being machine-
gunned. (Applause). 
 We are informed that the main landing is now taking place at Singora in Thailand, so 
that Thailand as well as the British Empire has been attacked without provocation and without 
cause...The Council will now proceed with its business.
322
     
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
There is no record in the minutes, of Percival contributing to the proceedings.
323
 However, 
Hugh Bryson, who was Clerk to the Legislative Council, wrote after the war, that „Percival 
came in about half way through the meeting and, the public having withdrawn, gave members 
a survey of the position in Kedah and the Kroh – Betong area; he appeared confident that he 
could hold, if not repel, the Japs‟ (sic).324       
The distances between commanders and the opening battle have been compared with 
fighting taking place on the borders of Scotland and Corps HQ in Crewe with the G.O.C. in 
the Isle of Wight. Senior commanders did not have the benefit of personal aircraft to cover 
these huge distances. When Percival needed to meet the Corps Commander in Kuala Lumpur, 
he had to fly from Singapore by civil airline on an early morning flight. However, even this 
facility was suspended as the Japanese drew closer to the capital of the FMS and enemy 
aircraft dominated the skies over Malaya. Even the most senior commanders did not have 
their own air transport.
325
  
On the East coast, at Kota Bahru the primary Japanese assault took place.  The first 
shot in the Malayan campaign was fired by the Indian 3
rd
 Dogra Regt. 18-pounder gun at 
enemy landing craft just after midnight on the 8
th
 December 1941.  By 12.25 a.m. Japanese 
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troops were ashore and by 1.00 a.m. they had captured the pillboxes in the area of Badang.  
Savage fighting then took place for a number of hours with several of the other pillboxes 
resisting to the last man but by 4.00 a.m., the Japanese had a firm beachhead.
326
  
Most of the RAF‟s strength were by now deployed in North Malaya.  Of the 158 
aircraft available to the Air Commander, 110 were in the north by dawn on 8
 
December. At 
12.30 a.m. when Singapore heard the news of the landings, a few aircraft from Kota Bahru 
attacked the landing craft and succeeded in hitting all three Japanese transports, two of which 
sank. This notable success by a small number of Hudson‟s and old Wildebeests aircraft, has 
been seized upon by adherents of air power, as an example of what could have been achieved, 
if the RAF had been reinforced by the 336 aircraft promised by the C.O.S.
327
   
At daylight, the Japanese Air Force took to the air and demonstrated their superiority 
in both flying ability and the quality of their aircraft. They attacked the major aerodromes on 
both coasts. British aircraft returning to the aerodromes on the West coast to refuel and rearm 
were attacked on the ground and their numbers fatally reduced.  At Alor Star, a squadron of 
eight Blenheims caught on the ground were reduced to two aircraft. At Sungei Patani, south 
of Alor Star, two fighter squadrons similarly caught, were reduced to four aircraft in each 
squadron.  The remaining aircraft at Sungei Patani withdrew and repositioned at nearby 
Buttterworth and inexplicably the ground staff hastily withdrew leaving over a 150,000 
gallons of aviation fuel as well as the bomb stores and the runways intact. At the time, there 
were no Japanese ground forces anywhere near Sungei Patani.  
On the East coast, the three airfields had been under continual bombing and strafing 
throughout the day but the Japanese were careful to use only anti-personal and fragmentation 
bombs to avoid damaging the runways. Pulford ordered the remaining aircraft, to withdraw to 
Kuantan.  Again, the RAF Station staff, in panic, deserted the aerodromes and while they set 
fire to the buildings, they left the fuel, stores, runways and 550 tons of bombs intact.  
Fortunately, units of 8
th
 Indian Brigade managed at least to set fire to the abandoned fuel 
stores. Without instructions to the contrary, the Brigade remained responsible for the defence 
of these abandoned aerodromes.
328
  At the end of the day, only fifty operational aircraft were 
remaining in the North.    
On 9 December, the second day of the war, the air situation deteriorated even more. 
Early that day, Pulford decided to reduce the concentration of aircraft at Kuantan.  
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Unfortunately however, the Japanese got there first (they flew 120 sorties a day for the first 
three days of the war)
329
 and destroyed seven aircraft on the ground. The remainder were 
ordered back to Singapore. Attempts to strike back at the Japanese led to further losses.  Six 
Blenheims left Singapore that morning to attack the Singora area, they were to be joined by a 
fighter escort from North Malaya but the only two remaining fighters in the North were at 
that time heavily engaged in other tasks supporting the army. The Blenheims pressed on 
unescorted and were attacked by thirty enemy fighters and lost half their number.   A second 
strike was planned comprising the remnants from Singapore and the only remaining 
Blenheims in the North, but they were attacked on the ground at Butterworth before they 
could take off; all but one was destroyed.  The Governor recorded in his diary: 
 
December 9. 
Enemy reinforcing in Kelantan and State Government move to Kuala Krai. Aerodromes in 
Kelantan, Alor Star, Sungei Patani and Kuantan badly bombed.  More machines gone.  
Singapore quite composed and all first aid posts fully moved [sic].  All very reassuring.  
 
In reality there was no plan drawn up for the evacuation of either the State 
Government or the civil population from the state of Kelantan, an Unfederated State.  When 
firing was plainly heard on 8 December at about 1.00 am, the British Adviser, Mr A. C. 
Baker, rang around the British community warning them that women and children should be 
ready to leave the area as soon as possible.  At 4.30 am, the military commander ordered 
them to leave immediately, which they did in their private cars to Kuala Krai, a railway town 
some distance in the interior.  Some Europeans from the adjoining state of Terengganu, also 
an Unfederated state, heard of this instruction through friends, and also left. However, they all 
believed that this was only a temporary arrangement, and when the „incursion‟ was 
suppressed, they would then return home, so in the event they took only the minimum of 
belongings with them.
330
    
 
Key‟s 8th Brigade finally abandoned the two remaining airfields on the East coast on 
the night of the 10
th
/11
th
, destroying as much as they could. However, as the runways were 
grass there was little they could do about the landing surfaces, and in any case, the RAF had 
positioned dumps of material for repairing craters nearby.   By the end of the day, British 
aircraft losses were crippling and the Japanese had secured total air supremacy across North 
Malaya, a lone Buffalo photo-reconnaissance aircraft remained at Butterworth.  By the 
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evening of the 10th December and before the ground battle for the west-coast trunk road had 
begun in earnest, British airpower in Malaya had been virtually destroyed.
331
   
The 10 December turned out to be an even blacker and more disastrous day for the 
British Forces.  Now without airpower, and adding to the unremitting despair, the two 
prestigious capital ships, Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk. Admiral Phillips the 
Fleet Commander had, after intense deliberations (mentioned above), decided to take the risk 
of attacking the Japanese naval forces still offshore and gathered opposite Singora.  Phillips 
set sail from Singapore on the afternoon of 8
 
December at a time when the air situation in the 
North was critical but not hopeless. His Force Z consisted of the two capital ships and an 
escort of H.M. destroyers Electra, Empress, Vampire and Tenedos.  The Force was spotted 
late afternoon the 9 December by enemy reconnaissance aircraft, whose presence was noted 
by the Fleet. Unknown to Phillips, however, a Japanese submarine had earlier that afternoon 
also sighted his squadron.
332
  By then he was aware that the RAF could not provide air cover 
over Singora, so he decided it would be sensible to return Singapore. En-route, however, he 
picked up an allied signal suggesting there was an attempted enemy landing at Kuantan and 
as this was not far off his return course, decided to investigate.  His squadron was again 
spotted by Japanese air reconnaissance and both capital ships were attacked and sunk. The 
majority of the three thousand crew, (from the two ships), were rescued by the destroyers.  
Admiral Phillips and his flag captain, John Leach, both died. The reported landing at 
Kuantan, for which Z Force diverted, proved false. Admiral Layton, who was about to depart 
Singapore for his new command, was ordered to remain and reassume the appointment as C-
in-C Eastern Fleet.
333
  His first decision was to order the remaining cruisers and destroyers 
away from Singapore to the safety of Java and Ceylon.  The naval base was now empty.  
Layton, on 5
th
 January 1942, then removed himself and the FECB to Java.  Later, in mid-
January, he was appointed C-in-C, Ceylon [Sri Lanka].
334
    
After less than a week of war, the RAF had effectively been destroyed and the Royal 
Navy chased from the seas of East Asia.  Only the Army remained to fight. The effect on the 
morale of the people of Malaya was immediate and devastating.  A number of historians, 
examining closely the loss of the capital ships, consider that Pulford, in spite of radio silence 
imposed by Phillips on his Task Force, should have at least sent a reconnaissance aircraft to 
Kuantan to investigate the rumour of a landing. In which event he would have been able to 
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disprove it, and most certainly found the ships and sent assistance. Instead, he is reputed to 
have said to Palliser the naval chief-of staff in Singapore, “My God, I hope you don‟t blame 
me for this.  We didn‟t even know where you were.” 335  
On this same day, 10 December, Duff Cooper took over as chairman of the recently 
re-named War Council. Now appointed by Churchill as „Resident Cabinet Minister‟ at 
Singapore for Far Eastern Affairs, and given the authority to form a War Council.  It was not 
an auspicious meeting.  Both Brooke-Popham and Thomas told Duff Cooper that they 
intended to take their orders from their respective masters in London (the Chiefs of Staff and 
the Colonial Office) and saw little need for a War Council.  Moreover, when Duff Cooper 
asked Brooke-Popham to let him have a list of his urgent military requirements, he was told 
that such a list had already been sent to the War Office and turned down.  Duff Cooper then 
said he would now raise this with Churchill; at which Brooke-Popham told him he should not 
do so as he could not be disloyal to the Chiefs of Staff.  Duff Cooper recorded in his diary:  
I told him that if he thought loyalty to the Chiefs of Staff was of greater importance than 
winning the war I could not agree with him, and that if he really believed that the supply of 
certain weapons was essential there were no methods which he should not adopt to secure 
those weapons.
336
 
           
The disastrous events during the first few days of the campaign, the crushing defeat at 
Jitra, the loss of the 2 capital ships and the destruction of most of the RAF, were so 
momentous, the outcome of the war was virtually determined at that point.  The speed, 
momentum and pressure with which the Imperial Japanese Army launched and maintained 
their dogged drive south, stunned the defenders.  Without air or sea power, the beleaguered 
and ragged army reeled backwards, pausing periodically for half-hearted, but ineffective, 
stands against a relentless blitz.
337
   
The Japanese forces, commanded by Lieutenant General Yamashita, advanced 
simultaneously on three axes, each a division strong, supported by light tanks, additional 
units, and air support.  Two divisions traversed, in parallel, the Isthmus of Kra, to the west 
coast of Malaya - which was to be their main thrust - towards Alor Star, Kroh and Grik on the 
Perak River. The third division began its advance down the east coast, from Kota Bahru, 
following the line of the East Coast Railway, towards Kuantan.   The two advancing west 
coast columns converged or separated according to the terrain, roads and rivers along their 
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routes.  On both coasts, they additionally employed amphibious “leap-frogging” manoeuvres, 
inserting forces at points along the coast in the rear of the British positions.
338
    
 From Jitra, the army fell back on Gurung, about thirty miles further south, but 
their stand here was no more successful than the attempt at Jitra and as the pressure mounted 
Murray-Lyon ordered an immediate withdrawal some seven miles further south to put the 
river Muda between his forces and the Japanese. By the morning of the 16
th
 December his 
division, sorely depleted and exhausted, was behind the river, which he hoped would prove a 
formidable tank obstacle.  In so doing, however, he left exposed the island of Penang.   
The written records of the European civilians caught up in the early days of the 
fighting in north Malaya almost unanimously affirm the lack of information about the 
devastating events taking place around them.
339
  In a particular memoir, Harvey Ryves, a 
British police officer working in north Kedah, deplored the complete absence of official 
communication about the military developments engulfing them, especially regrettable, he 
felt, in view of his appointment.  In the end, he relied on people passing through his area, the 
beginning of the flood of refugees, to let him know what was going on so he in turn could 
warn others and make decisions.  He mentions an incident when a Mrs Scott the wife of a 
rubber estate manager went to find the British Resident to get advice and help: “A couple of 
hours later she returned to say that the British Resident had issued orders that no women and 
children were to leave the state (Kedah) without permission.  I was so amazed at hearing this 
report that I promptly phoned Jomaron, the District Officer, to ask if he had heard similar 
information.  He hummed and hawed and made the extraordinary reply that women and 
children could leave, but the government could accept no responsibility if anything happened 
to them on the journey!”340   
 
The Penang Debacle.  
 The episode of the loss of Penang to the advancing Japanese was the first significant 
challenge to the administration‟s management of passive defence matters. It was, 
distressingly, to uncover evident inadequacies, which caused international opprobrium and 
haunted the image of Thomas and his government.    Penang was bombed on 11 December.  
It was a heavy raid, which, in spite of the previous day‟s air raid on Butterworth‟s RAF 
airfield, on the mainland opposite, came as a surprise to the people of the island.  They rushed 
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into the streets to watch the approaching formations, and too late, realised the danger.  
Hundreds were killed and thousands injured. It set in motion a saga, which highlighted the 
inadequacy of the civil defence and passive defence measures on the island, and brought into 
sharp focus the poor planning for managing such an eventuality.
341
  
The raid was unopposed because by this time there were no fighter aircraft in northern 
Malaya, and there were no anti-aircraft defences on the island and the only regular battalion 
had been withdrawn to form part of Krohcol.
342
  Air raids continued over three consecutive 
days, the casualties were terrible from bombing and machine gunning in the crowded streets 
of Georgetown.  All essential services broke down, the town was in flames, hundreds of 
corpses lay unburied and looting became endemic. Most of the native population fled to the 
relative safety of Penang Hill and disconcertingly the labour force and the local police 
disappeared.  The place was in utter confusion and panic, which in turn led to hasty and 
misguided decisions that were later the source of much recrimination and reflected badly on 
the entire administration.  Subsequent enquiries, nevertheless, acknowledged the valuable 
part played by a number of Europeans, particularly women, working alongside Asian women, 
in treating injured and providing succour to homeless and about half of the ARP Corps and 
the Medical Auxiliary Services remained at their posts.  
Nevertheless, overall, in this first test of passive defence measures, there were glaring 
defects. Most of the important facilities, such as the Fire Service, Ambulances and Police 
either failed to function or deserted, and there were no air-raid shelters.  On 15 December, the 
military garrison commander, Brigadier C.A. Lyon (not to be confused with Maj. Gen. 
Murray-Lyon, the Divisional Commander) received instructions from General Heath that he 
was to make secret preparations for the evacuation of the garrison, including the Europeans. 
Moreover, he claimed afterwards, the evacuation orders were to be given verbally at 12.00 
pm on 16 December, and passed onto only those who had to apply them.  
 He informed the Resident Councillor, Leslie Forbes, of the plan, who until that 
moment maintains he had no hint of the intended secret evacuation, which was fixed for that 
night 16
 
/17
 
December. From the Inquiry, after the war, it is clear that the two did not get on.  
When asked about co-operation with the civil authorities at this time Brigadier Lyon replied:  
 
Good co-operation was maintained with the naval staff, although the Commander felt 
obliged at the start to arrange for the removal of the pre-war SNO (senior naval officer). 
Airfields were demolished early and co-operation did not arise. Co-operation with the civil 
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authorities was imperfect partly because senior civil officials did not get on with the 
Commander, nor had he a high estimation of the Chief Police Officer.  In the crises, 
however, the Commander took charge and maintained close contact with the Resident 
Councillor.
343
   
 
Fierce criticism, which followed this first ordered evacuation, was directed at the underhand 
way in which it was arranged and the discriminatory selection of those to be evacuated - the 
message was for the European society only.  Without warning, the white women were told to 
prepare to leave that night and that it was a military order, which they had to obey.  It was 
determined that the evacuation of Asian civilians was not possible, since there was 
insufficient transport for large numbers, and to avoid an unmanageable stampede they would 
not be told.  The evacuation that night, considering the haste imposed and the brevity of 
instructions went relatively smoothly; the ferry taking them across to the mainland had to be 
manned by Royal Navy ratings, survivors from the recently sunk capital ships, because the 
Asian crew, Malay, Chinese and Indian, had deserted.   
A few Europeans, notably the Medical Superintendent, Doctor Evans, refused to leave 
and insisted in remaining to look after the injured.  An attempt was made to destroy 
everything of use to the invaders: defences, ammunition, quantities of petrol and oil were 
destroyed, as well as equipment and machinery, the power station, the civil airport buildings 
and the Penlaga Cable station, which was the terminal for the important telecommunications 
cable to India and UK.  However, some important omissions occurred, which the Japanese 
later used to inestimable advantage. The broadcasting station and a fleet of small boats and 
craft in the harbour were untouched as were 3000 tons of tin in the form of ingots. In the 
harbour, the Japanese found twenty-four self-propelled craft and many large junks and 
barges, all deserted by their crews and left in working order. The radio station was operated 
by the Japanese to broadcast propaganda throughout the remainder of the campaign.  Indeed, 
almost right away, according to the written stories of survivors, Radio Penang was taunting, 
„Hello, Singapore, how do you like our bombing?‟344      
 Previously, on the 13 December, the Governor had sent a cipher cable to the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies in London: 
Penang has been raided several times by daylight and damage to Asiatic quarters has been 
extensive.  So far as known, fatal casualties 200, wounded about 1000, all Asiatics.  Owing to 
destruction of aerodromes in the North air defence has been impossible and the Asiatic morale 
in consequence bad.  Military authorities in collaboration with the Resident Counsellor 
arranging to control the town.  European women and children will be evacuated as soon as 
possible.
345
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It should be noted that in this cable he made specific mention of European women and 
children.  In his diary entry that day, Thomas wrote that at the War Council, after some 
prevaricating remarks from Percival about the uncertainty of defending Penang. „….it was 
decided that I should advise European women and children to leave and other Europeans who 
wanted to.‟ [he then added] – „that was the Council minute, but my own note at the meeting 
was that European women and children should be allowed to go if they wish.  Policy is to 
defend Penang. Difficulties great but that is the fixed decision. European men also should be 
allowed to go if they wish, but any who desire to stay and help – let them.‟346 His addendum 
reads like an afterthought in the light of later accusations.   
 Percival had circulated a memo to the War Council before this meeting, outlining the 
pros and cons of withdrawal from Penang.  However, as the members noted, it contained no 
firm conclusion or recommendation.
347
  Presumably Percival believed, that following a 
discussion he would have a consensus on a favoured solution, or hearing other opinions 
would help him arrive at a decision.  Either way, it did not convey an image of decisive 
leadership. In the end, the decision was left to Heath.  Duff Cooper, on the other hand, at 
what was described as a depressing meeting, considered that the situation was so serious he 
proposed a radical change of strategy: 
 We should now ask ourselves is it possible with barely four divisions (mainly Indian), with 
only three squadrons of fighter aircraft not all properly trained, without command of the sea, 
to defend a country the size of England?  The Japanese can reinforce quicker, land anywhere.  
If not possible, then we should consider change of plan.  Real question is defence of the 
Naval Base by holding Johore….There is a need to withdraw to Johore and hold the island to 
the last.
348
    
 
Both Thomas and Duff Cooper were now, not only directly concerned with the course 
of the battle, but also appear to have become assertive enough, to impose their opinion on the 
strategic direction of the campaign. Thomas did not agree with the major withdrawal 
proposed by Duff Cooper nor did he agree with Percival about withdrawing from Penang, but 
his logic suggests a concern more for his government‟s image than military judgment. He 
believed the proposals would be very bad for public morale and he did not want his 
administration associated with them. Thomas‟s diary and the War Council minutes, reveal a 
growing gap between him and Percival and increasing animosity towards Duff Cooper.  In 
his diary, he explains, as an example, that his idea of „defend to the last man‟ differs from 
Percival, who qualifies such a stance with „but only to the best of our ability.‟  Equally, 
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Percival had little faith in Thomas sticking to decisions reached between them, so much so, 
that he took to having a stenographer accompany him to meetings with the Governor 
recording the discussions. Percival would not leave the building until he had Thomas‟s 
signature to them.
349
     
On 19 December, Penang was eventually abandoned and a week later Ipoh was 
hastily evacuated. In the space of sixteen days, the British forces were behind the Perak River 
with its left flank on the coast. North Malaya was effectively lost.  With the capitulation of 
Penang and the planned withdrawal of his forces to a position further south, behind the Perak 
River, Heath (instructed by Percival), ordered all the European women and children to leave 
Perak State.  Thomas learned of this instruction from Fraser [Federal Secretary] in a 
telephone call from Kuala Lumpur.  Following so soon after the Penang fiasco, Thomas 
immediately ordered that this instruction be cancelled as he considered it invalid. Moreover, 
he said, it should not have been made without reference to him. He sent telegram‟s to 
officials in Perak: - 
The evacuation of Perak is entirely unofficial and unnecessary, and liable to cause a panic 
amongst the Asiatics.  Singapore is already overcrowded, and no one may go there. 
350
   
 
His orders to Fraser included some draconian measures. Trains travelling south were 
forbidden to carry passengers who appeared to be evacuees, and first class carriages were 
removed from trains in order to prevent Europeans from travelling.  Motor cars travelling 
south were to be turned back, that petrol should not be supplied to private individuals and that 
they should not be allowed to telephone long distance calls.
351
 Thomas then noted in his 
diary, that after his interjection, a „big row broke out‟ in the War Council.  Duff Cooper told 
Thomas that he made Heath‟s position impossible if he countermanded his orders.  A most 
unpleasant and lengthy altercation followed with Thomas eventually conceding that in future 
„the civil government will not order the compulsory evacuation of civilians from any area, 
but if a military commander considers the military situation justifies it, he may order 
compulsory evacuation by the civilian population.‟352 In his letter to Churchill, describing this 
confrontation Duff Cooper said that Percival who was there said nothing „until I suggested 
that it was the first time in the history of the British Empire when it had been our policy to 
evacuate the troops first and leave the women and children to the tender mercies of a 
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particularly cruel foe.‟353   Shortly after this episode, the Governor had to meet a delegation 
of Asians, led by Bisseker, who asked to see him for an explanation of the racial 
discrimination during the Penang evacuation.  He confesses to his diary that „it was one of the 
most difficult speeches he ever had to make‟, but he clearly attempted to divert the blame by 
adding that it was a decision taken without his knowledge. He added that he had given orders 
that in future European government officers will stay with the people to look after their needs 
regardless of the consequences.
354
  
The Penang evacuation was a further serious blow to everyone‟s morale, following as 
it did, and so soon, after the loss of the „Prince of Wales‟ and the „Repulse‟.  In an attempt to 
explain the calamity and play down the tactical impact of the loss, Duff Cooper, on the 22 
December, decided to broadcast by radio to the population. Instead of assuaging the people, 
his message compounded the problem by trying to reassure everyone that all civilians were 
evacuated safely.  This was patently untrue, because of course, only the Europeans were 
evacuated. The statement caused general uproar and from the minutes of the War Council 
meetings and Thomas‟s diary entries, the topic then absorbed an unprecedented amount of 
valuable time. It led to the drafting and re-drafting of a directive that was to be adhered to, by 
all parties, in the event of similar occurrences.   
The GOC, like the others, became distracted in this bureaucratic detail, and at a time 
when the army in northern Malaya was fighting for its life.  After the war, in early 1948, 
reading of the Penang episode in the draft Official History, Thomas wrote a note to the 
author, Maj. Gen. Woodburn Kirby:  
The bad thing about Penang was its hasty evacuation by the whole of the European 
population with the exception of two or three who refused to move.  The order was 
given by the military, and the civil government in Singapore knew nothing about it and 
would not have approved. This was made quite clear.  We should have been able to 
point out the disastrous effect on morale of such a move.  We stood for no racial 
discrimination (this should also be made clear) and my final telegram to the Resident 
Councillor dated the 16
th
 read:  „In any evacuation, preference should be given to those 
who are essential to the war effort, without racial discrimination.‟ This order to the 
Resident Councillor came from me, and not Percival, as stated in the last paragraph of 
page 331.  Duff Cooper was not in favour of the words underlined, but gave way.  On 
December 23
rd
 I received instructions from the Colonial Office supporting this policy:  
no other was of course possible if we were to retain any sort of respect.
355
                
 
On the east coast, the Japanese made even more rapid progress because of the scarcity 
of forces to resist them. The British forces withdrew from Kuantan on the 31 December, 
though they remained in position defending the airfield, which was nine miles from Kuantan 
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itself.  At various points, on both coasts, the Japanese momentum was, checked temporarily 
and heavy fighting took its toll in casualties on both sides. However, the Japanese were able 
to replace their losses with fresh, trained units and maintained pressure at every contact. 
Fighting went on day and night, there was no release and they were able to rotate their front 
line troops with rested units from the rear.  They were determined and courageous, forcing 
their way through swamp and jungle and using every means of transport - trucks, buses, carts, 
horses and thousands of bicycles. The bicycles enabled a silent approach and were also used 
to carry rations and reserves of small arms ammunition.  The Japanese army was a highly 
disciplined force based on absolute despotism.  It was inseparably linked with state religion 
and education. Powerful spiritual leaders exercising control over people and throne directed 
it. The Shinto religion demanded a spirit of self-sacrifice and disregard for loss of life. It was 
without parallel in any country in the world.
356
   
 The British Army under General Percival, on the other the hand, comprised an 
international medley coming from places as far apart as the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Malaya, Burma and British India; and they fought under leaders divided by differences of 
nationality, outlook, background and political allegiance, added to which was  their dietary 
differences. They were armed and equipped as for a campaign in Western Europe or the 
Desert; relied on wheeled transport for administrative support, which in turn restricted them 
to roads and tracks and dependent on supplies of fuel and oil; all combining to create a 
logistical nightmare.
357
 The main roads became vital supply routes. Inevitably, they became 
choked with endless columns of slow moving trucks, obstructed by abandoned equipment 
and columns of refugees.   
 Military analysts, almost unanimously agree that at this point in the campaign a 
forceful field commander would have acknowledged the limited capability of his ill-trained 
forces and the grievous handicap of a shortage of appropriate equipment, and crucially, no air 
support. He should, they maintain, have recognised that a major strategic adjustment was 
called for. A clean break from contact with the enemy and a lengthy withdrawal to well-
prepared defensive positions much further to the rear.  Heath was proposing this very idea: 
that it was better to cut their losses and pullback over three hundred miles to northern Johore 
into a properly sited, constructed, and defendable location. This proposal was very much in 
line with that suggested earlier by Duff Cooper in the War Council meeting of 13 
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December.
358
  Percival refused to countenance such an idea.  He maintained that it would 
mean giving up, without a fight, valuable territory, enabling the Japanese to use airfields 
closer to Singapore and make it easier for them to attack allied shipping bringing desperately 
needed reinforcements, supplies and equipment.   Moreover, it would leave exposed and 
undefended the long East Coast.  
 On 18 December, what was to be the last formal Allied War Conference was held in 
Singapore, under the chairmanship of Duff Cooper.  British, American, Dutch, Australian and 
New Zealand representatives attended these infrequent gatherings. The meetings, while 
intended to make recommendations for common allied action, did little more than discuss the 
situation throughout the Far East and keep each other abreast of developments and concerns 
in their respective regions. There was little more they could do, and their pronouncements 
stated the obvious.  The situation was bleak; more manpower and equipment was needed, but 
importantly in this instance, they endorsed Percival‟s plan to hold the Japanese as far north in 
Malaya as possible to give time for reinforcements to arrive unmolested.   Final 
communiqués went to each authority, and in the case of Duff Cooper, his went to the Chiefs 
of Staff in London and he added a passionate request for vital and urgent support.
359
   
 Feelings in the local War Council meetings were running high and becoming increasingly 
acrimonious. The senior civil members seemed less concerned with the direction of the war 
than with the trivia of bureaucracy, and personal power.  Duff Cooper, at this same point, 
took it upon himself to write confidentially, direct to Churchill.  His letter was delivered by 
hand of Captain Tennant, who until he lost his ship was the captain of HMS Repulse.  The 
letter conveyed his contempt for nearly every senior figure in both the Government and the 
Services; in his judgment, the Governor was a weak character whose opinions were a 
reflection of the last person he spoke with. In addition, he was served by a „sinister figure 
called Stanley Jones [Colonial Secretary] who is universally detested in the Colony, where he 
is accused of having been defeatist since the beginning of the war. His record in the way of 
preparations is certainly a black one – there are no air raid shelters, no trenches even, no tin 
hats or gas masks for the civilian population. No preparations have been made for a system of 
food rationing, no registration of the inhabitants nor identity cards.‟ He added, that he may 
later ask for empowerment to get rid of Jones and replace him with an „admirable man now in 
Kuala Lumpur called Hugh Fraser [Federal Secretary].‟ Then in a dismissive manner, he 
thought Percival „is not a leader, he cannot take a large view; it is all a field day at Aldershot 
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to him. He knows the rules so well and follows them so closely and is always waiting for the 
umpires whistle to signal the cease fire and hopes that when such a moment comes his 
military dispositions will be such as to receive approval.‟360      
 His letter
361
 leaves the clear impression that, in his opinion, senior figures in 
Singapore, running the affairs of government and war, were inferior people, supported by 
equally unimpressive subordinates, and that the management of the country during the 
hostilities and the conduct of the campaign was incompetent. Conversely, though unspoken, 
reflects the state of the relationships. Top officials seemed unable to discuss and resolve the 
most basic issues, were hypersensitive to perceived challenges to their dignity and were 
unable to put aside personal animosities and acrimony for the common good. By this stage, 
the danger facing the country was ominous and getting worse by the day, but still the petty 
bickering and inconsequential disputes dominated the agenda. 
 Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham handed over his portfolio of command to Lt. Gen. 
Sir Henry Pownall on the 23 December; and in a final gesture of authority before departing, 
wrote an edict to senior Air Force Commanders expressing his dismay at the lack of 
determination and resolve shown by RAF personnel in the face of the enemy: 
 During the last fortnight it has been necessary to order the evacuation of several aerodromes.  
It has come to my notice that in some cases the process has been carried out badly….while 
there have been cases of gallantry  ...there have also been instances where the air force appear 
to have abandoned aerodromes in a state approaching panic. Stores that will assist the enemy 
in his further advance have been left behind, material that is urgently required has been 
abandoned and a general state of chaos has been evident.
362
     
    
In practically every instance involving the northern aerodromes, the station staff withdrew 
without warning the army, who had the task of defending the airfields, and in the majority of 
cases left so hurriedly that valuable stores, equipment and even prepared food, were lying 
unattended at their sudden departure.      
 On 26 December, the people of Singapore learnt that Hong Kong had surrendered the 
previous day, Christmas Day.  On 27 December, Thomas called an extraordinary meeting of 
the Legislative Council.
363
  The purpose was primarily to ratify the enactment of Martial Law.  
Martial Law had, for some time, been the subject of impassioned discussion at the daily War 
Council meetings, but its introduction was strenuously resisted by Percival on the grounds 
that he felt it both unnecessary and he could not, in any case, release a senior officer solely 
dedicated to fulfilling the role.  Duff Cooper had throughout supported the idea, because he 
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felt the situation needed a Supremo with absolute authority who would, through dictatorial 
powers, demand instant reaction and response from everyone.   
 During this Legislative meeting, which as it turned out was the last one to be held, 
Bisseker grasped the opportunity to raise again civil defence issues, on what he claimed had 
now become matters of national survival. He demanded that the authorities start telling the 
people the truth, good or bad, about what was happening in the war.  It was, he said, an 
endless series of shocks to learn, after the event, of Japanese progress down Malaya, while at 
the same time being reassured by the government that everything was all right and our Forces 
were containing the Japanese advance. Moreover, he wanted to know, what are the lessons 
from Penang? „Had we learnt anything from the chaotic evacuation and if so, is it being 
promulgated to those who can prevent it happening again?‟  He then catalogued civil defence 
measures which needed improving, including compiling a list of qualified and skilled 
officials now in Singapore from up-country, because of evacuation, who could be called upon 
to help. Moreover, he believed, a central body was needed, with plenary powers solely 
concerned with co-ordinating passive and civil defence measures.  Particularly, he felt, the 
country was not unified, not acting as a cohesive nation and importantly, the energy and 
desire of the Chinese to play a major role in the current emergency was being ignored.  The 
Governor, without apparent conviction, tried to reassure Bisseker that these matters were in 
hand.
364
       
 On 29 December, Thomas left by car for Kuala Lumpur, accompanied by his 
wife.  He wanted to inform himself how the FMS Administration was managing with the 
crisis. It was a brave and noble gesture at this time of danger and recognised as such by most 
people. Shortly after his return, he chose to broadcast and give his impressions of conditions 
in up-country Malaya including how the people were coping.  His account, however, seemed 
to reinforce the opinion of many, that he still had not recognised the gravity of the situation, 
and he avoided mentioning, what everyone wanted to hear, an honest summary of the 
military situation. According to Cecil Brown, an American journalist with Columbia 
Broadcasting: 
 He made an incredible broadcast.  He spoke for about forty five minutes about his tour 
up-country, but for almost the entire time he told about seeing a steam roller which got 
out of control, rolling backwards, and how the Indian driver finally saved it.  The 
broadcast was also printed in the paper and took more than two columns….He was not 
referring to any armed force, just talking about a steam roller.
365
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In his book, Brown has described the Governor,   
as an uninformed individual.  A slave to service clichés, bromides and banalities. He lives 
in a dream world where reality seldom enters and where the main effort is to restrict the 
entrance of anything disturbing.
366
  
 
Brown‟s acerbic comments in his own broadcasts to America about the state of affairs in 
Malaya, often prophetic, were considered too dangerous for the morale of the Asian 
population.  His accreditation papers were withdrawn in January 1942 and he had to leave the 
country.
367
  
 Earlier in the month, on 15 December, Duff Cooper, with the consent of the War 
Committee, formed a separate Civil Defence advisory committee of which he was chairman 
and which included, among others, the Inspector-General of Police, Dickinson, and the 
Fortress Commander Maj. Gen. Keith Simmons. This committee met every day. While 
Thomas was visiting Kuala Lumpur, Duff Cooper decided that civil defence needed urgently 
a dedicated, energetic professional, to co-ordinate the whole range of civil defence issues.  
For this task, he identified Brigadier Simson, who was Percival‟s Chief Engineer.  Percival 
was not enthusiastic about the idea (nor indeed, initially, was Simson) but later accepted a 
compromise arrangement whereby Simson remained his Chief Engineer but had the 
additional role of Director General Civil Defence (DGCD).  Simson had for some time been 
critical of the absence of almost any form of proper defensive fortifications and efficient 
civil defences measures, but believed, albeit reluctantly, the appointment might give him a 
late opportunity to correct this grave flaw.  Duff Cooper then appointed Bisseker as 
Simson‟s deputy.   Thomas, on his return, was affronted that such a major governmental 
arrangement had been put in place without his consent. He recorded in his diary on the 31 
December: 
There is serious political trouble.  Duff Cooper, being led by the nose by Bisseker and 
Seabridge [editor of Straits Times newspaper], demands a kind of Dictator for Civil 
Defence…Duff Cooper has officially appointed Bisseker, and War Council has 
officially appointed Simson, all in my absence and without my knowledge, though 
neither has any authority to make any appointments under the civil government.  I 
cannot agree to Bisseker; everyone would think I have gone mad, or had surrendered to 
DC [Duff Cooper].
368
   
 
In the end, though most begrudgingly, he approved the appointments of Simson and Bisseker. 
Nevertheless, to demonstrate that he retained some power, enforced strictures to Simson‟s 
authority. He limited his activities to Singapore Island only, and further, insisted if anybody 
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challenged any of his (Simson‟s) orders he must refer the matter to the Malayan Legal 
Department, and await their decision.  Explicitly, he must not extend his area of 
responsibility into Johore, because Johore was an Unfederated State and was not under the 
jurisdiction of the Governor:
369
 To impose such a curb, on these grounds, when all around 
was remorseless military retreat, fast approaching Johore, reveals a renunciation of reality. It 
was a decision, which would later prove fateful.
370
  
The unpleasantness was further compounded when Simson and Bisseker approached 
Jones for help with finding a suitable office close to the civil authorities; they were rudely 
refused any help. „I was soon to discover that no civil servant would help Mr. Bisseker or 
anyone associated with him.‟371 Simson and Bisseker eventually occupied the offices vacated 
by Duff Cooper after his departure.
372
    
This trivia was acted out in Singapore while the British forces were engaged in a 
desperate struggle in central Malaya.  The Governor was in bad humour, concerned more 
about the apparent usurping of his authority than the gravity of the danger. He broadcast a 
New Year‟s Day message to the people of Malaya and his remarks, in attempting to minimize 
the concern some people had about the introduction of Martial Law, caused more concern 
than they quelled.  He repeated the statement he made to the Legislative Council on the 27 
December:  
During the last few days Martial Law has been imposed in Singapore, but there is no need 
for anyone to worry about that.  I signed the Proclamation because it was necessary to make 
certain that evil-doers against the State shall be punished quickly and it seemed to us that 
this could be best secured by the promulgation of Martial Law.  I know you will agree that 
men who conspire against the State, which means their fellow countrymen in time of war, 
should be dealt with properly and quickly.
373
     
     
The implication of this statement, interpreted by many, both within the country and outside it, 
was that there were Fifth columnists and conspirators at work.  Whereas, - and proved 
conclusively afterwards - there was no such organised element, nor any fear of it.  Thomas 
was intending to reassure the people that the new legislation intended solely as a means of 
dealing expeditiously with a variety of circumstances that had arisen during a state of 
emergency. Instead, he caused much alarm and newspaper conjecture about enemies within 
the country.
374
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            At about this point his authorities in London were beginning to sense that Thomas was 
in danger of losing touch with his responsibilities because of both the escalating pace of 
developments and his concern with administrative trivialities.  The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies had to remind Thomas of the need to let Whitehall know what was happening,  
I regret to have to   trouble you with enquiries at this time but I feel that I must ask to be kept 
informed of current developments affecting civil administration in the territories under your 
jurisdiction. For example where are the various Malaya Rulers? Is active cooperation of the 
Chinese community being organised in any particular forms either by government or 
spontaneously? 
375
     
 
There is no record in the colonial office files of a reply to this enquiry.   
 
  By 3 January 1942, the Allies had fallen back to the Slim River, about fifty miles 
north of Kuala Lumpur, having been forced to abandon Kampar, which was acknowledged as 
the best, and probably only defendable site in west Malaya.  Simson recognising the defence 
potential of the Kampar position - and with the Corps Commnder‟s agreement- had proposed 
to Percival that he be allowed to construct heavy fortifications at Kampar for the forces to fall 
back on. Percival adamantly refused to allow any action, on the grounds „that building of 
defences in rearward areas was bad for the morale of troops and civilians alike.‟376 Even 
without proper preparations, Kampar still managed to hold out for 34 days. The Japanese 
eventually outflanked the Kampar position by coming down both the Perak River, in shallow 
draught boats, and made coastal landings using, among others, the flotilla of small craft left 
behind at Penang.   
The Slim River position was the next stage in the withdrawal, and was attacked in 
force on 7 January by infantry preceded by tanks. Mines and obstructions impeded their 
progress for a while but in due course the Japanese breached the obstacles and a force of 
twenty tanks broke out and penetrated the British lines for 15 miles inflicting heavy losses on 
the defenders. During the battle, seven British Commanding Officers were killed on one day 
alone and 11
th
 Division lost virtually all of its artillery and transport. The position became 
untenable and Percival decided to give up central Malaya and make a substantial withdrawal 
to northern Johore. The Japanese entered an undefended and deserted Kuala Lumpur on the 
11 January and found vast stores of food, maps and ordinance.  Petrol and oil stocks had been 
set on fire. On Percival‟s instructions, the whole apparatus of civil government, European 
                                                 
375
 CO 967/74. S of S to Governor, 2 Jan 42. NA  
376
 Kirby Singapore: The chain of Disaster p.168  
  
145 
 
officials and residents, were ordered to abandon Kuala Lumpur; the last of them departed on 
the10 January.
377
   
 General Wavell arrived in Singapore on the 8 January on his way to Java take up the 
new appointment of Supreme Commander of a newly formed allied organisation, an 
American initiative. ABDA Command, (American, British, Dutch, and Australia, Command). 
He selected Lembang, in Java, as the location of his HQ.  After calling on the Governor he 
hurriedly departed by aircraft to visit Heath in Kuala Lumpur for a briefing and assessment of 
the military situation, and where possible visit some units. On his return to Singapore, he 
presented Percival with his own plan for the defence of north Johore, which he drew up 
without consulting Percival. As it turned out, the plan was quite different to what Percival 
had intended, and he was taken aback at the peremptory manner in which it was presented. 
What was clear was that such imperious behaviour indicated that Wavell had lost confidence 
in Percival. He had been impressed by the energy and confidence the Australian General 
Bennett radiated, and thought the Australians should play a greater role in the Johore defence 
plan.
378
  Moreover, he put Bennett in charge of the forward areas on this briefest of 
acquaintance, upsetting the predetermined command arrangements and adding friction to the 
already strained relations between Bennett and Heath, the Corps Commander.    Percival had 
no option but to redesign his plans in accordance with Wavell‟s wishes, which included 
withdrawing 9
th
 Division from its defensive duties on the East coast. In the end, however, the 
defence of northern Johore followed a predictable pattern, except for one notable, proactive, 
action by the Australians, which seemed to justify Wavell‟s confidence in them. In their first 
engagement in the campaign so far, on 14 January, they laid a successful ambush near Gemas 
(Gemencheh), a position forward of the main defensive line, allowing a vanguard of bicycle 
born Japanese infantry to pass over a bridge, before demolishing it. The trapped unit of nearly 
600 were either killed or wounded.
379
 
 During the War Council meeting in Singapore that day, Duff Cooper announced the 
termination of his appointment as Minister Resident.  He explained that with the appointment 
of Wavell as Regional Supreme Commander, the role he filled was absorbed into the new 
arrangement (see Chapter 2).  In his diary, Thomas noted: 
In War Council Duff Cooper announced that Wavell‟s appointment had made his own 
unnecessary and he was leaving. …I said I thought his presence had been very 
useful…Actually Duff Cooper‟s departure will be hailed with shouts of joy!  He is 
suspect by most people; partly for his broadcast reference to evacuation of the “majority” 
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of the population of Penang (well knowing it could only refer to the Europeans) and partly 
for the Simson-Bisseker-Seabridge racket. I shall see him out with a sigh of relief.  A 
rotten judge of men, arrogant, obstinate, vain; how he could have crept into [Cabinet] 
Office is beyond me…. 380    
 
In the same diary entry, Thomas also mentions that Wavell had spoken with him about the 
military situation, and said that the „Japanese breakthrough at Slim River should not have 
happened if proper dispositions had been made. It was Paris‟s 11th Division.  Poor wretched 
troops.‟381  
 What Thomas did not know was that Duff Cooper, on 11 January before departing, 
sent a final „Secret and Personal‟ cable to Churchill, which he copied to the Secretary of 
State for Colonies and to Wavell: 
 Before leaving Singapore I think it right to tell you that I believe certain 
changes in the local Administration are of first importance.  A breakdown on civil side 
may well paralyse fighting services.  There exists a widespread and profound lack of 
confidence in Administration. 
 I believe simplest solution would be to declare a state of siege and appoint a 
military governor for the duration of the emergency.  The obvious selection for 
appointment would be Fortress Commander, Major General Keith Simmons. 
 I had already arranged appointment of Director General of Civil Defence, 
Brigadier Simson, who has done very well but whose hands are tied by Civil Authorities 
and who is not allowed by Governor to dismiss incompetent officials.  He would 
continue to act under Military Governor. 
 If these measures are considered too drastic, I would urge that Colonial 
Secretary should be replaced by Mr. Hugh Fraser who has done extremely well.  I would 
also urge with equal candour that Mr. Jordan, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, should go. 
The Chinese who form the majority of the population of Singapore are behaving 
splendidly, have made up their internal quarrels and are united in their resolve to 
withstand the enemy.  Mr. Jordan is unfortunately most unpopular with them he is 
tactless and rude and cannot assimilate the idea that some of those who gave the most 
trouble in the past and even the tougher communist element may prove most useful at 
present.  The necessity for a Secretary for Chinese Affairs no longer exists….382 
 
Churchill‟s response to this damning cable was, first, one of dismay that conditions among 
the Administration should have reached such a state without him being alerted. Second, 
that Duff Cooper had not done something about it much earlier; and third, the Governor 
must go.
383
 His advisers consulted Wavell, who thought that such a change at that point 
would do more harm than good, persuaded Churchill that replacing the Colonial Secretary 
with Fraser [Federal Secretary, ex-Kuala Lumpur], could help resolve much of the trouble. 
Thomas was informed of this decision by cipher cable, and because of the confidential 
contents, he was advised to decipher himself.  His first reaction was to fear for his personal 
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position. He thought he was dealing with an instruction for his own recall.
384
  In reply, he 
defended Jones vigorously and believed Duff Cooper‟s time in Singapore was too brief for 
his judgement to be of value. The Colonial Office was adamant and Jones left Singapore 
shortly afterwards.  The fearful reaction of Thomas for his own position on reading the first 
few lines of the cable exposes a confused state of mind, certainly insecurity and arguably a 
loss of confidence. However, he had the honesty to disclose his insecurity to his diary. 
 
 The Loss of Malaya.    
The retreat of the British Forces down the length of Malaya was relentless. At the 
daily War Council meetings the war‟s progress was discussed at length but little honest 
information was passed to the public. The majority of the population were ignorant of the real 
state of affairs.  Most people relied on the arriving refugees, in their increasing numbers, for 
details of the fighting and the locality of the Japanese army.  
At the same time as the Gemas encounter, a serious threat was developing to the 
British left flank position at Muar.  The Japanese had closed right up to the northern bank of 
the 600-yard wide Muar River posing a dangerous threat to one of the British main lines of 
communication south of the river, the Muar – Yong Peng road. On 16 January, they forced a 
crossing of the river and blocked the road. This part of the British front line was the 
responsibility of a newly arrived Indian Brigade, 45
th
 Brigade, made up of young hastily 
trained recruits. Against them, the Japanese deployed their crack Imperial Guards Division.  
Adding to the Brigade‟s ordeal, the battalions of this unit were given impossibly long 
frontages of river line to defend. The Japanese following their standard outflanking 
manoeuvre, in another amphibious hook, landed behind the position, with additional 
landings much further behind, in the area of Batu Pahat.  The 45
th
 Brigade came under 
attack from the front, the West and rear; the fighting was confused and intense, but the 
predictable outcome was the almost total elimination of 45
th
 Brigade.  
After the collapse of the Muar front, it was becoming obvious to Percival, as well 
as Wavell, that the strategy from this point must be based on fighting delaying actions in 
Johore to give time for reinforcements to arrive, and that the final action would be the 
defence of Singapore.  Wavell, on the 19 January, instructed that plans for this eventuality 
be developed in full, as soon as possible, but kept entirely secret and that they should 
include the preparations of defences on the north side of the Island.   
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The trauma of battle and the confused, ferocious and devastating fighting was 
taking its toll on leaders at all levels through loss of commanding officers in battle and stress 
on the diminishing number of leaders remaining. Added to which, the almost non-existent 
communications between major formations resulted in senior commanders accusing each 
other of not resolutely sticking to their defensive tasks and making insidious accusations of 
poor fighting qualities of troops under their command.  For the next eight days, the fighting 
was almost unremitting retreat with periodic pauses to turn and face the enemy.  There were 
no longer any natural obstacles to help the defenders. The Official British History was to 
record, most harshly:  
During this period of eight days, from the 16 to 24 January, the Japanese out-generalled, 
out-manoeuvred and decisively defeated the British forces in Muar-Yong Peng-Batu Pahat 
triangle and won the battle for Johore.
385
     
  
And the Governor wrote in his diary on 21 January: „The behaviour of the military ever since 
the retreat began has been disgraceful…if Singapore falls it will be the army‟s fault; they 
have been incredibly inefficient.‟386 Percival issued orders on 26 January for the withdrawal 
of his forces onto Singapore Island; the move was to be complete by the night of 31 January.  
Thus at the end of January 1942, Malaya was lost to the Empire and in the hands of the 
Japanese. It is not clear from Thomas‟s diary when he learnt officially that Malaya was to be 
finally abandoned.   
In a separate diary, kept by Meg (Megan) Spooner, who was the wife of Rear Admiral 
Jack Spooner. He was commander of the Naval Base, which at this point had no ships, but he 
was also in charge of the residue of British naval and civil personnel at the base.  Meg 
Spooner‟s diary sheds quite unintentionally, more light on the relationship between Percival 
and Thomas. While it is heavily flavoured with gossip and is indiscreet, it shrewdly catches 
the atmosphere and urgency of events and the mounting tension at this time. In an entry on 
the 27
 
January she wrote:  
….Jack told War Council that soldiers were retiring onto the Island on the 30 January.  
H.E. [His Excellency] nearly passed out.  Asked if it was true P[ercival] said “there is a 
possibility”.  J[ack] said “Possibility be damned your orders are out.”387  
 
This exchange reflects the nadir now reached in affairs between the military and the 
administration. Peninsula Malaya was to be abandoned and the Governor, responsible for its 
governance and protection, had not been informed. Percival either did not trust Thomas to 
keep secret this information, or thought it pointless informing him.    
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  Spooner himself was also guilty of arbitrary decisions. No doubt spurred by the 
imminent surrender of Malaya and mindful of the Admiralty instruction, not to allow skilled 
personnel and vital equipment to fall into enemy hands, evacuated the Naval Base without 
informing anyone.  On 31 January, he ordered the whole of the European naval and civilian 
staff to leave the Base and transferred most of them to Ceylon.
388
  Thus, even before the last 
soldiers had crossed the causeway, the object of all the planning, striving and death was 
deserted and left untouched for the victor.  The following week, on 5 February, Thomas wrote 
in his diary: 
Brought up Naval Base evacuation at War Council with Percival and Spooner.  Spooner said the 
military told him they wanted no navy personnel in operational area, so he took them all away.  
Percival said he had never been consulted in the matter at all.  I said I could not understand how a 
great Base could be handed over by the Navy at the request of anyone but the G.O.C. Bretheron 
[friend of Thomas] says the whole place looks as if the staff left for lunch and never returned.  
Maps and plans left on office tables and so on.  A dreadful thing.
389
                            
 
The Imperial Japanese Army assembled in Johore Bahru, waiting to launch their final 
assault, with only the 1000-yard stretch of water, Straits of Johore, between them and 
Singapore.  What remained of the British Forces was in complete disorder. They were 
exhausted, dispirited and in many cases without weapons and equipment, which had been 
abandoned in the hurried and harried retreat.  The army found no prepared fortifications on 
the much-vaunted Island Fortress to offer them protection and behind which they could 
recover. There was no respite from the unforgiving foe. Their Commander had lost the 
confidence of his Supreme Commander and the leading British Generals could not agree 
among themselves.
390
 The Governor was barely consulted about the momentous events 
bearing down on his province and he had lost the confidence of his Colonial masters in 
London. In addition, the civilian government in Singapore was in confusion. The Island was 
overwhelmed with refugees from up-country, and the public services, under increased 
demand and constant bombing, were struggling to provide a minimum service.  The 
government had also lost the confidence of the people and was paying the price for their less 
than honest propaganda. The fact that the Japanese were so close astonished nearly everyone 
because no warning was given.
391
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES DURING THE SIEGE OF SINGAPORE. 
 
When the last British battalion had crossed onto Singapore and the causeway 
connecting the island with the mainland was breached, an optimistic section of the civilian 
population of Singapore believed this final move would in fact be their saviour.  The reasoning 
was that with all the British troops now concentrated in a single garrison, it would present a 
formidable barrier against any attempt by the Japanese to invade the island.  However, they 
were unaware there were no prepared defences anywhere on the island, and in particular none 
  
151 
 
along the northern shoreline. It was an area rarely visited by civilians because access was 
restricted to the military, and in any case it was covered in thick mangrove swamp. The 
population of Singapore, with the arrival of the troops and the fleeing refugees from up-
country, had escalated from its pre-war 750,000 to about 1,400,000,
392
 which placed, not only 
the already stretched public services and food supplies under severe strain, but caused acute 
problems of accommodation. There are corroborated reports that the European population, 
even at this point, appeared to show little regard, or illusory lack of concern, for the 
destruction around them, and the drama unfolding on their doorstep.  They continued to revel 
and socialise, visiting restaurants and hotels for dances, and even the Corps Commander, 
General Heath, is reported in Meg Spooner‟s diary, of 4 February, attending a dinner party at 
their house, together  with „his young wife.‟393  Meanwhile, the urgent question now facing the 
government was the matter of evacuating people, particularly European expatriates, and above 
all, wives and children, (referred to in official correspondence as bouches inutiles)*. In view of 
the Penang calamity, equal account had to be given to any members of the ethnic community 
also wishing to leave.  An immediate difficulty, on the matter of evacuating the ethnic races, 
was the strict and very modest pre-war quota of immigrants that countries such as Australia 
and Netherlands East Indies continued to impose.  Departments of government, without 
instructions to the contrary, attempted to continue business as usual and some MCS officials 
evacuated from up-country sought office space so they could feel gainfully employed even 
though in most cases there was nothing for them to do.
394
 The War Council continued to meet 
daily but its deliberations were little more than listening to reports of Japanese progress. They 
were bereft of ideas and even in these critical times, there were still arguments and 
disagreements. The meetings also disclosed startling ignorance, among senior government 
officers, about the basic infrastructure and public utilities of their island.    
The Japanese army, meanwhile, between 1 and 7 February, gathered their amphibious 
landing craft, including tank landing craft, assault teams and supporting units in various 
assembly areas around Johore Bahru, ready for the attack. The Japanese had complete air and 
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naval supremacy and total freedom of action. Apart from occasional allied shelling their 
preparations were relatively undisturbed.
395
 
 
Evacuation. 
There was confusion in the minds of most British expatriates about government 
regulations regarding evacuation.  As early as September 1939, on the outbreak of war in 
Europe, the government imposed a blanket ban on travel to ensure nobody could either leave 
or enter Malaya without an authorised permit. This control was introduced to prevent the 
departure of young European males anxious to enlist in the fight against Nazi Germany; 
many of these same young men held key appointments in the trade and industry of Malaya, 
which, at this critical time, could ill afford to lose them.   This regulation later amended in 
March 1940, to allow free entry and departure to all women and children. Then in June of the 
same year, to clarify some doubt,  it confirmed that exit would be refused to all males over 
the age of eighteen years, that is, of an age when they were liable for service with the 
Volunteers or the Local Defence Force. In October, it was allowed that all wives and children 
could come and go provided they were related to a resident European. Thus, the position at 
the end of 1940 was that no male European could leave Malaya, except in very special 
circumstances, but their wives and children could freely enter and leave the country.
396
 There 
are no records however, to indicate that the authorities took the matter of travel controls to 
the next stage, that is, of discussing what organisation, preparations and instructions need to 
be made ready for an emergency evacuation if it became necessary.    It is important to 
remember that, at this time in 1940, the Governor was on home leave, and these regulations 
were introduced under the authority of the OAG, Stanley Jones.
397
 
As noted in the previous chapter, in July 1941, Japan occupied Indo-China and the 
British Government declared, in Parliament, its concern that this action posed a threat to the 
region, and in particular to Malaya.   Historians analysing the events of the final days of 
Singapore identify the Japanese move into Indo-China in 1941, as the pivotal point at which 
the civil authorities should have acknowledged the gravity of the regional threat and begun 
their planning, probably secretly, for the possible emergency evacuation of civilians.
398
 In 
Singapore, no such contingency plan was ever discussed.  The reason for this neglect is 
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thought to be that it was incompatible with the Governor‟s conviction that the Japanese would 
not invade Malaya. Moreover, in Thomas‟s opinion, if such plans became known, it would not 
validate prudent government planning, but on the contrary, it would exhibit a defeatist attitude. 
It must also be said that the military authorities, with their misplaced optimism on Singapore‟s 
impregnability, did not stress the urgent necessity to incorporate such a scheme. The exception 
was Simson, who shortly after becoming Director General Civil Defence, did urge the 
Governor to evacuate the bouches inutiles as soon as possible.  The Governor‟s approach was 
in stark contrast to that taken by the authorities in Hong Kong, which, even before the 
outbreak of war in the west, had identified the evacuation of British women, and children in an 
emergency as a major operation for which contingency plans were essential.  Hong Kong was 
vulnerable, with the Japanese already resting against its border with China, nor was it judged a 
defendable fortress.  In August 1940, the situation was assessed serious enough to order the 
compulsory evacuation of non-service British women and children. It was certainly not a 
universally popular decision, resisted by many, and considered premature, it nevertheless took 
place and 3,474 evacuees were transferred faultlessly and safely to a staging destination in the 
Philippines.
399
 
The Malayan exodus of evacuees, without sanction, had begun as early as 1 
December, gathered momentum down through the Peninsula, bringing to Singapore many 
European expatriates, from both the business community and government civil servants. The 
event, which alarmed the expatriate community and prompted the early passage, was the 
announcement of compulsory enlistment for the Volunteers, followed, a few days later, by the 
enlistment of various Local Defence Forces. While the government continued to reassure 
people that this was no more than an elementary precaution, many nevertheless, saw it as a 
danger signal. Women and children began to leave their homes in Malaya and head for 
Singapore in order to secure a passage home to Europe.  The influx increased weekly and 
began to overwhelm the shaky reception arrangements hurriedly put in place to receive 
them.
400
  The Government set up a Billeting Committee to find accommodation for them in 
private houses, in hostels, and in any school or club building where it was possible to arrange 
bed and board. Similar assistance was given to the rest of the community, including the 
Eurasians, though in most cases, each race was inclined to look after its own.
401
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The clamour for passages on ships leaving Singapore became a major administrative 
challenge. In response, the Government created a committee headed by a High Court Judge to 
decide the priority of requests. Mr Justice J. Aitken, (Aitken Committee), chaired it. According 
to Duff Cooper, this committee never sat because the Governor „had been endeavouring to 
settle the whole matter without allowing the committee to meet, and behind their backs.‟402 
The selection criteria was to be absolute impartiality, with the provision that husbands who 
were required for national duty could not accompany their wives. The committee when it 
eventually sat only resolved the question of whether a person and family were eligible to 
leave, it was then up to the individual to find a shipping line to take them.  Not surprisingly, 
there were few requests from local nationals to leave, whose only home, after all, was Malaya. 
However, the authorities by failing to control the essential element of allocation of berths on 
available ships caused great confusion and distress for many wives.
403
 
The administration by insisting on retaining peacetime bureaucratic regulations added 
untold complications and disorder.  When the women registered with the shipping lines for a 
passage, they were asked for payment, or proof that payment was forthcoming. And in the 
majority of instances these women had hurriedly left their homes in Malaya without money 
and now could not contact their husbands for support, because their spouses were still up-
country either on essential work, or conscripted for military duty.   Adding to the turmoil was 
the demand that all passports must be in order and correct visas attached.  This was an absurd 
request because many of the ships could not confirm with any confidence their likely 
destination. Passengers were also told that UK regulations forbade them taking out of the 
Colony any currency greater than ten pounds sterling in value,  and that all cash had to be 
reported to the Exchange Control.  All personal jewellery had to be catalogued, and no one 
might take with them a diamond larger that half a carat.
404
  Imposing these petty bureaucratic 
rules dogmatically, added untold distress and chaos to a procedure already failing to meet the 
urgency of the situation.   
The ships, which had brought supplies and reinforcements to Singapore, were loaded 
with civilian evacuees and wounded service personnel for the return journey.  On 21 January, 
Percival was able to cable London that 5,200 women and children had been evacuated. 
However, there was still nearly that number remaining and awaiting passage.  So chaotic were 
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the departure arrangements in the last week of December that several large transports left the 
port either empty or only half-full.
405
 
Air raids on Singapore, which had been heavy during January, continued unabated, and 
to which was now added the incessant artillery bombardment from the Japanese batteries in 
southern Johore. It was at about this time that Mrs Reilly, the Governor‟s Cipher clerk, in a 
diary entry undated, wrote that about twenty shells landed near Government House with one 
hitting the grass bank outside, near her office.  Thomas was at the daily War Council meeting 
during the bombardment. When he returned, she told him of the event, to which he retorted, 
“Shelled – rubbish – whoever said that!” He was taken to see the damage and was assured by 
the military officers present, that it was indeed caused by 4-inch artillery shells.
406
 The damage 
to the public utilities caused by these barrages was severe and continuous repairs to gas, 
electricity and water supplies barely completed before they were again damaged.  Control on 
consumption had to be imposed. Water gave the greatest concern. There were two large 
reservoirs on the Island, „MacRitchie‟ and „Pierce‟ together could provide 14,500,000 gallons 
daily.   However, the greatest volume of water, over 15,000,000 gallons daily, came from 
Johore Bahru. It was pumped from the station at Gunong Pulai via the causeway, where the 
pipe carrying it was above ground; indeed the pipe was laid above ground for most of its 
journey across the Island.  When the causeway was breached on 31 January, after the final 
withdrawal, the water pipe was also destroyed leaving the island dependent on its reservoirs. 
The Governor who learnt of this eventuality expressed surprise, as he noted in his diary on 30
 
January: 
Discovered in War Council that when the Johore causeway goes up, after our troops are across, 
the water mains supply to the Island will go too.  I confess I did not realize the latter, and, as a 
number of taps have to be fitted to stand pipes which will have to come into use when house 
supplies are cut off, there is need for great haste. Curfew is being imposed from tonight from 9 
pm to 5 am. More raids this morning and damage to godowns [warehouse] in the harbour area 
and in the coolie lines. Probably aimed at ships, such as the Empress of Japan which are taking 
away a lot of women……Wavell for half-an-hour at 2.00 pm.407 
 
That the Governor did not know the Island‟s main water supply came from Johore is a 
shocking admission. In the daily War Council meetings, discussions on the possibility of the 
Island eventually being besieged would, almost surely, have included the important matter of 
the supply of reserves of food and water.  His ignorance of the source of water begs the 
question; if he did not know where the Island‟s most vital resource came from, why did he not 
ask? 
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The food situation for the military garrison was satisfactory.  There was meat for 
three months, flour and tinned vegetables for four months, and enough other items for five 
months.  The stocks of food for the civil population were enough for four months, with flour 
for six months and meat for nine months (a large proportion of meat were live animals under 
government control), which could also be used to supplement army stocks.
408
 
As noted in the previous chapter, General Wavell instructed Percival, on 18 January, 
during his visit to the stricken army, to prepare a plan for the defence of Singapore.  The Island 
is no more than about 27 miles east to west and about 15 miles north to south. Percival‟s plan 
for the defence of the Island has been the subject of endless debate by historians and military 
theorists, and the predominating consensus is that his plan was wrong.
409
 The glaring omission 
in his preparations, and the issue most debated, is his failure to permit properly constructed 
fortifications on the north shore of the island.  His military philosophy, as previously noted, 
and with which the Governor concurred, was not to engender a rearward mentality by early 
defensive preparations. Even though he must have recognised that his relentless retreat would 
lead inexorably to a final defence of Singapore, he still did not permit defensive works to 
begin. His senior engineer, Brigadier Simson, records a passionate appeal to Percival, on 26 
December, when the retreating Army was still north of Kuala Lumpur. He succeeded in 
meeting alone with Percival late at night, to make his case for work to begin on defensive sites 
both in north Johore, a proposal supported by Heath, and on the north shore of Singapore. 
Simson has described in his book, this crucial dialogue between two tired, exhausted men, one 
of whom – Percival – resented, not so much the midnight intrusion of his Chief Engineer, but 
of having to face,  yet again, the distasteful subject of rearward defensive sites. Simson with 
all the passion and conviction he could muster told the General that he had still time, materials 
and manpower to erect formidable obstacles. He could prepare defensive positions on the main 
Japanese thrust route and the likely assault beaches on the north of the Island, but that he must 
begin right away because as the Japanese got closer civilian labour would disappear.  After 
hours of impassioned pleading, Percival still refused and when Simson asked why, he got what 
he described as the „frankly horrifying‟ answer “I believe that defences of the sort you want to 
throw up are bad for morale of troops and civilians.”410 
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Wavell in his new appointment as Commander of A.B.D.A. followed personally the 
progress of the battle in Malaya and Singapore.  When, on 19 January, he instructed Percival 
to prepare secret plans for withdrawal onto the island he had added in his cable „…Under 
cover of selecting positions for garrison of island …you can work out scheme for large force 
and undertake some preparations such as obstacles or clearances...‟  He was referring to the 
northern shore of Singapore and as he had earlier made clear, with the Japanese approaching 
from Malaya it would not be much use holding troops on the southern beaches if the attack is 
coming from the north.
411
 
Governor Thomas, post–war, claims to have been taken aback on learning very late, 
there were no defensive positions and obstacles prepared on the north shore of the Island.  This 
statement is hard to believe, for it is safe to assume it would most certainly have been one of 
the major topics, if not the main one, at the daily War Council meetings when all talk was then 
of the impending attack.  He wrote to Wavell at the end of 1947 explaining that soon after 
retuning home in 1945 he contacted Bond (Percival‟s predecessor) asking why no defences 
had been prepared either in south Johore or north of Singapore Island.  He got an 
unsatisfactory answer and passed this onto Wavell who replied: 
I do not know of course what secret reasons given to you for not constructing a defence line 
on the north of Singapore island were: but I do distinctly recollect that when I landed at 
Singapore on the morning of Jan 7
th
 1942 the first thing I asked to do was to inspect such 
defences.  When I found that there were none I spoke with some asperity and I do remember 
Percival giving as a reason – I think the main one – for his neglect was that it would have a 
bad effect on civilian morale.  My retort was that it would have a much worse effect on 
everyone‟s morale if its troops were driven into the island, as it seemed quite possible even 
then, and there were no defences.  He also complained I remember of labour difficulties, 
which I said I found difficult to accept with such a large population in Singapore. 
412
 
 
On discovering the paucity of defence preparations on the northern shores, during this 
visit, Wavell warned London of this glaring omission and later Churchill when learning of it 
wrote: „The possibility of Singapore having no landward defences no more entered my mind 
than that of a battleship being launched without a bottom.‟413  To answer Thomas‟s question of 
no defences in south Johore, Bond was certainly in a position to do this because he (Bond) 
stopped the erection of a string of pillboxes across this area.  Bond‟s predecessor Dobbie 
ordered the building of a line of concrete machine-gun posts. He was authorised a sum of 
£60,000 by London, to construct these measures.  With £30,000 only of this sum spent and the 
project half completed, Bond on arrival personally cancelled the scheme, for no clear reason. 
On defences „north of Singapore Island‟, it is uncertain if Thomas means northern Singapore 
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or across the causeway in Johore, which, as he pointed out to Simson, was an Unfederated 
State and he personally refused Simson permission to prepare any military defences in that 
location.  Wavell certainly seems to think Thomas is referring to the northern shore of 
Singapore.     In this same letter to Wavell, he (Thomas) says: 
I think I may say that from the day when the Japs (sic) entered Indo-China the average British 
civilian foresaw a land attack on Malaya but I am quite sure that none of us expected the route 
that took place and no one ever suggested it to me. 
 
This is blatantly untrue. Every military Appreciation since 1937 pointed to a landing in the 
North East followed by a crossing of the Kra Isthmus to the west coast.
414
  The main thrust 
south would be on this side of the country, parallel to the coast. This region of Peninsular 
Malaya offered not only the best terrain for the movement of large military formations, and a 
continuous road and rail network, but it was also a mixture of open and cultivated areas with 
a network of tracks and secondary roads which permitted the option of changes of axes. No 
discussion of the defence of Malaya after 1939 considered any other option a practical 
possibility.  Furthermore, Thomas in the paper he submitted to the Overseas Defence 
Committee in March 1940, 
415
 in which he was making a case for an increase in frontline 
aircraft, explained that all the storage facilities for reserves of food were per se on the west 
coast: 
In the present state of Malayan defence the Japanese can land in the Peninsula from the sea 
or enter it from Thailand… [T]his means… in most of the country on the western side of 
the central range of mountains, in Penang, and in Singapore. Supplies so stored would be at 
the mercy of the invader. 
416
 
 
 Most analysts agree with Percival‟s claim, that in general terms, with the forces at his 
disposal, there were only two options open to him.  He could either disperse his resources 
around the island‟s coastal perimeter to prevent landings anywhere, or alternatively, have 
likely landing sites thinly covered, and concentrate his reserves ready for immediate counter 
attack at the point of landing.  His final dispositions were an untidy compromise of the two.  
He dispersed valuable units to cover possible approaches from both the Malacca Straits on 
west side and from Mersing on the east side; additionally, he thinly deployed others along the 
southern coastline.  He nevertheless believed the main attack would develop on the north 
coast, to the east of the causeway. Wavell agreed that the main assault would be directed at the 
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north coast. However, he strongly maintained that west of the causeway was the more likely 
objective. 
The Governor continued to Chair the daily meetings of the War Council and received 
increasingly depressing reports of destruction, damage and death. His diary also documents 
reports of drunken misconduct by British and Australian troops around Singapore to the point 
that he tells Rear Admiral Spooner and the Army‟s Provost Marshal to see that this behaviour 
stops immediately „We cannot allow our men to riot, and refuse it to Asiatics‟ (sic).417  He also 
heard first hand from civil service colleagues, arriving with the retreating army, some 
depressing accounts of military actions in Malaya. In his diary, on 2 February, where he 
catalogued the raids on the Naval Base oil tanks, godowns, railway station and oil barges, 
added: 
Leslie Davies [previously his Private Secretary] turned up, having got through Johore with 
troops who were cut off, and then rescued by the navy. He said the Australian Air Force at 
Kuantan were dreadful.  Panicked out at first bombing.  I have heard the RAF panicked in 
exactly the same way at Alor Star.
418
 
 
Until this point, Chinese labour had been reliable and essential for sustaining basic 
public services around the Island and just as vitally, providing the manual support at the docks.  
However, with mounting aerial bombing in the dock area, and loss of life increasing daily, the 
Chinese Dockers were beginning to desert.  Thomas visited the Harbour area to see for himself 
the destruction and assess the problem.  So concerned were both he and Percival, because of 
the interruption it was having on evacuating families and on unloading vital military stores that 
Thomas summoned the Chinese Mobilisation Council and „told them plainly that unless they 
could prevent labour from running away they might find themselves doing coolie work for 
Japs (sic) at the point of a bayonet.‟419 Two Chinese, Lim Bo Seng and his brother, acted as 
Liaison Officers with the Mobilisation Council, and even during the worst conditions, still 
managed to organise a daily workforce of 12,000 labourers.   It was about this time that 
Thomas mentions meeting a deputation of Chinese communists, on the advice of the senior 
Police officer, some of whom had been released from goal, but all of whom had the common 
desire to fight the Japanese and agreed to suppress their differences and join with Kuomintang 
supporters to do so. „They wished to form a united front with the sole purpose of resisting the 
invader‟420 Thomas gave his approval for the formation of a military unit under the command 
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of Chinese speaking John Dalley, a British special branch police officer.  The unit was known 
as DALFORCE.  In a broadcast, the next day Thomas declared: 
You can realise the immense contribution which the Chinese can, and will, render to the war 
effort by mobilising themselves in this way, by helping to preserve the peace, by preventing 
panic, by assisting in the distribution of food, by producing labour, by joining the defence 
forces, and in a multitude of other ways.  I have had similar assurances of unstinted co-
operation from leaders of the Indian community, and I have, of course, accepted them with 
equal gratitude.
421
 
 
Unfortunately, it was too late to take advantage of this initiative. I consider that such a 
formidable grouping, with its passionate hatred of the Japanese, should have been conceived 
long before this point. However as noted the indigenous Malays were strongly against the 
training and arming of the Chinese. There was now no time to train them, nor were there 
sufficient spare weapons to arm them all properly.  In spite of these handicaps, however, they 
acquitted themselves bravely and ferociously and after capitulation took to the Jungles of 
Malaya, where they later formed important resistance groups, ambushing convoys, destroying 
supplies, and causing endless trouble to the Japanese occupation forces. 
 
Propaganda 
A major complaint mentioned interminably in nearly every personal post war account 
of this period was the lack of accurate information about the progress of the war. Indeed, there 
are insinuations of disingenuous communiqués from the Government Information Office. 
People were ceaselessly bewildered by events overtaking them of which they had had no 
warning. Moreover, in some cases, alleged they had been deceived by the government into 
believing occurrences were less serious than they actually were.
422
  The newspapers 
complained loudest and continuously, demanding to know the truth.  In their frustration with 
the authorities, they filled their columns with reports of developments in the international war 
scene. In examples of national newspapers seeking to fill the void created by lack of local war 
news, according to Cecil Brown, the Columbia Broadcasting System war correspondent, they 
filed articles with headlines such as „…Russians Pursue Nazis in Crimea‟, „…Fresh Blows at 
Rommel‟s Forces‟,…‟British Air and Sea Successes.‟  They resorted to picking up any titbit 
from outside the country or from international news agencies, such as Reuters. In many cases, 
the information was out of date by the time it was printed. A notable example of withholding 
bad news was the report of the loss of the Airfield at Kelantan.  The Japanese captured this 
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important aerodrome not long after they landed at Kota Bahru at the outbreak of hostilities, 8 
December, but no news of this was disclosed until the 22 December when the military 
authorities issued the following communiqué: 
Owing the loss of aerodrome facilities in Northern Kelantan, and the vulnerability of the 
communications, it was decided some days ago to withdraw from the area north of Kuala 
Krai.  This operation, involving a series of carefully co-ordinated movements by night, has 
been successfully carried out by the military commander concerned.  During the last few 
days, the enemy‟s land and air forces have attempted to interfere with the operation.  In 
spite of this, the greater part of the force and the majority of the stores and equipment have 
been brought out.
423
 
 
The Kota Bahru aerodrome was one of the air bases hastily evacuated by the Air Force on the 
night of 10/11 December. By then they had lost most of their aircraft and were now vulnerable 
to continuous attack from Japanese planes flying from southern Thailand. The runways were 
grass and the RAF had left dumps of material close at hand for repairs. (See Chapter 5).  
Moreover, by the 22 December, when the communiqué was released, the Japanese were 
unquestionably winning the war, Kedah and Perlis had been lost, Penang had been evacuated 
and the Japanese Army on the west coast was at the Perak River.  On the east coast, they were 
approaching Kuala Trengganu. 
The new Director General Propaganda, (Sir George Sansom) at the War Council 
meeting on 18 December according to the minutes, drew attention to the fact that: 
Foreign Correspondents profoundly disturbed at the situation reports, which hide the true 
picture, and are not believed by white or Asiatic communities in the war areas. Situation is 
known to be bad up country; news seeping through to Singapore is causing loss of civilian 
morale.
424
 
 
The Cabinet Minister, Duff Cooper, who was Chairman at that time, replied that the first rule 
was to say nothing to help the enemy.  Sansom, while agreeing that security was paramount 
and   quite properly, it was the military who decided which fighting details to disclose.  They 
(Propaganda Dept.) were the final authority, which vetted the journalists copy before 
dispatch. Moreover, it was with his department that the press had fierce and daily disputes 
and it was therefore vital that the extant situation should be disclosed.  It is not clear from the 
records whether incorrect or inaccurate information given to journalists‟ was by design or 
blunder.   
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Military Headquarters in Singapore suffered equally from scant information since 
communications with the forward formations were appalling.  Their image was not helped, 
however, by the choice of retired Naval Officer, Commander Burroughs, (Chapter 2), as 
Head of Public Relations. A man who readily admitted he had no experience for the job. The 
clash, between press and censor, began from the very outset of the campaign. One of the 
earliest communiqués was misleading; it was also the source used for the Governors 
mistaken statement to the Legislative council on the 8 December (Chapter 5). It implied that 
the first landing at Kota Bahru was successfully repelled and the few enemy troops who had 
succeeded in getting ashore were rounded up and their surface craft had withdrawn at high 
speed.  This statement was quite inaccurate but never corrected.  The Japanese, as described, 
successfully landed a sizeable force, after a fierce but brief fight secured the beachhead, and 
later took possession of the airfield.  The departing craft were only returning to their base 
after effectively completing their part of the operation. 
The Straits Times, like other newspapers, resorted to using outside sources for pithy 
amounts of information, and made clear that its copy was reliant on external informants. For 
example on 15 January they printed: 
A British United Press correspondent, quoted by the B.B.C., says that the slaughter of the 
Japanese in some areas of the Malayan front is unbelievable.  Our concentrated fire has mown 
down wave after wave of them and whole detachments have been blown to bits. 
 
And on 21 January: 
It is learned in London, said the B.B.C. last night that in spite of the enemy‟s claims, there are 
no Japanese troops within 76 miles of Singapore. 
 
And on 29 January: 
A B.B.C. broadcast this morning says that Ipoh is suffering incessant bombardment from the 
air.
425
 
 
Each of these reports is wrong; there was at no time anything that could be described as 
wholesale slaughter of the Japanese forces, and on the 15 January, the British were desperately 
struggling in central Malaya around the town of Gemas. On 21 January, the Japanese were 
indeed within 76 miles of Singapore. In addition, on the 29 January, they were within a few 
miles of Singapore and Ipoh had been in Japanese hands for nearly six weeks.  The Japanese, 
meanwhile, were broadcasting daily from the captured station at Penang giving reports of their 
progress, often exaggerated, but as it was the only available source of current campaign news, 
the populace listened and were confused.  Government communiqués were composed of bland 
and vague adjectives “heavy and confused fighting”, “enemy attacks in strength” and “local 
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penetrations”. The press correspondents continued their own daily battle with the censors. 
There were at that time twenty war correspondents in Singapore, all demanding they be told 
the truth about the conflict and more importantly, be allowed to print it.  Brown, described by 
his colleagues as something of a maverick, endlessly challenged the censor about the content 
of his reports for CBS. He mentions in his book a number of examples of his broadcast notes 
being rejected. On 29 December, he wanted to say, within the context of his address, „the 
British administration seems to have disappeared in these towns in the threatened areas‟ 
instead he was told he could say „people have to shift for themselves as there is no European 
authority to turn to.‟   
In another, later broadcast, he wanted to explain the effect on the United States, of 
losing to the Japanese important tin producing areas in central Malaya.  
„…Fifty per cent of the tin-ore production of Malaya is now in Japanese hands…..The United 
States has been taking seventy per cent of this country‟s output.  This means that the Japanese, 
by occupying the territory they have, are denying the United States thirty thousand tons of tin 
ore a year...‟ 426 
 
The censor cut most of this material and would not let Brown say that fifty per cent of 
the tin-ore production was now in Japanese hands; instead, he could say, „a large area, from 
which tin ore comes, is divided with the Japanese.‟427  Brown‟s loss of accreditation and 
dismissal from Singapore on 23 January was because his broadcasts to America, the British 
authorities claimed, could be picked up in Malaya and were having a depressing effect on local 
morale.  The editor of the Straits Times, G.W. Seabridge, on 5 January summed up the 
situation in a passionate and reasoned leader article: 
Malaya has now been in the front line for a month.  The Northern Settlement [Penang] is in 
enemy hands, and fighting is taking place within 200 miles of Singapore.  This island has 
been bombed on several occasions with „slight damage to civilian property‟ and „a few 
civilian casualties.‟  That is a reasonably accurate summary of all the people of this country 
have been told of the fighting that is going around them.  Vague „lines‟ have been mentioned 
and there have been sundry „strategic withdrawals.‟ Such generalities provide a very flimsy 
basis indeed for detailed comment – so flimsy that we do not propose to attempt a task which 
is very nearly impossible of achievement…The view we propose to put forward here is the 
view of the middle-class Asiatic who has been asked to help in maintaining morale but finds 
himself quite unable to do so…If the newspapers and the newspaper reading public are to be 
any help in combating rumour, they must be supplied with the only things which are of the 
slightest value in carrying out the task.  And those things are facts.
428
 
 
The Governor took offence at many of the reports and remarks in the national 
newspapers, but specifically, those in the Straits Times, which persistently and pointedly 
accused the Administration, and in particular the Governor, of failing to prepare and galvanise 
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the country for war and now failed to tell them what was happening. This same newspaper and 
editor had in pre-war years warmly applauded Thomas; „He did well from the start.  The 
business community found him approachable, friendly and sound.‟429   Thomas now made it 
perfectly clear he did not like Seabridge. The antagonism between them had rumbled on since 
well before the invasion and reached its nadir when Seabridge strongly endorsed Duff 
Cooper‟s appointment of Simson as Director General Civil Defence, thereby, claimed the 
Governor, making his (Thomas) position untenable. 
No convincing reason can be found for the reluctance by the authorities, both the 
administration and the military, to keep the public truthfully informed of the real state of the 
war.  Indeed there is the argument put forward by Elphick, that had the real picture been 
disclosed, a more measured and orderly evacuation could have been underway earlier, 
avoiding the late chaotic and perilous rush.
430
   
Duff Cooper‟s early decree of not announcing anything, which may be helpful to the 
enemy, seems to have assumed the authority of a rigid canon.  With people having to rely on 
second-hand information, enemy propaganda and Japanese leaflets dropped by plane, all 
confidence was lost.  The press pointed out that bad news was better than no news. When the 
truth is eventually known, which inevitability it would be, the authorities would lose all 
credibility and had little chance of restoring loyalty.  The ethnic, Malays, Chinese and Indians, 
speaking only their own language and living in remote areas were solely reliant on rumours 
that inevitably eroded all respect for their departing European bosses.  Public confidence was 
further shaken when the Governor issued his fallacious memorandum in mid-January 
intending to infuse a sense of urgency in his civil servants. In allowing his directive to be made 
public, he hoped to reassure everyone that he was galvanising his staff; instead it shocked 
them to learn that even at that late date such bureaucracy still existed: 
The day of minute papers has gone. There must be no more passing of files from one 
department to the other, and from one office in a department to another.  It is the duty of 
every officer to act, and if he feels the decision is beyond him he must go and get it.  
Similarly, the day of letters and reports is over. ….Every officer must accept his 
responsibility to the full in the taking of decisions…. The essential thing is speed in action. 
Nothing matters which is not directly concerned with defence, and no one should be troubled 
with it.
431
 
 
Thomas had this instruction published in full in the newspapers on the 17 January, and 
broadcast it himself later.  By this date, not only were Penang and Malacca in Japanese hands, 
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but eight Malay States were also conquered, and in the final State, Johore, a desperate fight 
was underway.  The public reaction was one of incredulity, with the Straits Times declaring, 
that it was an appalling revelation and it was two and quarter years late.
432
 The statement, 
while causing dismay and despondency, only confirmed what many had suspected for some 
time. 
 
The Nadir 
The Japanese assault on the island began on the night of 8 February 1942, and the 
Governor learned of it in a phone call from Percival. In turn, he passed a warning to Simson 
(DGCD) and the police, noting in his diary that shelling was disturbingly close to Government 
House, and now with an experienced ear, able to add, „that it was the same 4-inch gun.‟ At the 
War Council meeting in the morning (9 Feb), he learnt about the poor performance of the 
Australian contingent, and records in his diary „…the Australians are not fighting well. They 
have been heavily shelled and many found wandering about the roads.‟  He then privately 
unburdens his frustration with the military hierarchy: 
Not easy to proceed with denial schemes when we are given no progress reports. Absence of 
personality in High Command most unfortunate.  Percival doubtless good on paper but not a 
leader and his staff are small men.  Simmons [Fortress Commander] is excellent and Bennett 
and Key are staunch fighters, but there is no one to whom the troops can look to. RAF much 
worse – Pulford nice but no more. 
 
He also claims to have suggested to Percival that Simmons or Bennett become GOC Fortress 
with himself as GOC in C[hief] but as Percival explained, the Fortress was now the only area 
they had, it therefore did not make sense, and in any case, they were both junior in seniority to 
Heath who would have to be first choice.  Thomas added that Heath was a tired man who had 
retreated over 400 miles in a few weeks, and no one had any confidence in him.  He then 
confessed to his diary „we need someone really big here.‟433 In spite of claiming difficulty over 
introducing denial schemes, Thomas nevertheless ordered, on 9 February, the implementation 
of the civil denial scheme and controversially, on the 10 February, without informing either 
Percival or Simson, the withdrawal of all European technical staff from the Singapore Harbour 
Board installations.  This latter order caused untold problems and virtually brought the one 
organisation still working efficiently, to a halt. The hard-pressed army had to find manpower 
from its dwindling resources to keep the docks working. Defending this decision after the war, 
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Thomas said that he was ordered by telegram, on 27 January, that all such men (and others) 
were needed in India.  „I see no reason why the military should have been consulted.‟434 
Simson, not long after assuming his appointment as DGCD, had recommended to the 
governor that a phased scorched earth policy be prepared. Thomas prevaricated and it was not 
until late January - by which time Simson had been appointed onto the War Council - that he 
got a decision.  The plan was that the public utilities would remain untouched, and the civil 
administration would organise the demolition of rubber and tin stocks, radio stations, currency 
and importantly alcohol. Simson had also requested the destruction of forty Chinese owned 
engineering works but Thomas refused saying such action would crush Chinese morale, but he 
agreed the destruction of forty-seven British owned engineering plants. The demolitions were 
eventually carried out by the military but in the face of strong and active opposition from 
owners and/or agents. By this point there was little effective government authority and the 
military had to assist with the destruction of the other facilities which the Administration had 
previously agreed were their responsibility.
435
 
After only two days of fighting, the battle situation was quite desperate.  Percival 
informed the Governor „the Japanese had progressed more quickly than expected. 300 RAF 
ground staff ran away from Tengah aerodrome last night.‟436  The Japanese had landed on the 
North West coast of the Island, which Wavell had predicted, an area held by the Australian 
22
nd
 Brigade (Brig. H. B. Taylor).  The reports from this formation were sparse and confused 
but it was clear the Australians had offered little resistance. General Bennett, their 
Commander, says in his diary: 
Word came through from a few men who escaped that 2/18
th
 and the 2/20
th
 battalions had been 
overrun. No word had been received from the 2/19
th
.  All battalions were out of touch with 
[22
nd
] brigade.  The enemy bombardment had destroyed all beach lights and beach guns and 
machine-guns and caused heavy casualties among gunners ….during the afternoon General 
Percival called and seemed very worried. 
437
 
 
The island consisted largely of plantation, jungle and mangrove, but was flat, with very 
little high ground.  Good roads radiated out from the city in every direction.  In addition to the 
four airbases and the naval base in the north, the only urban zone was the city, which sprawled 
along the central area of the south coast.
438
  The terrain in the important North West region of 
Singapore Island was thick mangrove swamp with limited visibility, appalling conditions 
underfoot and affording little chance to construct any form of protection. In these conditions 
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and the confused, fluid battle, control of units and sub-units in the front line was chaotic, and 
in some cases non-existent, with subordinate commanders taking decisions without consulting, 
or unable to consult, their formation headquarters. The result was the abandonment of critical 
blocking positions for no clear reason and in some cases without firing a shot.  The most 
inexplicable was the retreat of the Australian 27
th
 Brigade, which had been deployed to cover 
the causeway, alongside and to the east, of their compatriot 22
nd
 Brigade. Without waiting for 
instructions, the Brigade Commander (Brig. D. S. Maxwell), after learning of the plight of 22
nd
 
Brigade, decided the battle was already lost and ordered his brigade to pull back leaving an 
alarming 4000-yard gap in the forward defensive line.
439
 When Wavell, together with Percival, 
visited General Bennett early on 10 February, they found Bennett had little information about 
the units under his command in the Western Area and did not even know that his 27
th
 
Australian Brigade had withdrawn in the night. Counter attacks were ordered, but such was the 
confusion, they never materialised. 
 Later, on 11 February, Wavell flew out of Singapore after what turned out to be his 
final visit.  Afterwards he recorded in his Despatches: 
I ordered Percival to stage a counter-attack with all troops possible, but I left Singapore on the morning of 
February 11
th
 without much confidence in any prolonged resistance.
440
 
 
Before departing, he called on Thomas and in their final talks, and in a rare display of emotion, 
said repeatedly, „It shouldn‟t have happened.‟  He believed the rot started with the poor 
deployment and defence, first at Slim River and later at Muar. He confessed that on his 
previous visit (30 January) he had considered whether to relieve Percival, “but”, he said, “it‟s 
not easy to get leaders nowadays.”441 
  Thomas now decided that the all-important ciphers, less one, be removed right away 
to the safety of the British Consul General in Batavia.  His cipher clerk, Mrs Reilly, was 
ordered to leave Singapore because, if captured, the nature of her work would have made her 
the object of unpleasant interrogation.  When she informed the Governor of this order, 
according to her diary, he did not believe that events were so serious for such an early hurried 
departure.  When she explained that the Japanese had reached the area of the golf course 
(about five miles from Government House), he thought this was incorrect and that they were 
still many miles away (the Japanese arrived outside her house that afternoon).  Reilly recorded 
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that he acknowledged „the Japanese had broken through the Australians, but that a small party 
of A&SH [Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders] had been rushed to the breach and they together 
with the Indians on the left and right flanks, had pushed the Japs (sic) back two miles.‟442   
Thomas then added, „The Australians certainly have let us down – right from the beginning 
when they panicked from Kuantan Aerodrome and left all their planes on the ground intact for 
the Japs to seize.‟443  In a later entry in the diary, Reilly writes: 
….the Air Vice Marshal [Pulford] came into the room.  I was shocked at his appearance.  He 
was obviously in a state of nervous tension – almost mental it appeared to me – and he kept 
walking up and down the room muttering to himself and thumping tables and chairs as he 
passed and every now and then stopping in front of me and saying “this is a dreadful state of 
affairs – the whole show is damnable.  An Air Force with no planes and no aerodrome – what 
the hell can we do.  What can we do!”444 
 
 On 30 January, Pulford had been ordered to reposition the few fighter aircraft, less one 
squadron, to the relative safety of the Netherlands East Indies.  On 11 February, Wavell 
ordered the transfer of the remaining aircraft: and by the time of Reilly‟s diary entry there 
were no RAF aircraft remaining on the island and only limited sorties were being flown from 
airfields in Palembang, Sumatra. 
 The night of 10/11, February was disastrous. The Japanese, with tank support, broke 
through the weak and poorly defended positions guarding the main north-south arterial road 
and onto the Bukit Timah heights (177 meters).  Then oddly, they halted. It is generally agreed 
that had they continued, the way was open to them to enter the city area on the morning of 11 
February. After the war, it was learnt that the Japanese at this point were in danger of out-
running their administrative support; they were particularly short of artillery shells and small 
arms ammunition and had to pause for resupply.
445
  Within the allied camp, confusion and 
recriminations reigned. In attempts to move units and sub-units from one sector to another, 
either in support of hard pressed troops, to fill gaps, or endeavour a counter-attack, co-
ordination and communication was almost non-existent. Many subordinate commanders, at 
any one time, were not sure under whose command they belonged. Radio communications 
were almost non-existent and orders were reliant upon dispatch riders and liaison officers.
446
 
 The British tactics during the Island fight were little different from the pattern followed 
during the retreat down Malaya.  There were no innovative responses to the relentless 
Japanese thrusts: when a position was breached, units fell back to a mythical line drawn on a 
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map and from there to another until the final perimeter, extending around, and a few miles 
beyond the city limits, was reached.  With the garrison holding this shrinking perimeter, the 
administrative situation was becoming desperate. About a million Asians were confined in a 
semi-circle with a radius of roughly four and a half miles from the waterfront (approximately 
an area of thirty square miles) and because of their proximity with the military were clearly 
regarded by the Japanese as a legitimate target for aircraft and artillery fire.  The area was a 
dense mass of military transport, mostly abandoned, and confused troops wandering without 
direction. The streets were littered with putrefying corpses, the numbers overwhelming the 
auxiliary removal services.  Bomb damaged and collapsed buildings, entombing more dead 
bodies, and cratered roads completed the grim picture. Both the main water reservoirs were 
now in Japanese hands, though they had not cut the supply: it was thought they allowed a 
continued supply for fear of inheriting a typhoid epidemic. The garrison‟s food reserves were 
down to seven days, due to the loss of the Bukit Timah depots and petrol was scarce, but 
reserves of ammunition were adequate.
447
  A failure of pre-war civil defence planning, 
regarding food reserves, now manifested itself. Sixty-four godowns in the dock area had been 
used to store thousands of tons of flour, rice, and other commodities. This was a serious 
planning error, because the docks were an obvious and legitimate military target.  Simson, too 
late, tried in January to rescue the situation, but by then a lack of labour, transport and 
alternative storage facilities prevented but little being rescued.  Forty-six of the godowns were 
destroyed including all their contents; the remainder were seriously damaged and much of the 
contents were irrecoverably ruined.
448
 
 The government no longer functioned as a governing body. I have not found any record or 
reference to the possibility of establishing a government in exile, as was the case in Burma 
where the Governor, Dorman-Smith, withdrew with a number of his staff to Simla, in India.
449
  
However, in fairness and with hindsight, finding a suitable island or other location in the 
region outside the Japanese reach would have been almost impossible. Added to which 
Thomas, and his wife, had made clear they were not going to leave Singapore.
450
 They refused 
an offer from Wavell, during their farewell meeting, to go with him to Java.    Even so, it is 
odd that such a possibility does not appear to have been even discussed.  
 Civil servants handling the evacuation and those trying to maintain public utilities, 
continued to work and provide as much help as conditions permitted.  The major offices of 
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state and the municipal departments no longer existed.  The Governor alone, with his 
immediate staff, worked from Government House because it was nigh impossible to travel 
with certainty around Singapore. Government House also provided refuge for a number of 
evacuees and itself became the target of incessant bombing and shelling. It was hit several 
times resulting in the death of loyal servants and members of the military guard.  Governor 
Thomas had refused several requests to move to a safer area of town; however his wife, Daisy, 
was now ill with dysentery, and by 13 February, even Thomas agreed the building was 
uninhabitable.  He moved that day into two rooms in the Singapore Club, which was located in 
the Fullerton Building on the waterfront. The War Council had ceased to exist having held its 
final meeting on the 10 February.  Percival kept him informed of the military activity by 
personal visits, as the public telephone system no longer worked.  On 14 February (the day 
before final surrender), he told Thomas that the position was no worse and that therefore they 
would carry on.
451
  On the vital matter of the water supply, Percival warned Thomas that such 
was the damage the supply had to be severely restricted and might last no more than forty-
eight hours.  Thomas in turn informed the Colonial Office: 
General Officer Commanding informs me that Singapore City now closely invested. …..Water 
supplies very badly damaged and unlikely to last more than twenty-four hours.  Many dead 
lying in the streets and burial impossible.  We are faced with total deprivation of water, which 
must result in pestilence.  I felt it my duty to bring this to the notice of the General Officer 
Commanding.
452
 
 
 On 13 February, the frenzied evacuation of civilians continued, it was to be the last day of 
officially controlled evacuation and was labelled „Black Friday.‟453 Japanese aircraft attempted 
unremittingly to prevent the departure of ships, by bombing and machine-gunning and then 
pursuing them at sea.  Some harrowing attacks sank a number, which had cleared Singapore 
and made it to the open sea, with huge loss of life.  In the bureaucratic bedlam, which reined 
throughout this time, an unpleasant accusation was levelled against Simson. He was allocated 
300 places out of the final 1200 evacuees and agreed they should be reserved primarily for 
young technical staff from the Malayan Civil Service, especially the PWD (public works 
department) whose experiences and expertise it was judged, would be invaluable elsewhere.  
Out of the odd assortment of 40 vessels remaining for the final departure, Simson was 
assigned thirteen of them.  His major problem, however, was to get the message to the selected 
names. With no communications and people being forced to move frequently to avoid 
bombing and because of the ever-changing military front, many of those selected could not be 
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contacted. Rather than waste these valuable places Simson, together with Bisseker, decided to 
issue their own permits to those most desperate, even if they did not meet the PWD criteria. 
Without consulting the Governor or the Aitken committee, they issued permits to the old, and 
to women and children.  Some 320 passes in all, signed by Simson, were given to others to 
distribute, but with first call to as many DGCD staff as possible.  Simson refutes the allegation 
made later by the Governor, that Bisseker took care to make sure he was one of the fortunate. 
Simson states categorically, in his book, that he expressly ordered Bisseker to leave, and what 
is more, did so with Thomas‟s agreement.454  Among those with permits to evacuate were both 
Rear Admiral Spooner and Air Vice Marshal Pulford. 
 This episode and similar badly managed arrangements, all caused by shocking indifference 
to contingency planning, left the way open to all sorts of acrimony and accusations of 
favouritism.  All of Simson‟s thirteen vessels which departed Singapore on the 13 February 
were sunk with a heavy loss of life; both Spooner and Pulford later perished, after being forced 
to make for an uninhabited island.  Bisseker survived and eventually returned to England.
455
  
 Until the very end, there were astonishing incidents of staggering incompetence and 
intransigent bureaucracy: the Chief Officer of the SS Empire Star ordered off his ship a 
number of wives (about 40) together with their children, when it was discovered they did not 
have the correct permits.
456
  By 15 February, when Singapore surrendered, over 10,000 
women and children had been evacuated: 7,174 Europeans, 2305 Indian and 1,250 Chinese.  
About 200 European women and children were left behind, most of whom ended up in 
captivity.
457
 
 Throughout the fighting on the Island, Percival was continuously implored by Wavell to 
fight to the last and that there should be no thought of surrender while there were soldiers to 
fight and ammunition to fight with.  Wavell in turn had been subjected to Churchillian 
pressure cajoling him to ensure that Percival not be allowed to consider capitulation: that he 
should only finally succumb at the end of a tenacious siege, which embodied all the 
doggedness and resourcefulness of British Arms. It was mid-January 1942, that Churchill 
claims to have first become aware of the lack of prepared defences in north Singapore.  He 
cabled Wavell on the 14 January and enquired „…what are defences and obstructions on 
landward side?‟458  To which Wavell replied „Until recently all plans based on repulsing 
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seaborne attack on island, and holding land attack in Johore or further north, and little or 
nothing was done to construct defences on north side of island to prevent crossing of Johore 
Strait…‟459 Churchill sent a minute to General Ismay to be brought up at the COS. Committee: 
I confess to being staggered by Wavell‟s telegram….merely to have seaward defences and no 
forts or fixed defences to protect their rear is not to be excused on any grounds….I warn you 
this will be one of the biggest scandals that could possibly be exposed…460 
 
He then listed ten measures needed for defending the northern shore. Seven of the ten points 
he listed quite clearly came from an earlier report by Simson, sent to London, recommending 
these same preparations.
461
  In a cable on the 20 January to Wavell to ensure there was no 
ambiguity, he said: 
I want to make it absolutely clear that I expect every inch of ground to be defended, every 
scrap of material or defences to be blown to pieces to prevent capture by the enemy and no 
question of surrender to be entertained until after protracted fighting in the ruins of Singapore 
City.
462
 
 
With these imperatives ringing in his ears, Percival must have been confused by the 
contradiction between the scorched earth policy demanded by his authorities, with all this 
implied regarding the destruction of all military materiel, and on the other hand the demand 
that he continue fighting to the end.
463
 
 Wavell on his return to Java after his final visit, 11 February, recognising that the end in 
Singapore could not be far off, cabled the Prime Minister: 
Battle for Singapore is not going well. Japanese with their usual infiltration tactics are getting 
on much more rapidly than they should in the west of the island. I ordered Percival to stage 
counter-attack with all troops possible on that front. ….everything possible is being done to 
produce more offensive spirit and optimistic outlook. But I cannot pretend that these efforts 
have been entirely successful up to date. I have given the most categorical orders that there is 
to be no thought of surrender, and that all troops are to continue fighting to the end.
464
 
 
From the many eyewitness accounts, made known later, there was a serious and 
noticeable deterioration in the morale of the troops engaged in the final struggle.  Scarcely 
trained soldiers of the reinforcing 18
th
 Indian Division, and other units, which had been 
arriving during January were committed to battle against a seasoned enemy without, in some 
cases, essential equipment, and certainly no chance to adjust to a tropical environment.  Many 
of these reinforcements had been at sea destined for other theatres, primarily the Middle East 
or Burma, arrived in Singapore very bewildered and disoriented and were deployed straight 
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away into the front line. The reports of the shameful behaviour of Australian troops in 
particular, caused serious concern; they were reported to have run away from the fighting, seen 
wandering half-dressed, unarmed and drunk around the city precincts.
465
 They commandeered 
private cars to get them to the quayside to board ships, pushing aside women and children in 
the process.  They were, it is claimed, out of control.  In a letter to his relative in Australia, J 
Brash, a government servant, after escaping, wrote from Bangalore: 
…the one man who could tell the truth but instead has told a pack of lies is Gordon 
Bennett.  The one and only reason for the sudden collapse of the Singapore defences was 
the Australian troops.  That Singapore might have fallen in any event after a long 
struggle may be true, but if on Monday night, Tuesday morning [9/10 Feb] the 
Australian troops who were allotted the task of holding the Bukit Timah Road had not 
just thrown down their arms and run into Singapore it may have been a very different 
story……It really was disgusting performance.  Why they were given the Bukit Timah 
god knows after the pitiful performance at Batu Pahat where they just collapsed. 
Anyway they broke into all the houses on the way into Singapore and those that came 
into ours, we asked if they would like tea or breakfast and they said no! no! we don‟t 
want to wait all we want is ships to take us away.  I have never seen men such cowards 
and so thoroughly frightened.
466
 
 
Mrs Reilly avows an example of the complete breakdown of leadership, poor communications 
and misinformation.  In her last journey from home to Government House to decipher an 
urgent telegram from London, she wrote later of „seeing hundreds and hundreds of Aussies 
straggling along the Johore – Singapore main road – others sitting on the sidewalks - most of 
them clad only in shorts – no arms – no equipment.‟  They stopped and gave a lift to two 
soldiers who asked Reilly‟s husband, who was driving the car, if it was true that the British 
forces were going to surrender when the Japanese reached the Botanical Gardens?  And if this 
was true, they explained, there was little point in continuing to fight and lose more lives. After 
strongly rebuffing such nonsense, Mr Reilly asked them to speak to their officers to put an end 
to such rumours to be told that most officers had already left.
467
 
On 13 February, with the garrison now within the final crowded perimeter and Bukit 
Timah and the main reservoirs in Japanese hands, Percival called a meeting of his senior 
commanders and principal staff officers to discuss the situation.
468
 The Governor was not 
included in these talks.  Percival first debated the possibility of a last, all-out counter attack to 
attempt to retake Bukit Timah.  No one was in favour; it was felt there was little chance of 
success, the troops were exhausted and their morale was rock bottom.  Both Heath and Bennett 
advocated capitulation. Both argued that if the Japanese troops entered the city area they 
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would run amok and the population will be subjected to the same havoc suffered by Nanking.   
Nevertheless, with Wavell‟s strictures in the forefront of his mind, and despite the gravity of 
the situation, Percival decided to continue the struggle.  He had in fact the day before warned 
Wavell of the dire position and asked for discretionary powers to decide whether to surrender.  
Wavell clearly not wanting to be the architect of such an important decision urged him to 
continue to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, if necessary in house-to-house fighting: 
Where water supply exists for troops they must repeat must go on fighting.  Your gallant 
stand is serving its purpose and must be continued to the limit of endurance.
469
 
 
Percival visited the Governor at the Singapore Club, at about 10.30 a.m., to brief him 
on the latest state of affairs.  It is safe to assume that the grave military situation was discussed 
and even the question of possible surrender, but in his diary Thomas alludes only to his 
worrying concern about the danger from epidemic if the water was suddenly cut off.
470
  
Certainly, the dwindling volume of available drinking water was a serious concern, but as 
mentioned, it was the result of damage to the pipes carrying the water rather than the supply 
being disconnected.  Percival spent much valuable time in these final hours dealing with the 
potential water crises, including calling a meeting at the offices of the Chairman of the 
Municipality.  While I do not minimize the gravity of this issue – it begs the question, whether 
this was not a matter best left to the Chief Engineer and his team, leaving him free to deal with 
vital battle matters. 
At 9.30 a.m. on 15 February, Percival again held a conference of the senior 
commanders and principal staff officers at his headquarters at Fort Canning, the only member 
of the civil government present was the Inspector General of Police, Dickinson. He began by 
listening to a battle situation report, which described how little enemy activity there had been 
during the night. On the administrative side, he learned that while there were enough reserves 
of food to last for several days and ammunition though short, was not by any means 
exhausted: the greatest danger was the failing water supply.  He returned to the options: either 
go onto the offensive in a last effort, or surrender.  The formation commanders unanimously 
agreed that a counter-attack was impracticable. Percival then agreed that he would capitulate.  
A vignette, described by a staff officer, Major Cyril Wilde, taking notes at this final meeting, 
was his description of Bennett, after the surrender decision had been agreed and the discussion 
had moved onto the practicalities, saying quite unconvincingly and quite out of context at that 
point, “Maybe we should try one last counter-attack”.  It was received in silence, and most 
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believed he said it purely for the historical record.
471
  By 11.45 a.m., Percival was at the 
Singapore Club where he informed Thomas of the decision.  Afterwards he sent a final signal 
to Wavell, following which all communication with Singapore ceased: 
Owing to losses from enemy action, water, petrol, food and ammunition practically finished.  
Unable therefore to continue the fight any longer. All ranks have done their best and grateful 
for your help.
472
 
 
In the last hectic hours before the agreed time of ceasefire, this was to be at 8.30 p.m. 
that evening, 15 February, Thomas and his few staff spent the time trying to put in place 
arrangements for their incarceration, making final administrative decisions and cabling 
London before communications ended.  He also drafted a statement, with the agreement of the 
Japanese. It was to be published in the newspapers and broadcast by him, explaining to people 
the implications of the surrender and what the Japanese now expected of them.  On the 
question of political protocol, he was determined, unlike Sir Mark Young the Governor of 
Hong Kong who surrendered unconditionally the Crown Colony, that it should be understood 
by the Japanese that it was the British Military Forces which surrendered. It was not the 
Crown Colony of Straits Settlements, and that he as Governor would not sign any instrument 
of surrender.  He did however send a representative to the meeting, Hugh Fraser, the Colonial 
Secretary.
473
 
Not everyone seems to have been aware of imminent surrender.  John Forrester, a 
Volunteer, who previously worked for the trading firm Harrison & Crosfield, recorded:  
We were sitting in a compound owned by a Chinese millionaire with our Bren carriers all 
around us and thinking what a peaceful time it was when somebody said “Oh, we‟ve 
surrendered.”  We just couldn‟t believe it, because there was plenty of water, and our 
Bren carriers were full of petrol.  We thought the man who‟d brought the news about the 
surrender was some fifth columnist and somebody even suggested shooting him.  We 
were particularly amazed and dumbfounded because, although we had been to various 
corners of Singapore Island, we had never actually seen a Japanese or fired a shot in 
anger.  We had done nothing worthwhile to stop the capture of Singapore.  We had done 
nothing. 
474
 
 
As I have discussed in this chapter, the relations between the civil and military 
authorities, at this critical time, had reached their nadir.  Neither side trusted the other. The 
civil authorities raged against the incompetence of the military and the military in turn, had 
no respect for a government that had lost control of the most basic functions of civil 
administration and furthermore had lost the confidence of the people. Seventy days exactly, 
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after landing in northeast Malaya, one of Britain‟s most important overseas possessions was 
in the hands of the Japanese enemy. A pitiful, badly managed campaign ended.  The Japanese 
in their pre-war planning had calculated the operation would take one hundred days; they had 
achieved their objective, to even their great surprise, in considerably less than their estimate.  
Their staggering success was achieved partly by maintaining a ceaseless momentum with 
unremitting pressure. The Japanese soldier was highly motivated and his opponents were 
poorly trained and inadequately prepared troops.  In addition, to a significant degree, a British 
administration divided amongst itself, unable to prioritise its responses to Japanese aggression 
and unable to coordinate both the civil tasks of protecting a country, the people and its 
resources, with the military aim of defending a Naval Base.           
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
The loss of the “Impregnable Fortress” so swiftly, and as seen from Britain, so easily, 
was unprecedented in the annals of British history.  In spite of the increasingly ominous 
portent throughout the campaign, the end stunned the British nation and the watching world.  
Conversely, Japan‟s swift success brought with it the considerable challenge of both 
protecting what it had gained and rebuilding the damaged countrywide infrastructure to 
provide the resources they so badly needed to sustain their war effort.  Moreover, they 
needed urgently to restore the agriculture and manufacturing base of the country to provide 
both work and food for the people that were now their responsibility.  It was a challenge for 
which the Japanese temperament; their inherent arrogance, disdain for the other Asian 
nations, hatred of the Chinese and lack of previous experience, ill-suited them.   The 
expansion of Japan‟s Far Eastern Empire, achieved sometimes under the pretext of a Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but mostly by force, meant she had no experience, or indeed 
understanding, of benevolent rule.  What it had gained by the sword, it had to administer by 
oppression.  Masanobu Tsuji
475
 admits, „…no plans had been discussed for the administration 
of the occupied territories. This question should have been settled in advance.‟ Following an 
acrimonious navy/army debate, it was decided that it was to be an Army responsibility with 
the Minister for War in overall charge.   
Immediately following the ceasefire, surviving British senior officials, in both the 
military and civil organisations, took upon themselves the task of trying to re-establish a 
semblance of authority in the war torn island. The most serious worries were an outbreak of 
disease, burial of the dead, and looting, not just by the civilian residents, but also service 
personnel. They also set about trying to restore, where possible, the more vital public services 
and utilities and impose some order on a suddenly leaderless people.
476
 In nearly every post-
war account of the day of surrender, the return of silence, following the cessation of bombing 
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and shelling, is the first and most common recorded sensation.  The bomb damaged city and 
its precincts were eerily quiet and empty.
477
  Slowly and timidly, the inhabitants emerged 
from their refuge to examine their devastated surroundings and experience the first taste of 
Japanese authority.  Initially, there was little evidence of the victor‟s presence, the Japanese 
combat troops, under a strict injunction from their commander, Yamashita, were restrained 
from entering the city for fear of causing mayhem and to prevent them indulging in a drunken 
rampage.
478
  He also insisted that they would later make only a modest triumphal entry into 
the city, because, he pointed out… „this battle is no more than a prelude…and immediately 
after a commemoration service we will begin operations in Sumatra.‟479 The first few 
Japanese figures who appeared publicly were concerned, just as much as were the British, to 
get functioning the infrastructure and restore essential facilities for basic living.  
The Governor and his wife remained in Fullerton Building during the day of 
surrender, learning the details of the day‟s events from visitors, including Fraser, the Colonial 
Secretary, and  Percival.  The day after the surrender, he was taken to Fort Canning to meet 
the Japanese and agreed the setting up of various committees to deal with critical matters 
concerning restoration of basic public utilities and administration.  Afterwards he was 
allowed the use of an official car to go to Government House to collect some belongings.  In 
this early period, a large number of military personnel and civilian specialists were ordered to 
repair and rebuild vital elements of the infrastructure, such as bridges, restore power and light 
supplies and repair communication lines.  An incongruous occurrence was that Thomas had 
to discuss most of these matters with the Japanese ex- Consul General to Singapore, Toyoda, 
whom he had arrested and imprisoned with another 40 Japanese nationals, on the outbreak of 
war.
480
 Toyoda, in fact, proved to be very helpful and accommodating, including getting 
passes and transport for Thomas and others so they could attend to the business of restoration.   
 The total number of Allied POWs taken at the fall of Singapore is estimated at 
100,000.  No precise figure was possible because of the uncounted wounded, injured and 
those who attempted to escape. Later official figures list total British, Australian, Indian and 
volunteer forces lost because of battle casualties and by the surrender as 138,708.
481
  
Categorized Japanese records show that captured British, Australian, New Zealand, and 
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Dutch troops in Singapore amounted to more than 40,000 and nearly 3000 civilians.
482
  What 
is often overlooked is that in the fighting down through Peninsula Malaya and before the 
battle reached Singapore, the Japanese already took more than 11,000 POWs. They included 
over 10,000 Indian officers and men and approximately 1,200 officers and men of other 
nationalities.
483
   
 At the time the decision to surrender was agreed, Percival had debated with the others 
the possibility of the military attempting to escape from Singapore to avoid becoming 
Prisoners of War.
484
  Curiously, Gen. Heath, perhaps concerned for his pregnant wife, asked 
Percival at the end of January, and before the Japanese had even attacked the island, if he 
could leave Malaya, but Percival refused.
485
  It was implicit that until the official hour of 
surrender, the armed forces would remain under arms and thereby under the jurisdiction of 
the military authorities.  An exception was granted for those whose military skills would be 
valuable for the continuance of the war and those whose recent employment would leave 
them vulnerable to severe interrogation: they were permitted, right away, to make an escape 
attempt.  After the surrender hour, those who wished could attempt to escape.  What was not 
specifically brought up, but by the terms of military doctrine generally assumed, was that 
normal military responsibilities would exist; senior commanders would remain with their 
men as long as possible, to supervise arrangements for their imprisonment and see that some 
form of command structure remained in place.   
General Bennett, the commander of the Australian Imperial Forces, appearing to 
ignore this implicit responsibility, hastily left his command in what was later determined as 
curious circumstances. He escaped together with two of his junior staff officers. The events 
surrounding his departure and his explanation afterwards were considered most unusual the 
Australian military authorities decided to call for an official enquiry.  Investigations 
uncovered the fact that Bennett had been considering escape for some time before the end of 
the fighting.
486
  In itself, this revelation throws into doubt the strength of Bennett‟s 
determination to fight the Japanese tenaciously and to the end.  Moreover, the account of his 
escape, his boorish behaviour and total selfish disregard for others during the flight, caused 
many, particularly within the Australian High Command, to question the quality of his 
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leadership and reassess his performance as the leader of the Australian military in Malaya.
487
  
The official military Court of Inquiry and a later Royal Commission into the whole event 
highlighted, but never satisfactorily resolved, three questionable issues: whether Bennett 
departed before the official deadline, whether he should rightfully have left his men at this 
crucial time and whether he properly appointed a successor. What was not in dispute was that 
he failed to tell his Commander, Percival, of his intentions or even give a hint of the plot.  
Bennett‟s defence was that he had acquired valuable experience and knowledge fighting the 
Japanese and it was important that this information be brought home to meet the continuing 
Japanese threat in the region, particularly the threat to Australia. He was also publicly 
scathing about the fighting ability of the Indian and British troops and their commanders.
488
  
His later career never fully recovered from the stigma attached to his controversial and 
premature escape. He was never again allowed to command combat troops.
489
   
There were too many military POW‟s for Changi jail to house, and in any case the jail 
was scheduled to hold civilian prisoners.  At the eastern end of the island there was the 
Changi military garrison complex with several large barracks, including Selarang Barracks 
which was to be the site for enclosure.  Percival, when he learned of the destination asked to 
speak with the Japanese commander.  In time, a Lt. Col. Sugita arrived, and Governor 
Thomas joined the meeting, together they explained that the area selected could hold no more 
than a few thousand soldiers not the 50.000 proposed. Their appeal was to no avail, Sugita 
informed them that Yamashita himself had selected the Changi area and they were to start 
marching there right away.
490
 As it turned out, the British military commanders were left to 
themselves to allocate accommodation and arrange administration, including catering and 
medical facilities for the injured. Senior officers were put initially into military houses within 
the barrack compounds together with their immediate staff.  Soldiers, though crowded, 
lodged throughout the available barrack rooms and in tents erected within the barracks. In 
fact during this interregnum, before the Japanese themselves got organised, they were content 
to leave the POW‟s to run their own affairs, and in comparison with the later hardships the 
prisoners were to endure, this proved to be a time of relative ease.  
Prisoners, regardless of rank, were nevertheless subject to abuse, ill treatment and 
periods of solitary confinement for what the guards considered disrespect or non-compliance.  
Percival was no exception and underwent solitary confinement for refusing to enforce orders 
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his captors wanted imposed on the POW‟s and he considered unacceptable. Conditions in the 
hot and humid climate deteriorated, and as more prisoners were added to the enclosures, 
accommodation became crowded, there was no electricity, limited food and water and no 
sanitation.
491
 In mid-1942, the most senior officers were moved, in the cramped hold of cargo 
ships, to Formosa and two years later transferred to Manchuria. The state of affairs in both 
these places was little better than Singapore.  Constantly deprived of all the necessities of life, 
it was a harrowing time for all of them.  Also in mid-1942, many of those held in Singapore, 
including civilians, were transferred to build the infamous Burma-Thailand railway. In 
addition, a great number went to camps in Saigon, Taiwan, Korea and Japan to perform 
forced labour under brutal conditions.
492
  
   Civilian prisoners fared little better. Indeed, Governor Thomas having made several 
complaints about the behaviour of the guards and living conditions in Changi goal, and 
refusing to cooperate in propaganda films, which were intended to depict how well he and the 
other civilian prisoners were being cared for, was given fourteen days solitary confinement in 
a tiny concrete cell, the first three days without food.
493
  On another occasion, he was locked 
alone in a separate lavatory for twenty-four hours for saying something that annoyed his 
captors.
494
 The Governor, like the other senior figures, was transferred first to Formosa and 
later to Manchuria.  His wife was imprisoned in Changi Gaol in a separate female area, as 
was the heavily pregnant wife of General Heath. There were 430 women and children 
imprisoned at the start, but by 1943 this had risen to 700.
495
   Prison cells designed for one 
person had between 3 and 5 women and children confined in them.   When Heath‟s wife 
came to give birth, she was taken to a hospital in Singapore city. Afterwards she returned 
with child to her cell in the prison; both survived the war, as did Lady Thomas. 
An early political casualty of the Fall of Singapore was the impact on relations between 
Australian and UK.  Most Australians looked upon the affair as a British disaster in which the 
Australian armed forces, as victims caught up in the debacle and paid a heavy penalty for 
British failure.  Prime Minister Curtin of Australia believed that Churchill betrayed Australia. 
He had appealed to London when cables from his representative in London, Sir Earle Page, 
were indicating that the British Government, at a very late stage, was beginning to recognise 
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the possibility that Singapore might be lost.
496
 Churchill in discussing the implications of 
such likelihood and of the equally ominous success the Japanese were making in Corregidor 
in the Philippines feared for the safety of India, which he felt, could only be ensured by a 
successful defence in Burma. On learning of this speculation, Curtin cabled Churchill saying:  
... he had heard that the Defence Committee had been considering the evacuation of Malaya 
and Singapore. After all the assurances we have been given the evacuation of Singapore 
would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal. Singapore is a central 
fortress in the system of the Empire and local defence. As stated in my telegram, we 
understood that it was to be made impregnable, and in any event it was to be capable of 
holding out for a prolonged period until the arrival of the main fleet.
497
 
 
Though Churchill denies that Australia‟s anguished appeal had any effect on the overall 
strategic plan for South East Asia, because, he believed, their parochial view failed to take 
account of the wider strategic threat. He nevertheless agreed that a reinforcing British 18
th
 
Division would proceed to Singapore and not as intended, to Persia. The Division arrived too 
late, was in any case quite unprepared for jungle warfare and lost a large proportion of its 
equipment when the ship Empress of Asia carrying its stores was sunk by Japanese aircraft as 
it approached Singapore on 5 February.  The loss of Singapore was a pivotal point in Anglo - 
Australian relations.   Australia became more assertive and displayed greater self-interest. 
Curtin‟s scepticism about future British intentions in S.E. Asia was soon reflected in his 
adamant refusal to agree to the C.O.S. London planned redeployment of the Australian 
division from North Africa to Burma. Instead, he insisted they should return to Australia to 
fight in New Guinea.
498
  He claimed the loss of Singapore left his country vulnerable and his 
protection now lay in the hands of General MacArthur of the United States who was then 
doggedly fighting his way in the Philippines. Curtin offered MacArthur the use of the 
Australian forces. In the event, the Japanese threat to Australia did not amount to much.  
MacArthur while acknowledging the additional Australian force deployed in New Guinea, 
did not call upon them for direct employment in his battle plan.  Effectively, from that point, 
Australian contribution to the continuing war in the Far East was circumscribed.
499
  
The Indian National Army. 
Another event, while having little influence on the course of the campaign, is 
nevertheless important. It was the extent of dissatisfaction, which surfaced, among the Indian 
contingent, with British imperial rule. During the retreat, as noted above, as many as 10.000 
Indian officers and soldiers, captured or deserted, were persuaded to switch sides and join the 
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recently formed Indian National Army (INA). This number increased dramatically when a 
further 40,000, after capitulation, joined them.  
The INA, an unofficial armed force, was formed by a group of Indian political 
dissidents belonging to the Indian Independence League (IIL), a militant offshoot of the 
Indian Congress Party. Their objective was to rid India of British rule. As a fighting force 
they proved of little use to the Japanese because of the caveats their leaders imposed on their 
employment, such as, they were not be used to fight against other Indian soldiers.  They were 
however, successfully engaged in anti-British propaganda, intelligence, and sabotage work 
not only in the region but also in India and Ceylon.     
The Japanese Administration.    
The future administration of Malaya and Singapore was to be in the hands of a 
military garrison, supported by Japanese government officials in key administrative 
appointments and qualified civilians in major posts in the private and commercial sector. 
Known as “The Military Administrative Department” (Gunseibu) it was to last for three years 
and eight months.  From the few Japanese documents released in the 1960‟s which survived 
destruction,
500
 and now translated into English by Japanese scholars, it is clear that Japanese 
planning for the administration of conquered territories was at best sketchy, and in many 
instances improvised ad hoc.
501
  It certainly did not match the thoroughness of the planning 
and execution of its military strategy.  It was not, for example, until February 1941, at the 
initiative of the Military General Staff, that a study group formed to consider the 
administration of occupied areas. Their sketchy draft conclusions, incorporated into the 
“Principles for the Administration of the Occupied Southern Regions” gave only general 
objectives such as: 
1. Acquisition of vital materials as rapidly as possible for national defence. 
2. Restoration of law and order. 
3. Self sufficiency for troops in the occupied territories.  
And in the specific case of Malaya: 
1. Because the Straits Settlements of Singapore, Malacca, and Penang were 
important military administrative centres, they were to be controlled by the 
Japanese Army.  
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2. The four Federated states (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang) were to 
be supervised and recognised under their respective Sultans. 
3. The four “Unfederated states” that were former Thai territories – Trengganu. 
Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis – were „expected‟ to revert to Thailand in the 
future.
502
       
It is noticeable that military requirements dominated the planning. There was no visionary 
policy for economic restoration and security.  Directly after the surrender, and before an 
established administration was in place, Yamashita addressed the people: 
We hope that we sweep away the arrogant and unrighteous British elements and share pain 
and rejoicing with all concerned people in a spirit of “give and take”, and also hope to 
promote the social development by establishing the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere on 
which the New Order of justice has to be attained under the “Great Spirit of Cosmocracy” 
giving all content to the respective race and individual according to their talents and 
faculties. 
Nippon armies wish Malayan people to understand the real intention of Nippon and to co-
operate with Nippon Army toward the prompt establishment of the New Order and the Co-
prosperity sphere.      
 
Judged by the behaviour of the military authorities at the time of the statement, and 
their subsequent pre-planned ruthlessness, the substance of his pronouncement was baseless. 
Early arrangements for control and administration called for certain national reorganisation.  
The FMS and the UMS were dissolved and Peninsula Malaya was divided into ten provinces, 
shu. Eight were made up of the nine Malay states, Perlis the smallest state, was absorbed into 
Kedah.  The other two were Penang and Malacca. Singapore was renamed Syonan (shining 
south) and was a separate municipality under a Japanese mayor. Malaya was later renamed 
Malai.   In June 1943 Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo, decided to transfer Kedah/Perlis, 
Kelantan and Trengganu back to Thai control. These states had been acquired by Treaty by 
the British from Thailand in 1909, (see Chapter 2).      
The officer given the responsibility for the military administration (Gunsei) of 
Singapore and Malaya was the 25
th
 Army‟s deputy Chief-of-Staff, Maj. Gen. Manaki 
Takanobu. His assistant and the more dominant figure was Col. Watanabe Wataru.  
Ethnic Cleansing. 
 Very shortly after the capitulation the Japanese authorities in Singapore entered upon, 
in modern terms, ethnic cleansing. They had in place before the final surrender a secret plan 
to exterminate dissident Chinese, who the Japanese believed would be a source of trouble, 
and whom in any case they saw as the traditional enemy, particularly the mainland 
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Chinese.
503
 The programme called sook chin, (purification by elimination) was 
indiscriminately and ruthlessly imposed. In the scale of horror and atrocities perpetrated by 
the Japanese, it has been ranked third, after Nanking and Manila.
504
  Calculations, after the 
war, by the Singapore authorities estimate that 50,000 were massacred.
505
  The Japanese 
scholar, Akashi Yoji, considers this particular incident and a later demand that the Chinese 
should make a „gift‟ to the Japanese government of ¥ 50,000,000 left an indelible stain on the 
Japanese administration in Malaya. He claims that these measures had an irreversible effect 
on Japanese efforts to gain the cooperation of the Chinese community.
506
  It also provided the 
Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Party (MPAJA) with a propaganda windfall, contributing to 
their anti-Japanese solidarity and legitimising their resistance.
507
    
Aftermath. 
The Japanese authorities while starting to impose their system of administration 
needed, initially, the help of experienced British civil servants languishing in Changi gaol.  
The Japanese were obliged to restore former municipal departments, and reinstate local staffs 
and retain about a hundred British civilian internees, to assist until replacements could arrive 
from Japan.  The captives taken from gaol to assist in re-establishing and restoring the 
utilities and infrastructure of Singapore, remained out of prison for days, sometimes weeks, 
overseeing and assisting work.  The replacements from Japan, when they arrived, were 
unavoidably poor quality and ill-educated, because the more able were in the Armed Forces, 
or seconded to appointments that are more important. The result was inefficiency and 
corruption.
508
    The Director of Fisheries, William Birtwistle, with his unrivalled knowledge 
of the fishermen, who provided so much food for the city‟s population, and was ordered by 
the Governor to remain at his post, was kept out of gaol.   In addition, many prisoners, seen 
as convenient and available labour, were quite illegally and in contravention of the Geneva 
Convention, (to which Japan was a signatory) used as labourers in a massive cleaning and 
rehabilitation operation.   
Engaging the help of these members of the Malayan Civil Service gave rise to some 
curious incidents, one of which occurred directly after the surrender. On 17 February, the 
Assistant Director of the Gardens Department of the Straits Settlements, John Corner, 
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approached Thomas whom he knew well.  Corner, a dedicated but friendless botanist, who 
appeared to have a myopic academic concern for the preservation of the many botanical 
records he and others accumulated during their work in Malaya asked Thomas to write a note 
to the Japanese authorities. He pleaded that he should not be imprisoned but allowed to 
continue his research and compilation of extensive records and oversee the preservation of 
the „scientific treasure houses of knowledge.‟  In the confusion and rush of the moment 
Thomas scribbled in pencil a note, we are told by Corner, in line with his appeal. The note 
which did not survive the war, eventually ended up with the Japanese Professor Tanakadate, 
an official assigned to be in charge of scientific affairs.
509
 The Japanese agreed to the 
arrangement and Corner subsequently spent the entire period of occupation in comfort and 
gainfully employed and even at times had use of an official car to move freely around both 
Malaya and Singapore.  His behaviour was branded by most as collaboration. Consumed by 
his own myopic naturalist world he failed to recognise the implications of his fraternisation 
and the insignificance of botanical records, precious though they were, compared with the 
scale of death and destruction in South East Asia.   Certainly, his comfortable lifestyle was in 
stark contrast to those incarcerated in Changi jail. In his book, published in 1981,
510
 
describing this period (mainly justifying his co-operation with the Japanese), he unashamedly 
recorded his „good fortune‟ and admiration for the Japanese he worked with. At one point, at 
the end of 1942, Tanakadate decided to give a public lecture in English about Japanese 
culture, and asked Corner to draft a speech for him, and in it he wrote: -  
The present war started with self-sacrifice on the part of some young Nippon-zin. And I refer 
to the gallant attack by our submarines on Pearl Harbour where those young men courageously 
sacrificed their lives at the altar of national necessity.
511
   
 
If Corner believed this he was either unaware of the unprovoked attack of noted 
„infamy‟, or was less troubled with exactitude and more concerned to gratify his captors. In 
another deed, which may be generously described as misguided loyalty, Corner, on hearing of 
the imminent trial of Yamashita in Manila at the end of the war, wrote to the military court. 
He pleaded for Yamashita‟s life on the grounds that he had only performed his duty „…in all 
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fairness he only carried out the instructions of General Tojo and had conserved scientific and 
historical institutes in Singapore and Malaya.‟512  
The Natural Resources. 
The core of the Malayan economy, rubber and tin, now isolated from their overseas 
markets, and thus the major source of national income disappeared almost overnight.  Earlier, 
Japan had in any case decided that the production of rubber and tin in Malaya exceeded the 
demands of the domestic industries in Japan and that the production of these commodities 
was to be reduced, (in the 1930s, Malaya produced over half of the world‟s rubber and about 
a third of the world‟s tin). However, anticipating a great demand for these products in the 
post-war world, the production systems were to be preserved in readiness to meet the need of 
not only the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but also of global demand.
513
 In the 
meantime, estates and mines either reduced or stopped operations altogether. In turn, this 
meant that not only were labourers out of work but all the associated industries, which 
serviced the production of these resources, also suffered. It was not long before people, out of 
work, were reduced to poverty and living on the bread line. The Japanese labour inspector for 
Kelantan was compelled to write to the authorities in Singapore:  
A major portion of the unemployed labourers, Indians and Chinese, are almost starving…..and 
some of these people have slowly drifted into towns and are maintaining themselves by 
begging on the streets and diseases are taking a heavy toll on them due to the absence of 
medical aid.
514
     
 
Additionally, Malaya had never been self-sufficient in rice production, importing 
almost 60 per cent annually, and now her neighbours who previously provided this staple 
product, were themselves caught up in war and unable to produce and export rice. Moreover, 
merchant shipping carrying these cargos were susceptible to, and suffered, attack by Allied 
submarines.   
With a declining food situation, the general health of the people deteriorated. Simple 
basic foods became unavailable or prohibitively expensive on the black market.  Children 
particularly, suffered through lack of vitamins and previously contained diseases, such as 
beriberi, reappeared and took a heavy toll. Medical stocks soon ran down and as there was 
little chance of replenishment, even common diseases and simple illnesses became difficult to 
treat.  Malaria reappeared as breeding grounds of the Aedes mosquito were left untreated 
because the oil-based liquid remedy (crude oil and kerosene) could no longer be produced. 
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The demand for labour rose in 1943 when the Japanese, suffering from increasingly 
successful allied attacks on merchant shipping, decided the solution to the transport of 
essential goods, especially military necessities, was by rail. Several major rail projects were 
initiated – a Trans Sumatran railway, a line across the Kra Isthmus and the notorious 
Thailand-Burma railway – they also needed labour for an airfield to be constructed in Borneo 
as well as a number of local projects. Wages were poor and working conditions appalling. At 
many sites, the labourers themselves, outside official working hours, had to build their own 
accommodation and dig fresh water wells. „On one project that employed 2,500 labourers in 
1942 and 1943 to build a landing ground at Port Swettenham [Malaya] the state Medical 
Department reported that three to four workers died of malaria or malnutrition each day.‟515  
The conditions and death of many of  the 62,000 European POWs sent to work on the 
Thailand – Burma railway is well documented (where 12,399 died),  but rarely is the tale of 
suffering and death of the 182,496 Malayan and Burmese and other Asians sent to work on 
this same railway mentioned. Of this number, the Japanese officially acknowledge the death 
of 42,214 but it is known that 92,220 labourers are unaccounted for and the explanation 
offered is that they deserted to escape the endemic cholera epidemic.  As they were never 
again seen, and the chances of survival in the jungle in their emaciated condition were 
negligible, it is safe to assume they also perished.  Other allied estimates put the Asian 
workforce as high as 269,948 and the number of deaths as 72,996; but it is accepted that the 
figures are unreliable, particularly for Burma.
516
    
 
Renaissance. 
Percival and Thomas survived their imprisonment and both in time returned safely 
home.  While in various internment camps, Percival began writing an account of his part in 
the catastrophe.  He knew that if he returned to England an official dispatch would be 
required from him and these notes written on a variety of scraps of paper were his aide 
memoire. However, on his final and hurried move from a camp in Moksak, Formosa 
[Taiwan] to Manchuria he had to destroy the notes to avoid them being discovered in the 
inevitable pre-move search. As he recalled, „The work of eight months was burned in eight 
seconds.‟517   The war ended while he was in the Manchurian camp. In a generous gesture, 
savouring of schadenfreude, General MacArthur arranged for Percival to be flown first to 
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Tokyo, to attend the Japanese surrender ceremony on the battleship Missouri and then 
afterwards to Manila, to witness his nemesis Yamashita sign the surrender there. He recalled, 
 As Yamashita entered the room I saw one eyebrow lifted and a look of surprise cross his 
face – but only for a moment. His face quickly resumed that sphinx-like mask common to 
all Japanese, and he showed no further interest.‟518  
 
In fact, Yamashita later confided, that he saw Percival‟s presence as an act of humiliation and 
revenge. So unbearable was the humiliation that he considered then to commit suicide.
519
  
Thomas also started compiling notes, and at one stage while in the same camp as 
Brigadier Ivan Simson, in Formosa, showed his written version of the final civilian 
evacuation arrangements to Simson.  It was an event which clearly troubled him, and was 
sure it would be the source of heated recrimination.  His recollection and description of the 
last hurried mass departures of the 13
 
February from Singapore was quite different from those 
of Simson. In particular, he strongly denied the claim by Simson that he had agreed that 
Bisseker be allowed to leave along with Nunn, the Head of the P.W.D.  Simson, in 1970, in 
his book „Singapore: Too Little Too Late‟ returned to this issue and stuck firmly to his 
conviction that while it was he, who authorised the evacuation of Bisseker and Nunn, he did 
so only after clearing it with Thomas.  Throughout the remainder of his life, Thomas 
restlessly and relentlessly sought to explain and defend his government‟s position before and 
during the campaign. When given a preview of the draft military dispatches, he was incensed 
at not being able to refute the disparaging remarks made in them. His reply to Gen. Kirby, 
after seeing the draft of the Official History, stretched to fifty A4 pages of closely argued 
justification and clarifications.   He wrote copious comments on every perceived slight and 
added his own version of events entitled „What Malaya Did‟520  He examined scrupulously, 
every book, document, official or otherwise and obscure works, written about the Malayan 
Campaign. He digested every comment made about the performance of the civil government, 
and tenaciously defended the civil position in pages of painstaking script, often in his own 
hand.  In 1954, he wrote another lengthy document „Malaya‟s War Effort‟ which he asked the 
Colonial Office to publish. They refused on the grounds it would prolong the painful dispute, 
and would in any case only serve to confirm in many people‟s minds the continuing wide 
differences between the military and the civilians.    
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Yamashita was hailed a national hero in Japan following his successful capture of 
Malaya and Singapore.  Not long afterwards however, he caused the displeasure of the Prime 
Minister, General Tojo. While addressing the community leaders in Singapore, on the 
Emperor‟s birthday, he carelessly informed them that they had now become citizens of 
Imperial Japan.  It brought a swift rebuke from Tokyo enlightening him that he could not 
make political statements of this nature and that only the Imperial authorities in Tokyo could 
take such decisions. On 12 July, he left Singapore for Manchukuo and had the indignity of 
being ordered to go directly there without the customary honour of an audience with the 
Emperor in Tokyo, an etiquette reserved for successful commanders to present their 
„memorials.‟521   He remained in Manchukuo until October 1944, and then sent to the 
Philippines to take command of the Fourteenth Army in the last stages of the hopeless 
defensive war against MacArthur. After Japan surrendered, Yamashita was indicted as a war 
criminal on charges of serious negligence of the rules of war and allowing his troops to 
commit atrocities. Found guilty, he was hanged.         
           The Imperial Japanese authorities‟ intentions for the future of Malaya did not include 
independence, but instead, that the country should become a permanent colony of Japan, a 
decision reaffirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1945.
522
 This decision was 
a purely pragmatic one, lacking any visionary prediction for the future. The Japanese needed 
the natural resources available in Malaya and were determined that their enemies, and the 
West in general, should not have access to them. And while they controlled the country they 
controlled its resources.  This policy ignored their assertion of seeking a Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere; and as far as Malaya was concerned, it simply replaced one master 
with another.  The Military Administration therefore, devoid of an incentive, showed little 
sense of purpose apart from supporting the war effort. During the period of Japanese rule, 
even these limited objectives were not met; there was little in any case, the people of Malaya 
could do to assist the war effort, and the Japanese were unable to overcome the shortages of 
food, clothing, and other necessities. 
Japan did not manage to make its colonies serve its economic needs.  A brief phase of 
constructive imperialism in 1942 soon gave way to the politics of scarcity and plunder.  
Japan‟s military ascendancy was short lived, and the resurgence of Allied naval power 
after the battle of Midway in mid 1942 meant that strategic goods from South East Asia 
could not be shipped back to Japan in any meaningful quantity.  The great rubber estates 
of Malaya became virtual wastelands in which the remaining labourers scraped a 
subsistence by growing food on roughly cleared ground.
523
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 With the departure of the Europeans, the economy of Syonan became virtually a Chinese 
one.
524
 The Japanese therefore faced the quandary of relying economically on the Chinese but 
not trusting them. The solution they concluded was to allow the Chinese to retain their 
economic position but have all business activity under Japanese domination and force the 
Chinese businessmen to co-operate with the Gunsei or force them politically to identify with 
the Wang Ching Wei faction.
525
   
 The majority of Chinese were inherently anti-Japanese, an aversion which surfaced in 
1931 with the infamous Manchurian incident; a staged pretext Japan used for invading 
Manchuria, and  further aggravated by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war of 1937.   As 
recounted by Lee Ting Hui the Japanese „…crude Chinese policy was a failure. Collaborators 
there were; but on the whole „outwardly there was compliance…inwardly there was an ever 
growing hatred,‟  The anti-Japanese movement at the end of the occupation was stronger than 
ever.‟526  
No Japanese figure of stature emerges to promote ruling fairly, firmly and efficiently, 
to take advantage of the country‟s talent and natural resources. I can find no reference to any 
Japanese assessment of how to govern successfully the people of Malaya and Singapore; or 
of how to gain their respect and possibly their loyalty.  The Japanese, throughout their 
history, had no experience of ruling a foreign country benevolently.  Their brutal repression 
and ceaseless demands aggravated a highly precarious situation and all the descriptions about 
their period of occupation leaves a distinct impression of an insecure conqueror, which saw 
its occupation as a time of temporary supremacy.  
From the British Government‟s point of view the Japanese invasion and occupation, 
though of relatively short duration, produced great changes throughout the whole of South 
East Asia.
527
  While it is undoubtedly true that the peoples of Malaya were genuinely glad to 
see the Japanese depart and the British return, conditions and relations between the colonial 
power and the Malayan people were never to be the same.
528
 There were many now 
determined that the return of the British should be of short duration only. A genuine Malayan 
nationalism gave rise to an independence movement, which reached its culmination on 
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Merdeka (Freedom) Day, 31 August 1957.  In 1946, the Straits Settlements ceased to exist, 
Singapore became a separate Colony, and by 1959, it was a separate State with a large 
measure of self-government. Penang and Malacca merged with the nine Malay States. In 
1946, the British attempted to restore their pre-war constitutional powers in the Peninsula 
through a short-lived Malayan Union, which was seen as a clumsy attempt to break away 
from the long tradition of indirect rule and bring the Unfederated Malay States under more 
direct rule. The Malays saw this as a threat to their survival as the dominant community and 
reacted in an uncharacteristically aggressive manner and indirectly it boosted Malay 
nationalism. The Federation of Malaya, an agreement that included special guarantees of the 
rights for Malays, including the position of sultans, and the establishment of a colonial 
government, soon replaced the Malayan Union, in 1948.
529
  These developments 
marginalised the Malayan Communist Party which reacted by embarking upon guerrilla 
insurgency, later described as an „emergency.‟ The „Emergency‟ lasted twelve years.  
In an interesting footnote to history, HM High Commissioner to Singapore, twenty-
eight years after the event wrote in his valedictory despatch.  
…no Singaporean has ever mentioned February 1942 to me in criticism or reproach. 
[however] I am reminded of the shame … not only an appalling military disaster but the 
most shameful disgrace in Britain‟s imperial history.  …One may not regret the passing of 
empire but no loyal British subject living in Singapore can forget that it was here that the 
hollowness of the imperial ethos was so cruelly and so shamefully exposed. And it does not 
relieve me to recall that the military pomp and ostentation – not to say arrogance – with 
which we reoccupied Singapore was a sham and a fraud, for we reoccupied it not by our 
own efforts, but by an American atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima…. 530       
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
529
 Winstedt. Malaya and its History .pp 140-2. 
530
 Valedictory Despatch, Sir Arthur De La Mare, HM High Commissioner to Singapore, Oct 1972. Quoted in 
Parris, Matthew, & Bryson, A. Parting Shots. Penguin Books, London, 2011.   
  
193 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
The seeds of failure in British civil/military cooperation, in this pivotal campaign, are 
identified in the early inability of the leading figures to work together in pursuit of a common 
objective. The disunity, I maintain, originated in London with the Colonial Office and the 
War Office failing, first, to agree early enough that Japanese behaviour in the Far East posed 
a serious threat to British interests and then later, when it became obvious, to jointly instruct 
the civil/military authorities what to do. Instead, we had the Colonial Office independently 
telling the Governor to focus his attention on the production of important war materials and 
the War Office ordering the military to protect the Naval Base on Singapore Island.  This 
conflict of concern inexorably led each side to see solutions to the danger from different 
parochial points of view.  The glaring solution, acknowledged too late, was the insertion of an 
overall Supremo, a person with total authority to impose directives on all parties.  It was an 
important lesson later used to valuable effect in other places such as Ceylon (Sri Lanka). 
However, this disastrous campaign was not lost on poor civil/military relations alone; other 
overarching factors determined the outcome before the war even began.     
An impoverished and debilitated Imperial Power was no longer in a position to meet 
the widespread demands, particularly military demands, of its far-flung Empire. Indeed the 
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signs of overstretch were obvious even before then, but the huge burden of the Great War 
accentuated this failing.  A dispassionate examination of its responsibilities, at that point, 
weighed against the resources needed to manage and protect the Empire‟s assets would have 
exposed the near impossibility of coping with simultaneous international unrest.  The human 
race had changed as never before, and the British Empire, the largest in the history of the 
world, far outstripped its ability to safeguard its territories [it was] „A global Empire without 
the resources to match its commitments.‟531 One manifestation of this weakness was later 
exposed by Britain‟s inability to provide the resources; armed forces, armaments and 
equipment, for an endangered Singapore to guard itself against the looming threat.  The very 
decision to build a naval base in Singapore was itself recognition that Britain simply could 
not sustain a two ocean navy. The base built in the Far East was big enough to harbour the 
entire British fleet should it need to rush there to meet a threat to its Possessions and 
Dominions.  
Governing this important and exposed possession was an administration little changed 
in substance and procedure from Victorian colonial days.  The untidy, but workable, 
administration looking after the affairs of the Straits Settlements and the states of Malaya was 
the result of governmental evolution over a period of one hundred and fifty years.  The 
administration had successfully overseen the development and growth of the country‟s 
natural resources, its economy, the infrastructure and the well-being of the people. It was a 
system, which had evolved piecemeal as British authority extended throughout the 
Peninsular. Its success was evident to the extent that Malaya became a leading world 
producer of rubber and tin and the people enjoyed the benefits of a thriving economy, which 
in turn enhanced their quality of life. Competent, dedicated and loyal staff, mainly officers 
from the prestigious Malayan Civil Service, staffed it.  However, it was not a service that had 
ever faced international hostilities, in any form, and therefore had no comprehension of the 
scale and danger an invasion would bring, nor the planning and preparations entailed to meet 
such a calamity.  
The undisturbed years of tranquillity and peaceful development, bred a narrow 
parochial outlook towards growing international unrest. Moreover, the civil authorities 
seriously believed the regions problems would not reach their quiet corner of Southeast Asia.  
This gave rise to a laisser-faire attitude and encouraged the conviction that danger was 
                                                 
531
 Callahan.  Worst Disaster. p.5. 
  
195 
 
remote perhaps even non-existent.  This viewpoint largely influenced the administration‟s 
early relations with the military authorities.  
My research has led me to classify this civil/military relationship into three phases, 
relative to the fall of Singapore in 1942.  The first period was before war broke out in Europe 
when there was marked resentment at the growing military presence in the area and the 
attendant material demands and inconvenience this imposed.  The second followed the 
outbreak of the Nazi war in 1939 when either side had different objectives. The civil 
authorities strongly charged by the Colonial Office to increase production of rubber and tin: a 
demand, which called for additional and dedicated work force. Meanwhile, the military were 
told there was no immediate solution to their shortage of materiel, nor were there any 
reinforcements and they had to make do with local resources and local manpower. It led to a 
serious clash and was an issue of such import it should have been resolved in London.  I can 
find no record of the Colonial Office and the War Office discussing this critical conflict of 
priorities.  
The third phase came in 1941 when a number of very senior personnel changes took 
place. The Secretary for Defence was removed, a Minister Resident was added to the 
hierarchy and the C-in-C Far East was under notice to be replaced. Moreover, at the last 
minute, even this decision was changed when the selected replacement, Lieutenant General 
Bernard Paget, was withdrawn on Churchill‟s orders and substituted by Lieutenant General 
Sir Henry Pownall.  These striking changes amid the gathering storm soured relations across 
the senior echelons of both civil and military services leading to apathetic cooperation, 
resentment and disagreement. Throughout this time, there was never a period of harmonious, 
constructive and united effort.  
Added to the command disunity was the plethora of branches of the Home 
Government e.g. the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Ministry of Information and the 
intelligence services. „Each of these many organisations corresponded separately with their 
own headquarters in Britain. As a result of these complications in the administrative machine 
there was, at all levels, too often uncertainty and delay in reaching decisions.‟532 In Hong 
Kong, which suffered the same fate as Singapore, there was a simpler administrative machine 
and a less complicated hierarchy among the fighting services and in consequence, there was 
no evidence of discord in the direction of the Colony‟s defence. The solution, in Singapore, 
as noted above, was obvious – an overall Supremo, but the authority to install such an officer 
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came too late. Other more pressing matters at this time claimed Whitehall‟s attention.  
Difficulties of a comparable order were identified in the Middle East and West Africa. Partly 
to meet them a Minister of State was appointed to the Middle East and a Minister Resident to 
West Africa. The lesson, as noted, was introduced successfully in Ceylon (Sri Lanka).
533
         
The raison d'être for all the military/civil endeavour was the defence of the Naval 
Base in Singapore. It was also the focus of ever changing tactical plans.  Before the outbreak 
of war with Nazi Germany it was assumed that a sizeable British naval force would assemble 
in Singapore either as a deterrent against any possible aggressor or from there sail forth to 
battle the antagonist.  The safety of this vital base was therefore paramount to the protection 
of Britain‟s Far East assets. The early assumption was that an attack on the base could only 
be come from the sea and the fortifications were designed to meet such a threat. At the same 
time though, the RAF could clearly make an important contribution with the development of 
the torpedo bomber and thus the air force became an integral part of the defence equation.  
However, as weaponry advanced and the Malayan hinterland opened up to allow easier 
movement, so the plan for defence had to change.  The changes all pointed to a need for more 
aircraft, warships and soldiers, none of which were immediately available, and they were 
warned, the likelihood of them becoming available later, was slim.  In the event no additional 
aircraft came, a token and vulnerable naval force arrived to be destroyed in the opening 
moves of the campaign, and the meagre army units were late, inadequate, untrained and 
adolescent. This failure to provide the tools to save the island was a direct consequence of an 
Empire too big to manage.  The finger of accusation has been pointed at Churchill; not for 
ignoring the pleas for help from Singapore, but for giving others, he considered more 
deserving, the limited tools at his disposal.  
The loss of Singapore, preceded by the surrender of Hong Kong and the hasty retreat 
from Burma cast a harsh unflattering light on British power. These calamitous failures were 
the catalyst that heralded the beginning of the end of the British Empire. The fragility of 
British authority was now exposed.  „What it led to was the demise of Britain as a world 
power, and her reduction to an American satellite.‟534  In India, it gave a new impetus to the 
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nationalist rumblings, which already existed before the war. An Indian officer of the Baluch 
Regiment recorded his reaction to the news from Singapore:  
Firstly, it had a tremendous effect on our people – we felt the shame that they had surrendered. 
Secondly, the fact of the tremendous defeat inflicted on the – till then omnipotent – British had 
an underlay of feeling that the white races weren‟t all that superior…The news had tremendous 
effect on those Indian soldiers who had always felt that the British were supermen.
535
   
 
 The Governor of the Crown Colony and High Commissioner to the Malay states 
before and during the Japanese invasion was Sir Shenton Thomas. He has been portrayed by 
nearly every historian and scholar I have studied as, at best, incompetent, and less kindly, as 
obstructionist.  My conclusion is that he was neither of these and his biographer, Brian 
Montgomery, in his book “Shenton of Singapore” while treating his subject with perhaps 
undue sensitivity, got closest to the truth when defining him as: -  
not a great man….but he was an admirable man, determined to do his best for the people 
under his charge, completely dedicated to the public service, not a prig in anyway, but a 
strong and upright character with a deep sense of duty….not devious in any way.536   
 
The progression of his Colonial education and previous Africa only experience meant that 
Thomas knew very little about the regular armed forces or military matters in general.  As a 
member of the Colonial Service, not the Malayan Civil Service, he was seen in Malaya as „… 
something of an interloper by what was, quite literally, the freemasonry of the Malayan Civil 
Service establishment.‟537 His failure to learn the Malay language was a further irritant to 
those who worked closely with him,  
…how could a Governor who knew not a word of the local language impress his views on 
people?  You can‟t really be impressive if you have to pause at the end of every sentence while 
your words are translated by a very bored interpreter (who probably hasn‟t your faith in any 
case) paraphrase your appeal.
538
  
 
He appears however, not to have noticed these hurdles, certainly none of his diary entries or 
later writings mention them. He either was oblivious to them or did not consider such 
hindrances worthy of mention. The result, however, was that in times of tension he appeared 
to lack the confidence to state his own unequivocal views and inclined to the person making 
the more forceful case, believing they had the experience and background for doing so.  He 
would later confess in his diary important but publicly undeclared opinions, vide the Penang 
civilian evacuation calamity (Chapter 4).  Had he the courage to declare in open forum these 
suppressed judgments, we may guess, that his standing and image, if nothing else, would 
have risen significantly.   
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 The momentous world events preceding and portending the fall of Singapore needed 
a leader of vision and herculean demeanour, Thomas was none of these. He was a competent 
colonial civil servant; nowhere was he even described as a „good‟ one, and thus was quite the 
wrong person to face the mammoth task of arousing and preparing a nation for war. Even if 
the forthcoming drama could have been foreseen, the London authorities were, in any case, in 
no position to replace him.  His character, personality and myopic view of his administrative 
responsibilities, made him the wrong person in the wrong place, at the wrong time. In early 
1942, after the fall of Singapore, Lord Cranborne –Thomas‟s chief at the Colonial Office – 
wrote:    
From the Governor downwards they seem to have been incapable of dealing with an abnormal 
situation. This, more than any inherent rigidity in the system, seems to be the real cause for 
criticism. Clearly the Governor should have been replaced earlier.
539
   
 
  Nor did Thomas have around him staff of conspicuous ability with perhaps the 
exception of Hugh Fraser, the Federal Secretary, who resided in Kuala Lumpur until called to 
Singapore to replace Stanley Jones, the Colonial Secretary, sacked at the behest of Duff 
Cooper.  A senior member of his staff, who played a controversial role in the mounting 
unhappy relations between the civil and the military administrations, was C.A. Vlieland, a 
man described by many as clever but abrasive, arrogant and delusionary.  In 1938, Thomas 
appointed him to the post of Defence Secretary. Vlieland was dismissive of the military and 
their tactical planning, believing he knew better. He wrote, without consulting anyone, a 
prescient forecast of likely Japanese tactics in their fight for Singapore.
540
   
Thomas chaired the Defence Committee, of which Vlieland was secretary, and clearly 
had high regard for him: high enough to authorise Vlieland not to accept any interference 
from the acting Governor and others on the committee while he, in 1940, was on leave. This 
instruction Vlieland saw as licence to feed his authoritarianism, vide his arbitrary selection of 
sites in north Malaya for storage of rice reserves.
541
 Not only was this instruction illustrative 
of Thomas‟s limited grasp of the importance of defence affairs, but also a reflection of his 
poor judgement of the professional contribution other members had to offer. As Raymond 
Callahan points out in his seminal study The Worst Disaster, „Nothing in Sir Shenton‟s 
previous experience had prepared him to preside over such a committee.‟542  Leaving 
Vlieland in charge during his lengthy absence, and at a time of menacing developments, 
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according to one of his principal subordinates, made him appear more complacent about the 
situation than he in fact was.
543
 On his return from leave Thomas was required to seek 
Vlieland‟s resignation, so strong was the antagonism against the latter.   It is my contention 
that Thomas was not so much complacent as he was a sceptic. In spite of all the mounting 
evidence, he simply did not believe, or more accurately did not want to believe, that the 
Japanese would invade Malaya. When they did, he seemed unconcerned. Learning of their 
initial landings, as we have heard,  he is reputed to have said to Percival “well I expect you‟ll 
shove them off again.”544   
Returning to Singapore at the end of 1940, he was dismissive of the need to construct 
air-raid shelters drawing a comparison with the hardihood of the people in wartime Kent, 
where he had spent his leave.  His reply, at his first Legislative Council Meeting on return, to 
a question about shelters, conveys a picture of disdain for such measures or worse, facetious 
rejection. Whether he intended this standpoint as a show of confidence and consciously made 
an effort to portray a picture of composure and aplomb, or genuinely considered the 
possibility of war so remote, as to be worth only a minimum of his time and effort is an 
unanswered question.  From my research, I have formed the image of a man of limited 
imagination who, in spite of his honorific title, Commander-in-Chief, was very reluctant to 
address military matters. In any case, it was a subject, he knew little about and would have 
preferred not to confront.  He had, until this unwelcome disruption, been running the affairs 
of his province successfully, overseeing the expansion of its manufacturing and industrial 
base and leading Malaya to become the world‟s major producer of tin and rubber.  He had 
passed retirement age and after seven years in Singapore, following a comfortable well 
ordered routine was almost oblivious to the enormity of the danger ahead.   
He seems to have been initially opposed to any defence build-up in Malaya, was ill-disposed 
to upsetting his bureaucratic routine which war preparations required and ill-prepared for the 
hard decisions which war itself brought….Shenton Thomas was not the man for the tempest 
that broke on all their heads. He and his officials seemed wedded to the pace and routine of 
peace.  Even Percival, who seldom offered public criticism of his superiors, was forced to 
admit….that Thomas‟s seven years in Singapore were “a long time in that trying climate.”545         
              
While the evidence exposing Thomas‟s ineffectual and half-hearted preparations for 
the onslaught and his indecisive management of civil affairs during the campaign is 
conclusive, it also reflects badly on the military.  There was no strong, determined military 
leader with foresight or imagination to describe to the civil authorities the mayhem and 
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destruction which could be expected.  Neither the civil population nor the government had 
any experience or understanding of war and its consequences; they needed educating and 
rudely awakening to the reality of the situation. In a letter Thomas received after the war 
from Wavell, then Field Marshal, Wavell said, rather pedantically, 
It was the duty of the chief military authorities in the Far Eastern Command to accentuate or 
accelerate the civilian effort if it did not meet adequately the possibilities attendant on a 
Japanese landing.
546
 
 
In spite of Thomas‟s blinkered desire to meet the instructions of his colonial authorities for 
more tin and rubber, which he believed required calm and reassurance, he more than anyone 
needed to be ruthlessly and relentlessly harassed, together with his administration, into 
confronting the reality of the circumstances. In mitigation, it should be remembered that 
during his leave in 1940 he found time to attend a meeting in London of the Sub-Committee 
of the Joint Planning Committee, during which he made a spirited defence of his 
Memorandum. This he had submitted in February, asking that the air force in Singapore be 
reinforced to compensate for the missing fleet.  A formal reply came, not from this 
committee, but from the Overseas Defence Committee, dominated by Foreign Office 
officials, telling him there were no forces to spare for areas not under immediate threat and 
that Malaya‟s prime duty was to produce as much rubber and tin as possible.547   
 Later in the year, when Thomas returned from leave, he faced the question of putting 
the local forces on a higher state of alert and increasing their hours of training. As Brooke-
Popham noted in his post-war despatch: - 
The view held in the Colonial Office was that rubber and tin was of greater importance than 
the training of local forces; for instance a telegram dated 31 December 1940 to the Governor, 
states “The ultimate criterion for exemption [from training] should not be what the GOC 
considers practicable, but what you consider essential to maintain the necessary production and 
efficient labour management.” 548    
 
Clearly Thomas faced two conflicting demands, that from his masters in the Colonial 
Office and the other from the Military Commanders in Singapore.  He does not appear to have 
attempted to negotiate compromise arrangements. The military demands were concerned with 
work force issues, manual labour and the release of volunteer forces for training.  Making the 
case for the military was the new C-in-C, Brooke-Popham; an elderly person passed his 
prime, and not a man of dynamic energy and decisiveness, which the circumstances clearly 
needed.  A study of the debates relating to these matters, as recorded in the minutes of the war 
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committee meetings, convey no sense of urgency or passion; all the senior figures seemed 
more concerned with simply making their point than forcing the issue to an unpopular 
conclusion.  It was this lack of rigorous and concerted effort for agreement between the 
administration and the military, which forced the British Government to send a Minister, Duff 
Cooper, to Singapore.   
In the event, most historians agree, that the contribution made by Duff Cooper was at 
best minimal, at worst damaging.
549
  After only three months in post, during which period he 
was away from Singapore for some weeks travelling extensively around his „parish‟ of South 
East Asia, Duff Cooper wrote a formal damning indictment of Thomas‟s administration.  He 
also corresponded privately with Churchill and though some of his observations about the 
poor relations between military and civilians were perceptive, his judgement on Malayan 
administrative affairs showed little understanding of the complicated governance in place.
550
 
He also broadcast an embarrassing statement about the rescue of all the civilians from Penang 
during the Japanese aerial attack on the island, when in fact the only civilians rescued were 
Europeans. The insensitive broadcast highlighted his ignorance of the complexities of 
Malayan society. The selective evacuation in Penang was to cast a shameful shadow on the 
behaviour of the administration.  
His appointment to Minister Resident in the Far East was a convenient means of 
finding Duff Cooper what appeared gainful employment while removing his intrusive 
presence from the London scene. He had failed as Minister of Information in Churchill‟s 
wartime cabinet and moved to the sinecure of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.  In his 
book „Old Men Forget‟, he openly represents himself as a licentious and frustrated figure. On 
arriving back in London, having left Singapore at the height of the trouble, his first remark on 
hearing that the Island had surrendered was not one of despondency or statesmanlike 
reflection on the impact of the loss, but rather what bearing it would have on his career.  
In politics it is damaging to be associated, however distantly, with failure. Singapore 
signified failure, and I had been out on a special mission to Singapore. The surrender 
which took place there coincided with my return.  The most malevolent of critics, knowing 
the facts, could not with justice have accused me of any responsibility for what happened. 
It was primarily a naval and military disaster and I had no connection whatever with naval 
or military affairs.
551
   
 
On 10 December 1941, Duff Cooper took over the Chairmanship of the War Council in 
Singapore, the meetings, from this point on, were almost entirely concerned with the progress 
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of the Japanese invasion, and the military tactics deployed to meet it.  And, notably,  
following the early British reverses at the hands of the Japanese, suggested at one of these 
meetings (13 December) that he considered the situation so serious he proposed a radical 
change of strategy to the Military Commanders.
552
  This is not, „having no connection with 
military affairs.‟  He was dismissive of nearly everyone and everything in Malaya, he did not 
get on with either Brooke-Popham or Thomas, had a low regard for Percival and was 
instrumental in the dismissal of the Colonial Secretary.  In early January, he cabled the 
Colonial Office that, in his opinion, the Malayan Civil Service had failed lamentably in 
making adequate preparations for war.  This judgement was made after nearly five weeks of 
war; none of his pre-war reports made mention of any inadequacies.
553
   
Duff Cooper‟s contribution in Singapore to government administration and promoting 
closer relations between the civil and military authorities was negligible.  Indeed a number of 
analysts go so far as to suggest that his intervention was counterproductive, he added yet 
another level to an already over-heavy command structure, „was a failed politician, exiled to 
Singapore with great responsibilities of the vaguest kind, no precise terms of reference and no 
authority.‟554  Shenton Thomas considered his behaviour was nothing more than an attempt to 
ingratiate himself with Churchill by magnifying the responsibilities entrusted to him.
555
   His 
brief tenure left no memorable legacy with the exception that he recognised the fundamental 
need for a Supreme Commander with total authority over all affairs, both civil and military.     
Directly after his release from prison at the end of the war Thomas launched into a 
defence of his personal role and that of his administration before and during the war.  Public 
accusations of incompetence had been levelled at both the civil and military authorities for the 
gross mismanagement of the whole affair.  The accusations began before the surrender and 
continued unabated until well after the war.  Churchill had rejected the call for an Inquiry on 
the grounds that it was inappropriate while the nation‟s energies were consumed with a major 
war; and in any case, he claimed, the key personalities could not be spared from their vital 
tasks.
556
  In Parliament, he admitted: - 
I will, however, say this: Singapore was, of course, a naval base rather than a fortress.  It 
depended upon command of the sea, which again depends upon command of the air.  Its 
permanent fortifications and batteries were constructed from a naval point of view.  The 
various defence lines which had been constructed in Johore were not successfully held.  The 
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field works constructed upon the island itself to defend the fortress were not upon a sufficiently 
large scale.
557
   
 
Thomas set about putting the record straight and spent the rest of his life in this 
unrewarded mission. He wrote three major works, „What Malaya Did‟, „Malaya‟s War Effort‟ 
and a lengthy „Comment on the draft History of the War against Japan.‟558  None of these 
papers was formally published. He argued passionately that the role played by the Singapore 
Government was distorted to accommodate the military failings and went to great trouble to 
retrieve retrospective records supporting his assertion that he fulfilled his obligations, both to 
the Colonial Office, and within the restrictions this imposed on him, met the demands of the 
military. He does not however say that many of his responses were tardy and only because of 
persistent demands, by not only the military, but also the civilian population when the 
situation was already serious.     
His civil servants in up-country Malaya had no clear instructions about what to do as 
the Japanese approached.  In nearly every case, senior government officials had to make up 
their own minds whether to remain at their posts or abandon their responsibilities.  It has been 
said that it was the inherent capability of the British to improvise that resulted in many of the 
problems arising from the invasion being solved locally. District Commissioners, officers of 
the PWD, the FMS Railways and the Post and Telegraph services kept the civil administration 
in being in the various States under circumstances of the greatest difficulty.
559
 In a report after 
the war, the British Government decided to make sure that in future, civil servants were quite 
clear about their responsibility in such events: 
European officers of the civil government in areas of military operations should remain at 
their posts as long as they can serve a useful purpose and assist the military; but that, if and 
when they can no longer render such service and enemy occupation of their districts is 
imminent, they should (after completing the duties allotted to them) withdraw by arrangement 
with the military commander…560     
 
There was total confusion about the policy of evacuation and the management of 
refugees. Passive defence measures on the other hand, after initial muddle, responded well to 
the call. However, in essence, Thomas did not give clear, strong leadership, to either the 
populace or his Government.  He had the misguided belief that military setbacks and bad 
news generally should not be made public. Inevitably, this led to a serious breakdown of trust 
between the people and the authorities.   
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In April 1942, the editor of the Straits Times, G.W. Seabridge, compiled a secret 
report for the War Cabinet in London. He had been editor of this newspaper since 1928 until 
his escape to Batavia on 11 February 1942, so he wrote with some authority and experience of 
Singapore‟s affairs. He had been highly critical of Thomas and the Singapore Government 
throughout the campaign. In his report, among many harsh comments, he said, 
Singapore itself was in a state of almost complete chaos from the end of December. Civil 
Servants who had evacuated from the Malay States sought to set up temporary departments in 
Singapore for no other apparent reason than the preservation of their jobs.  Even the FMS 
Income Tax Department set itself up in Singapore after the last Federated State had fallen into 
Japanese hands.  The Civil administration cracked badly and broke completely at some points.  
There was little co-operation with the Services, and many indications of jealousy and fear that 
outsiders might poach on the preserves of the Civil Servant…The extent to which obstructionists 
flourished was staggering.
561
         
  
As an example of Thomas‟s vacillation, Seabridge described the passing of a War Courts 
Ordinance to expedite the trial of persons charged with treachery; an ordinance the Governor 
felt was forced upon him and with which he was not comfortable. However, before anyone 
had been brought to trial the Chief Justice, „who also disliked the idea intensely, discovered a 
statement by James I or II that the whole procedure was unconstitutional – and the War Court 
was stillborn.‟562      
From the military point of view, I endorse the findings of most eminent military 
historians, which is that it would almost certainly have made no difference to the outcome of 
the campaign had there been a change of Commanders at the very top, both military and 
civilian.  Without the vital tools, the task was impossible. A more energetic and ruthless 
military leader might have delayed the Japanese advance for longer than they took, and 
perhaps created time for more reinforcements to arrive.  However, unless those 
reinforcements included essential aircraft, ships, tanks, and other vital equipment, there was 
little hope of preventing an eventual collapse. At the end of the first week of the campaign, the 
Army were without any effective air support and remained unprotected for the remainder of 
the battle. The seas around Malaya were unguarded and clear for the Japanese to use as 
supplementary resupply routes for their advancing forces and to insert troops behind the 
retreating British.  Denuded of the support of the other two Services the Army, in effect, 
fought a solitary campaign.  
The Army Commander, Percival, taking up his post in May 1941, inherited a 
defensive strategy compiled and refined over many years, but based upon mythical forces and 
equipment.  The planners encouraged in the belief that their demands for a garrison of the size 
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needed for the task would in time be forthcoming, designed tactics based on this assumption, 
which inexorably led to the wrong conclusions.  The RAF made itself responsible for the 
defence of Malaya. Moreover, the Air Commander, without consulting the other Services, 
designed airfields on the exposed east coast of Malaya ready for the fabled modern fighter 
aircraft to fly from to assault the approaching armada.  The Army was told it had to defend 
these and existing airfields.  The disagreement between the Army and the RAF on this 
fundamental issue of protecting airfields, while simultaneously deploying the same meagre 
ground forces to defensive positions on the anticipated axes of enemy advance, led to open 
hostility between the two Services. It blighted the formulation of a sensible and practicable 
solution.  The upshot was thinly dispersed army units in isolated locations unable to support 
each other, and because of the terrain, unable to be quickly reinforced.  
In an attempt to compensate for the paucity of soldiers, a plan „Operation Matador‟ 
was prepared. A division size force would pre-empt a landing in south east Thailand by 
rushing to the assumed landing beaches before the Imperial Japanese Army stepped ashore. 
Again, it was a plan, which Percival inherited, but the authority to launch it was so tightly 
controlled by London, for fear of upsetting the sensibilities of the Thais, that permission when 
it came, was too late for it to be carried out.  In any case, it was a plan, which also assumed 
that the RAF would have created havoc on the approaching flotilla before its attempted 
landing.  Historians generally agree that with the conditions imposed on its implementation, 
Matador could not have succeeded.
563
 A thorough time appreciation would have revealed that 
the calculated 36 hours warning to launch an operation of this complexity was quite 
inadequate.
564
 The consequence was a serious diversion of resources and energy from the 
main aim of defending the Jitra area, which in turn led to this vital position being ill prepared 
and over-run before any determined resistance could be offered.     
Percival‟s command and tactics of his retreat down the Malay Peninsula and defence 
of Singapore, has been the subject of intense and endless scrutiny.  Nearly all the authorities 
agree, that even taking account of the scandalous conditions under which he was forced 
operate, his conduct of the operation was poor, without imagination and conviction. He lacked 
firmness and authority in managing his subordinates when it was a time for a ruthless 
assertion of leadership.  
There is no evidence that he ever directed his commanders‟ minds towards any plan that might 
regain the initiative, or to any area in which a decisive battle might be fought.  Instead the only 
plan in their minds was to hold on as long as possible….In the record Percival gives of his 
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conversations with his subordinate commanders it is noticeable that the suggestions always came 
from them. It was never that he told them what to do but that they told him what they must do.
565
 
     
However, of all his questionable judgments, the one that draws the most opprobrium was his 
failure, indeed refusal, to have defensive fortifications erected on the north shore of the Island. 
He refused to countenance the construction of such preparations on the extraordinary grounds 
that they would have been bad for morale.  His Chief Engineer, Brigadier Simson, pleaded 
passionately and ceaselessly, for permission to do so and drew up a list of ten most important 
things, both civil and military, which should be done in preparation for the defence of 
Singapore. The list eventually came before Churchill who claimed it was the first document to 
reveal to him the total lack of defence installations on the northern coast of Singapore Island. 
The historians, Moore, D & J, put it succinctly:  
Every military shortcoming in the fight for Malaya and Singapore is explicable in rational 
terms but this. The deplorable absence of intelligence, the catastrophic notions of superiority 
and security, the chronic shortage of equipment, the lack of forward planning, the 
breakdown of confidence, and every aspect of the retreat itself – the confusion, the failure of 
leadership, the inefficiency – all these things can be explained, if not excused.  But Gen. 
Percival‟s refusal to fortify the northern shore of the Island opposite the advancing Japanese 
army until it was far too late is explicable only in terms of irrationality.
566
   
 
            It is interesting to compare the reluctance of Percival and Thomas to prepare defences 
with that of the Japanese in 1945, when in similar circumstances they are expecting the Allies 
to return and invade Malaya. They were ordered to resist the enemy fully, even under the 
worst conditions. Artillery and close combat trenches were to be prepared; infantry positions, 
tunnel-type communication trenches, and dummy positions – constructed using local labour - 
working parties were taken by the hundreds across the causeway to Johore and made to build 
tunnels for weeks on end. They also drove bunkers four meters (13 ft.) high into the hills to 
protect Japanese troops and provide ambush positions.
567
  
The attitudes toward the war by the predominant native population of Malaya and 
Singapore; the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians, differed.  What is firmly established is 
that there was no effective Fifth Column at work during the war.  There were isolated 
incidents of local people helping the advancing Japanese by giving directions and confirming 
the location of allied forces, but practically no formed and directed Fifth Column. There were, 
nevertheless, some instances of behind the lines espionage but they were few and of little 
significance.  What was uncovered was that Japanese dressed in local costume and speaking 
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Malay attempted to infiltrate British lines. The unfortunate outcome was that British soldiers, 
with little knowledge of the country and its peoples, took no risk and on occasion shot any 
Asian approaching their positions. This is a fundamental problem for a Colonial Force in its 
early deployment, to be unaware of local nuance.   At the final conference in Singapore before 
the surrender, the Inspector General of Police, Straits Settlements, A.H. Dickinson, asked all 
the senior officers present, to what extent, had Fifth Column activity contributed to the 
military defeat   All senior commanders reassured him that they experienced no Fifth Column 
activity at all.
568
 This assessment was later confirmed by Major Fujiwara, when he was 
interrogated after the war about his Kikan (Agency), whose task was to organise sabotage and 
pro-Japanese propaganda admitted [Fifth Column activity] had been „militarily of no use 
whatever before and during the actual fighting.‟569      
The indigenous Malay suffered least at the hands of the Japanese and as noted by 
Sjovald Cunyngham-Brown, a senior MCS with over twenty years service in Malaya, in a 
rather jaundiced summation declared,  
..the Malays were not taking any great interest and can you blame them. It was their country that 
was being rolled over by two vast overseas giants…smashing and destroying everything.  The 
Malays had benefitted by joining western Civilisation and now they realised with horror that they 
were about to pay for it: this was what happened if you joined the west – so they stood by.  The 
Indians were mostly rubber estate workers who had no contact with what was going on.  They 
lay doggo, hearing nothing, saying nothing and doing nothing – and I don‟t blame them either.  
The Chinese on the other hand were already at war with Japan.  Their mother country was 
fighting Japan, therefore so were they, and the more virile of them were busy getting arms to go 
into the jungle to die fighting against the Japanese – as indeed they did.570              
 
         Another senior government servant, Hugh Bryson, who had for many years been clerk 
to the Councils (Legislative and Federal), also believed that calling on the Asians of Malaya 
to fight for the survival of the British was pointless and impractical. He wrote, „..had we been 
able to show clearly that our rule was ideal, and that an invading power would bring the place 
down in ruins without firm local support, we might have succeeded.‟571  Malayans, Bryson 
was convinced, were not particularly interested in maintaining British prestige. In any case, 
he noted, how was the message to be promulgated,  
Could we expect Residents and Advisors to stump their territories preaching all out 
preparations for war against another „foreign‟ power? Malaya was so divided with Malays, 
Chinese and Indians all with their own axes to grind, and no common loyalty to bind them 
together that a unity of purpose would have been almost impossible to develop. The Sultans 
too would have been of little avail.  Malaya was either a country where men were seeking 
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employment and security (Europeans, Chinese, and Indians) or looking for a life of 
comparative ease and comfort (Malays).
572
 
 
Moreover, he pointed out, it was official British policy to advocate procedures that kept down 
any [internal] movements that might have bred a local loyalty. This was because those 
movements were in part from outside subversives. However, inflexible adherence to this rule 
was in the end more divisive. In addition, before the war the British authorities looked upon 
the Japanese as no more than another group of potential developers who would invest capital 
that would ultimately benefit the Malayan Government.  In 1928, in Trengganu when the 
Japanese wanted a licence to open a big iron mine at Dungun, the local British Adviser, with 
Singapore‟s encouragement, agreed to grant it.573  Even then, some Malays pointed out the 
danger of allowing them this foothold. However, Trengganu needed money, and no British 
company was prepared to invest in the Dungun mine, there seemed no alternative.
574
          
          After an extensive and detailed study of the loss of Singapore in 1942, a pivotal event in 
the history of the British Empire, I am persuaded - considering all the circumstances prevailing 
at that time - there is no particular issue, or particular person, or crucial activity, had it been 
avoided or changed, would have altered the course of history. As many eminent scholars have 
concluded, Singapore was a lost cause from the day the construction of the naval base was 
complete. If such a large, comprehensive, modern facility, positioned on a strategic naval 
crossroads, was judged vital, it required a dedicated resident fleet with modern fighter aircraft 
protection, and a large ground force in properly constructed fortifications to ensure its security.  
None of these needs could be met by a bankrupt and exhausted nation, as Britain was in the 
1930‟s.   
           The naval base was barely used throughout its pre-war life, certainly not nearly to the 
capacity for which it was designed.  The region, in any case, was regarded less volatile than 
other areas of the world. Indeed the people of Malaya and Singapore regarded their territory as 
a peaceful backwater and with commercial transport still in its infancy, it was a long way from 
the contamination of western excesses.  The benevolent rule of 150 years of British 
administration had bred complacency and an unjustified belief in immunity from danger. Both 
the populace and its government were so suffused with their peaceful existence that even when 
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the harbingers of war came knocking, they were unable first, to believe there was serious 
danger, and later incapable of galvanising themselves for the struggle; they remained inert. 
A British Government insisting that every effort be made to avoid offending or 
provoking Japan reinforced Thomas‟s early belief that there would be no confrontation with 
Japan. He did not want people frightened by overt military defensive constructions, and in the 
person of Percival he had an Army Commander who was willing to oblige, as he too thought 
building defences was not good for the morale of his troops.  As I have shown, Thomas 
carried his obsession of preserving an air of composure, to the point of negligence. He failed 
to alert his staff in Malaya, of the dangers ahead, nor did he advise them to prepare 
contingency plans, initiate precautions, or instruct them about their role in relation to their 
administrative responsibilities in a crisis. No advice was given about evacuation, no plans 
prepared. In addition, he controlled the release of truthful information about the war so that 
people were in total ignorance of the true state of affairs. In summary, he displayed a lack of 
leadership and was indecisive; he failed to co-ordinate the activities of vital government 
departments and failed to prioritise civil defence and refugee activities.   
His early lack of knowledge of military matters is perfectly understandable. A colonial 
career in Africa did not prepare him for this arena.    However, he does not appear to have 
made any great or urgent effort to come to grips with the essentials of military knowledge.  
Some of his pronouncements at critical times convey either disinterest, or lack of realism, or as 
he sometimes claimed, he was not told what was happening.  At one point, he planned to 
replace the British Resident in Ipoh, Marcus Rex, with another of his staff, H. Weisberg, only 
to be told that Ipoh had already fallen to the Japanese.
575
  
My research has reinforced the legitimacy of the many highly critical censures, 
directed at the British Administration in Singapore before and during the campaign. The role, 
in simplistic terms, which the government of Shenton Thomas had to play in this fateful event, 
was first to warn the peoples of the country of the serious danger which could come their way.  
Then having spread this message, introduce measures to minimise the threat to life and give 
assurance that the authorities were being proactive. Also, importantly, provide the military 
with the practical support they dearly needed to prepare for the onslaught.  As it turned out the 
Government made minimum effort, until late, to put in place basic civil defence and passive 
defence measures. Nor did it attempt to place the country on a war footing.  On the contrary, 
the Governor avoided such measures.  
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It is tempting to speculate that had Thomas and his administration acknowledged 
earlier the Japanese threat, and followed the advice and met the demands of the military 
authorities, what local effect it might have had on the course of the campaign. With early 
accord, it would surely have become obvious that a combined civil/military authority with a 
Supremo in charge of all planning and preparations was essential. Certainly, it is reasonable to 
assume that many more civilian non-combatants would have been evacuated safely and in 
time, and many less would have ended up incarcerated in Changi jail. More air raid shelters 
would have saved many lives. Efficient and practised emergency services would have dealt 
with the injured and coped with the damaged infrastructure. A co-ordinated and properly 
directed scorched earth policy would have deprived the Japanese Army of valuable supplies, 
transport and propaganda facilities.  Releasing work force from industry would have enabled 
the preparation of properly constructed fortifications, of course at the expense of tin and 
rubber production, but it would almost certainly have disrupted the momentum of the Japanese 
advance.  
Conceivably, and most significant: the Japanese Army, as we now know, arriving at 
Johore Bahru was dangerously short of battle supplies particularly artillery and small arms 
ammunition.
576
 Its administrative tail stretched back up the Malayan peninsula for several 
hundred miles and the forward troops had outrun this supply chain. Had the Governor allowed 
Simson to build the defences, he proposed in January 1942 in South Johore, instead of 
refusing because Johore was an UMS, it would almost certainly have imposed a delay of some 
consequence on the Japanese advance. Arguably, it might have had a significant effect on the 
course of the battle.  
Crucially, the effect on the morale of the people and on the image of British 
Administration, of a proactive, realistic, honest Government, clearly in charge of the situation 
and acting with determination and authority, would have been immeasurable.  
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